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Abstract
All intelligence relies on search — for example, the search for an intelligent
agent’s next action. Search is only likely to succeed in resource-bounded
agents if they have already been biased towards finding the right answer. In
artificial agents, the primary source of bias is engineering.
This dissertation describes an approach, Behavior-Oriented Design (BOD)
for engineering complex agents. A complex agent is one that must arbitrate
between potentially conflicting goals or behaviors. Behavior-oriented design
builds on work in behavior-based and hybrid architectures for agents, and the
object oriented approach to software engineering.
The primary contributions of this dissertation are:
1. The BOD architecture: a modular architecture with each module pro-
viding specialized representations to facilitate learning. This includes
one pre-specified module and representation for action selection or be-
havior arbitration. The specialized representation underlying BOD ac-
tion selection is Parallel-rooted, Ordered, Slip-stack Hierarchical (POSH)
reactive plans.
2. The BOD development process: an iterative process that alternately
scales the agent’s capabilities then optimizes the agent for simplicity,
exploiting tradeoffs between the component representations. This on-
going process for controlling complexity not only provides bias for the
behaving agent, but also facilitates its maintenance and extendibility.
The secondary contributions of this dissertation include two implemen-
tations of POSH action selection, a procedure for identifying useful idioms
in agent architectures and using them to distribute knowledge across agent
paradigms, several examples of applying BOD idioms to established archi-
tectures, an analysis and comparison of the attributes and design trends of
a large number of agent architectures, a comparison of biological (particu-
larly mammalian) intelligence to artificial agent architectures, a novel model
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of primate transitive inference, and many other examples of BOD agents and
BOD development.
Thesis Supervisor: Lynn Andrea Stein
Title: Associate Professor of Computer Science
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Intelligence relies on search — particularly, the search an agent makes when
it chooses its next act. Search is only likely to succeed in resource-bounded
agents if they have already been biased toward finding the right answer. In
artificial agents, the primary source of bias is engineering. Thus engineering
is the key to artificial intelligence.
This dissertation describes an approach, Behavior-Oriented Design (BOD)
for engineering complex agents. A complex agent is one that must arbitrate
between potentially conflicting goals or behaviors. Common examples in-
clude autonomous robots and virtual reality characters, but the problems are
shared by many AI systems, such as intelligent tutors, monitors or environ-
ments. Behavior-Oriented Design builds on work in behavior-based and hy-
brid architectures for agents, and the object-oriented approach to software
engineering.
This chapter describes the contributions of this dissertation, first at a high
level, then in more detail. There is a preliminary introduction to Behavior-
Oriented Design, an argument about the importance of design in artificial
intelligence (AI), and an explanation of the forms of evidence provided in
this dissertation. Finally, there is a chapter-level description of the rest of the
dissertation, including road maps for readers with various interests, and an
description of its core motivations.
1.1 Contributions
The primary contributions of this dissertation are:
1. the BOD architecture, and
2. the BOD development process.
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The BOD architecture consists of adaptive modules with specialized rep-
resentations to facilitate learning. This includes one pre-specified module and
representation for action selection, the arbitration between the expressed be-
havior of the other modules. The specialized representation underlying BOD
action selection is Parallel-rooted, Ordered, Slip-stack Hierarchical (POSH)
reactive plans.
The BOD development process is iterative: it alternately scales the agent’s
capabilities then optimizes the agent for simplicity, exploiting tradeoffs be-
tween the component representations. This ongoing process for controlling
complexity not only provides bias for the behaving agent, but also facilitates
its maintenance and extendibility. BOD provides rules for:
• The initial decomposition of the agent into modules and plans. This
decomposition is based on anticipated adaptive state requirements.
• The iterative improvement of the agent’s design. These rules take the
form of heuristics for simplifying the agent, and recognizing when the
current decomposition is faulty. Due to BOD’s modularity, new decom-
positions (even switching intelligence between modules and plans) can
be achieved with minimal disruption.
Secondary contributions of this dissertation include: an analysis and com-
parison of the attributes and design trends of a large number of agent architec-
tures, two implementations of POSH action selection, a procedure for iden-
tifying useful idioms in agent architectures and using them distribute knowl-
edge across paradigms, several examples of applying BOD idioms to estab-
lished architectures, a comparison of biological (particularly mammalian) in-
telligence to artificial agent architectures, a novel model of primate transitive
inference, and many other examples of BOD agents and BOD development.
In the analysis of design trends (Chapter 3), I conclude that intelligence
for complex agents requires the following three features:
• modularity, a decomposition of intelligence to simplify the agent’s de-
sign,
• structured control, a way to focus attention and arbitrate between mod-
ules to bring coherence to the agent’s behavior, and
• environment monitoring, a low-computation means to change the focus
of the agent’s attention.
In the biological comparison (Chapter 11) I show that mammalian intelli-
gence also shares these features. These features provide the basis of the BOD
architecture.
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1.2 Behavior-Oriented Design (BOD)
Behavior-Oriented Design is a methodology for constructing complex agents.
It is designed to be applicable under any number of languages and most pop-
ular agent architectures. As can be gathered from its name, BOD is deriva-
tive of Behavior-Based Artificial Intelligence (BBAI) [Brooks, 1991a, Maes,
1991a, Mataric´, 1997], and informed by Object-Oriented Design (OOD) [e.g.
Coad et al., 1997]. Behavior-Based AI is a design approach that decomposes
intelligence in terms of expressed behaviors, such as walking or eating, rather
than generic processes, such as planning or sensing. Behaviors are modules
described in terms of sets of actions and the sensory capabilities necessary
to inform them. This sensing must inform both when the actions should be
expressed, and how. In other words, there are really two forms of sensing:
sensing for detecting context, and sensing for the parameters and feedback of
motor actions.
The central observation of behavior-oriented design is that mere sensing
is seldom sufficient for either detecting context or controlling action. Rather,
both of these abilities require full perception, which in turn requires memory.
Memory adds bias by recording experience and creating expectations. Per-
ception exploits these expectations to perform discriminations more reliably
than would otherwise be possible.
This observation has two consequences in the BOD methodology. First,
memory becomes an essential part of a behavior. In fact, memory require-
ments serve as the primary cue for behavior decomposition — the process of
determining how to divide intelligence into a set of modules. This strategy is
analogous to the central tenet of object-oriented design; the modular decom-
position of a system is best determined by its adaptive state requirements.
The second consequence is that determining context is both sufficiently
important and sufficiently difficult that it requires its own representation.
Control context decisions, though generally driven by the environment, must
often be retained after the original trigger is no longer apparent to sensing.
BOD uses hierarchical, reactive, plan structures to both ensure environment
monitoring and keep track of control decision context.
The influence of OOD on BOD begins with the analogy between the be-
havior and the object. Behaviors are in fact coded as objects, and the primitive
elements of BOD reactive plans are encoded as methods on the behavior ob-
jects. Equally important is the emphasis on the design process itself. As in
OOD, BOD emphasizes cyclic design with rapid prototyping. The process
of developing an agent alternates between developing libraries of behaviors,
and developing reactive plans to control the expression of those behaviors.
BOD provides guidelines not only for making the initial behavior decompo-
sition, but also for recognizing when a decomposition proven inadequate, and
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heuristic rules for improving it. This iterative development process results in
the ongoing optimization of a BOD agent for simplicity, clarity, scalability
and correctness.
1.3 Design in Artificial Intelligence
Hand design or programming has always been the dominant means of cre-
ating AI systems. The intrinsic difficulty of hand coding has lead to a good
deal of research into alternate strategies such as machine learning and au-
tomated planning. Each of these techniques is very successful in limited
domains. However, the problem’s complexity is as intractable to machine-
implemented (resource bounded) algorithms as to human design. Chapman
[1987] has proved planning to be impossible for time- or resource-bounded
agents. Wolpert [1996b,a] makes similar demonstrations for machine learn-
ing. There can be “No Free Lunch” — learning requires structure and bias
to succeed. Wooldridge and Dunne [2001] demonstrate that even determin-
ing whether an agent has some chance of bringing about a goal state is an
NP-complete problem.
More importantly, there is strong evidence that in the average case, the
utility of hand design still outstrips the utility of machine learning and plan-
ning. This evidence can be found in the research trends in planning. AI users
working under many different paradigms have turned repeatedly to designing
their plans by hand (see Chapter 3).
Machine learning and automated planning techniques can be very suc-
cessful in well-specified domains. The point of a design approach such as
BOD is not to deprecate these achievements, but to facilitate creating the sys-
tems in which these strategies can reliably succeed.
1.3.1 AI is Software Engineering
To reiterate, the thesis of this dissertation is not that machine learning or
constructive planning are useless. My thesis is that neither strategy in itself
will ever be a complete solution for developing complex agents. AI is a form
of software engineering, and as such the primary considerations of the two
fields are the same. Frederick Brooks lists these as the concerns of software
engineering:
• How to design and build a set of programs into a system
• How to design and build a program or a system into a ro-
bust, tested, documented, supported product
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• How to maintain intellectual control over complexity in large
doses.
[Brooks, 1995, p. 288 (emphasis is Brooks’)]
This dissertation addresses all of these questions. Behavior-oriented de-
sign is about building and incorporating useful modules into an agent capable
of coherent behavior. It specifies procedures for developing the modules, and
the coordination. These specifications include recommendations for program
structure and documentation that is highly maintainable.
BOD is an AI methodology that takes into account the fact that design,
development and maintenance are inseparable parts of the same process in
modern software engineering. Consequently, the developed system must doc-
ument its own design and provide for its own maintenance. BOD provides for
this by making clear, rational decompositions of program code. These decom-
positions are not only present in the functioning system, but are reflected in
the structure of the program code. They simplify both coding and execution.
1.3.2 Learning and Planning are Useful
Referring back to Frederick Brooks’ agenda (page 20), learning and planning
are some of the ‘programs’ that need to be incorporated into an intelligent
system. Nearly all of the examples of this dissertation incorporate learning,
because its capacity to generalize the applicability of a program helps control
the overall complexity of the system (see Chapter 6). One example that is
discussed but not demonstrated (the dialog system in Section 12.2) incorpo-
rates a constructive planner for a similar purpose, though at the same time the
BOD system reduces and simplifies the planner’s task relative to compara-
ble systems. Whenever learning and planning can be supported by provided
structure, their probability of success increases and their computational cost
decreases.
1.4 Evidence in an Engineering Dissertation
Engineering and the design process are critical to artificial intelligence, but
they are not easy topics for a research dissertation. Assertions about ease
of use usually cannot be proven mathematically. Further, statistically valid
scientific evidence demonstrating a significant ease-of-use improvement is
difficult and expensive to come by: it requires a large sample of programmers
tutored in a variety of methodologies, and comparisons in terms of time, ef-
fort and quality of the final product of the programming. Because this is in-
tractable in the average PhD program, most architecture theses resort to com-
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bining plausible arguments with a demonstration of some impressive system
or systems constructed under the methodology.
In the case of this dissertation, although I have employed both of these
latter strategies, I have also attempted to add a version of the scientific ap-
proach. Rather than hiring a large number of programmers myself, I examine
the history of agent design as made available in the literature. When practi-
tioners from various paradigms of AI research have converged on a particular
methodology, I take this as evidence of the viability of that method. This is
particularly true when the paradigm began in stated opposition to a particu-
lar methodological aspect it later adopts, or when a methodology has been
subjected to substantial application with significant results. In these cases the
selection of the methodological aspect can reasonably be attributed to forces
other than those of personal belief or some other social bias.
This analysis appears in Chapter 3. Chapter 11 also includes a similar
look at the structure of naturally evolved complex agents. The combination
of such uncertain evidence cannot lead to perfect certainty, but it can lead to
an increased probability of correctness. In this sense, my approach is similar
to that used in a scientific dissertation, particularly one employing arguments
from evolution or history. These dissertations and their theses will always
be more controversial than theses conclusively proven, but their approach is
better than leaving important areas of research unexamined.
1.5 Dissertation Structure and Motivation
This dissertation represents three different sorts of work, which might po-
tentially be of interest to three different sorts of readers. The work content
categories are:
• the development of an AI methodology,
• the review and integration of literature on organizing intelligent control
(both artificial and natural), and
• the development of a number of artificial agents.
Although these three activities are deeply interdependent, it is possible that
some readers will only be interested only in particular aspects. Therefore
this section includes not only a list of chapters, but also a few ‘road maps’
to sections reflecting particular interests. This section concludes with a brief
description of my personal interests in this work.
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1.5.1 Chapter List
I have already begun this dissertation with a brief description of my con-
tributions and methods, and of the importance of software design issues in
artificial intelligence.
Introductory Material
Chapter 2 gives a gentle introduction to BOD, both its architectural compo-
nents and its design process. This is a useful introduction to ‘the big picture’
and gives a number of toy examples.
The next chapter provides background material in AI architectures for
complex agents. As explained earlier, Chapter 3 is critical to validating both
my emphasis on design and the general structure of the BOD architecture.
Behavior-Oriented Design
The next seven chapters present the three primary attributes of BOD in detail.
Chapters 5 and 4 give a detailed description of action selection in BOD.
Chapter 5 describes Parallel-rooted, Ordered, Slip-stack Hierarchical (POSH)
reactive plans formally. It also discusses how and when to introduce POSH
planning structures into other architectures. BOD can be used to implement
agents under any object oriented language, and under many agent architec-
tures. Chapter 5 introduces the concept of architectural idioms, and how in-
sights derived in one research program can be best distributed throughout the
entire agent community. It also includes specific examples of adding a key
feature of POSH action selection to other existing architectures.
Chapter 4 goes into more detail on the specifics of my own POSH imple-
mentations, with examples, pseudo-code and performance statistics..
Chapters 6 and 7 describe the role of learning and modularity. Unlike
most ‘behavior-based’ architectures that also exploit reactive planning, BOD
maintains the concept of behaviors as semi-autonomous programs with their
own agendas and specialized representations. Chapter 6 classifies and demon-
strates the different types of state used in agent architecture. Chapter 7 contin-
ues this discussion in more detail, with multiple examples from two working
systems. The first system is a robot in a blocks-world simulation, and the
second is a real autonomous mobile robot.
Chapter 8 describes the BOD development process proper. The BOD
methodology is critical to maximizing the simplicity and correctness of a
BOD agent. Chapter 8 describes the ongoing process of trading-off between
the possible BOD representations to keep the agent’s code and structure clear
and scalable. It also gives very practical instructions for keeping a BOD
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project organized, including discussing maintenance, debugging, and tool
use.
Chapters 9 and 10 demonstrate the BOD methodology. Chapter 9 pro-
vides an extended example on a relatively simple modeling task. The agents
constructed model primate learning of reactive plans. Besides its pedagog-
ical utility, this chapter also advances current models of primate learning,
and illustrates the theoretical interface between plans and behaviors. Chap-
ter 10 provides another, briefer example of BOD. It fills in the gaps from the
previous example by using a real-time agents, demonstrating BOD in a Multi-
Agent System (MAS) setting, and showing the interaction of traditional emo-
tional/drive theory models of action selection with POSH reactive plans. The
model is of social interactions in a primate colony.
The Utility of BOD
The final chapters exhibit and summarize BOD’s usefulness and describe
some future work.
Chapter 11 relates the hypotheses implicit and structures explicit in BOD
agents to those of biological agents, particularly mammals. It also discusses
possible future work in creating more adaptive or biologically-correct agent
architectures.
Chapter 12 describes the utility of BOD beyond artificial life and psy-
chology research, in the problems of industrial applications of artificial intel-
ligence. Such applications include intelligent environments and monitoring
systems. There are extended examples of possible future applications from
two real industrial applications: natural language tutoring of undergraduates
and virtual reality entertainment of young children.
Finally, Chapter 13 concludes with a summary.
1.5.2 Road Maps
If you are only going to read one chapter of this thesis (besides the introduc-
tion), read Chapter 2.
If you are trying to learn about (or choose between!) different agent ar-
chitectures, start with Chapter 3. Then read Chapter 2 so you are familiar
with the terminology of the rest of the dissertation. Next read Chapter 5,
which discusses the varying levels of reactiveness in different architectures,
and how to implement features of one architecture in another. You might then
want to read Chapter 6 which gives my arguments about why specialized rep-
resentations are important. Finally, you should probably read 12, which gives
detailed perspectives on bringing my methods to two large-scale AI projects.
24
If you are actually interested in natural intelligence, again start with Chap-
ter 2 (it’s quick!) then skip to Chapter 11. You may also want to read my
primate modeling chapters, 9 and 10. It’s possible that any of these chapters
will then lead you to want to skim Chapter 3, so you can see alternative ways
to represent intelligence in AI.
If you are already familiar with BOD (perhaps from a paper or a talk) and
just want to finally get the implementation details, you want to read Chap-
ter 4 and the appendices. You may also want to look at Chapters 2 and 9
for examples of how agents get developed, and Chapter 5 for alternative im-
plementations of POSH action selection. Finally, you really ought to read
Chapter 8 on the methodology.
1.5.3 Motivation
The primary personal motivation for this research has been the creation of
a methodology for rapidly and reliably constructing psychologically plausi-
ble agents for the purpose of creating platforms for the scientific testing of
psychological models. However, I am also motivated socially by improving
human productivity, and æsthetically by clean design. The complete BOD
methodology and its underlying architecture supports my personal goal, as
is demonstrated by the experimental work shown in Chapters 9 and 10. In
addition, various of its attributes can help in other considerations. Chapter 11
offers a bridge between BOD-like architectures and neurological models of
intelligence, both natural and artificial. Pursuing more general productivity
and utility particularly motivates Chapters 5 and 12. However, any AI project
(in fact, any software project at all) benefits from good, practical methodol-
ogy facilitating both design and long-term maintenance. This theme is strong
throughout the dissertation, but particularly in the three nuts-and-bolts chap-
ters, 5, 6 and 8.
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Chapter 2
BOD Basics (or How to
Make a Monkey Do
Something Smart)
This chapter is a gentle introduction to behavior-oriented design (BOD). It is
designed more or less as a tutorial. The rest of the dissertation contains more
technical descriptions of each of the concepts introduced here.
2.1 Building Your Own Monkey
This is a tutorial on designing and constructing the behavior for an artificial
intelligent agent1. Agent is a term borrowed from philosophy, meaning an
actor — an entity with goals and intentions that brings about changes in the
world. The term ‘agent’ could be applied to a person, an animal, a nation or
a robot. It might even be applied to a program.
The tutorial example will provide opportunities to introduce the major
problems of agent design and illustrate the BOD approach to solving them.
This example is building a robot monkey — one that would live with us, that
we might take along to a party.
Designing the intelligence for such an agent requires three things: deter-
mining what to do when, and how to do it.
1There are other ways to make monkeys do intelligent things, but this is more interesting and
doesn’t involve issues of animal welfare.
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2.1.1 How
In a BOD agent, how is controlled by a set of modular programs, called be-
haviors.
If we are building a monkey from scratch, then at some level we have
to take care of what every individual component is doing at every instant
in time. To make this problem easier, we break it up into pieces and write
a different program for each piece. There might be different behaviors for
sitting, jumping, playing, eating or screeching.
2.1.2 When
When can mean “at what time”, but it is more powerful if you can be more
general and say “under what circumstances.” When is the problem of action
selection. At any time, we need to be able to say what the monkey should
do right now. In BOD, we solve this problem by providing a structured list
of circumstances and actions: a reactive plan. More formal definitions of
these terms can be found in Chapter 5, but for now it’s enough that we share
a vocabulary.
2.1.3 What
What is a problem of terminology and abstraction — at what level of granu-
larity do we have to determine when the monkey will act? How much detail
do we have to give? Assume that right now we want the monkey to stay out
of trouble while we decide what to do next. Should we tell the monkey to
‘wait’? To ‘sit’? To ‘put your legs under your body, put your hands on your
knees, look around the room and at approximately 2 minute intervals (using a
normal distribution with a standard deviation of 30 seconds around the inter-
val) randomly select one of three situation-appropriate screeches and deliver
it with gesticulations’?
The problem of choosing a what comes down to this: which what you
chose determines how hard a how is to write. But making a how program eas-
ier to write might make describing when to execute it harder, and vice versa.
For example, if we decide that one what should be ‘create world peace,’ or
even ‘go buy a banana,’ programming the how becomes complicated. On the
other hand, if we make a what into something easy to program like ‘move
your little finger up an inch’, we will have to do a lot of work on when.
There are two parts to this problem. One is behavior decomposition. This
is the problem of deciding what should be in each behavior module. If you
have ever worked on artificial perception (e.g. vision or speech recognition)
you might recognize that behavior decomposition is somewhat analogous to
the problem of segmentation.
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The other problem is determining an interface between how and when.
Unlike many architectures, BOD does not treat the problem of behavior de-
composition and interface as the same. For example, there may be a single
sitting behavior that has several different interfaces for ‘sit down’, ‘wait qui-
etly’, ‘wriggle impatiently’ and ‘get up’. Thus when plans aren’t made of just
of hows, but of whats. Plans are made of actions that behaviors know how to
do.
2.1.4 BOD Methodology
The trick to designing an agent is to choose a set of whats that make the hows
and whens as easy to build as possible.
We do this by first making an educated guess about what we think the
whats should be. Then we develop how and when iteratively. If it turns
out we were wrong about our first guess about the whats that’s OK; we can
change them or replace them.
Development is an iterative, ongoing process. We try to build something
simple, and then if it doesn’t work, we try to fix it. If it does work, we try
to build it bigger, better or more interesting. One of the mistakes people
sometimes make is to make a project more and more complicated without
being careful to be sure they can maintain it. The BOD methodology reminds
developers that development is an ongoing process. Its critical to continually
look at how the agent can be simplified, and to make it as clear as possible
how the agent works.
If a how becomes too complicated, we decompose it into simpler pieces
(new whats). For example, if ‘wait’ turns out to be too complicated a thing
to build, we might split it into ‘sit and scratch’, ‘snooze’, ‘look around’, and
‘play banjo.’ We then need to recombine the whats using some whens. For
example we might want to say ‘snooze if you’re tired enough’, ‘look around
every 2 minutes’, ‘play the banjo when no one is listening’ and ‘scratch if you
aren’t doing anything else.’
If a when becomes too complicated, we develop new hows to support
and simplify the decision process. For example, we may want to build a new
how for the monkey so she can tell whether she’s tired, or whether anybody’s
listening.
BOD exploits the traditional software engineering tools such as hierar-
chy and modularity to make things as simple as possible. It heavily exploits
the advances of object-oriented design and corkscrew development method-
ologies. It also uses new representations and understandings of intelligent
processes from artificial intelligence (AI).
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2.2 Behaviors: Saying How
The way we say how under BOD is using object-oriented programming method-
ologies. The particular language isn’t that important, except that development
in general and our corkscrew methodology in particular, goes much faster in
untyped languages like lisp, perl or smalltalk than in typed ones like C++ or
Java. Of course, typed languages can run relatively quickly, but in general,
the time spent developing an agent is significantly more important than the
speed at which it can, in the best case, execute commands. Finding that best
case is harder than making the agent run fast.
2.2.1 The Simplest Behavior
In BOD we decompose how into modules called behaviors, which we code
as objects. Behaviors are responsible for perception and action. Perception
is the interpretation of sensory input into information useful for controlling
effectors. Effectors are anything that affects the external world. They might
include motors on a robot, nodes in a model for a virtual-reality character, the
speaker or screen of a personal computer, or a teletype for an agent trying to
pass the Turing test. Since behaviors are responsible for governing effectors,
they must also perform any learning necessary for perception and control.
Thus, like objects in software engineering, they consist of program code built
around the variable state that informs it.
The simplest possible behavior is one that requires no perception at all,
and no state. So, let’s assume we’ve given our monkey a sound card at-
tached to a speaker for one of its effectors. One ultimately simple behavior
would be a screeching behavior that sends the sound card the instruction to
go “EEEEEEEEEE...” all of the time. We’ll call this the screeching behavior.
We’ll draw it like this, with the name underlined:
screeching
2.2.2 Behaviors with State
Unfortunately, constant screeching does not have much æsthetic appeal, nor
much communicative power. So we might want to make our screeching be-
havior a little more sophisticated. We can give it a bit of state, and only have
the action communicated to the soundboard when that bit is high.
To make our screeching behavior even more interesting, we might want
it to be pulsed, like “EEee EEee EEee”. This requires some more state to
keep track of where in the pulse we are. If we make our screeching sound a
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function of the pulse’s current duration, we only need an accumulator to keep
track of how long our monkey has been screeching.
Now the screeching behavior looks like this:
screeching
screeching-now?
pulse-duration
We draw the state inside the behavior’s box, under its name.
2.2.3 Behaviors with Perception
Relatively little behavior operates without regard to other events in the en-
vironment, or is controlled open loop, without feedback. For example, we
might want our monkey to be able to modulate the volume of her screeching
to be just loud enough to be heard over the other ambient noise in the room.
The monkey should screech louder at a party than while she’s sitting in a quiet
house. This requires the monkey to have access to sound input (a microphone
of some kind) and to be able to process that information to determine her own
volume. We might include this all as part of our screeching behavior.
screeching
screeching-now?
pulse-duration
noiseoo
On the other hand, some perception might be useful for screeching, but
require many states or processes that are generally unrelated to screeching. In
that situation, it makes more sense for the additional perception to be handled
by another behavior, or set of behaviors.
For example, real monkeys start screeching when they see someone en-
ter the room. They also make different screeches depending on whether that
person is a friend, an enemy, or a stranger. Visual recognition is a fairly com-
plicated task, and is useful for more things than just determining screeching,
so we might want to make it a part of another behavior. Replicating state is
generally a bad idea in software engineering (it makes it possible the copies
will become out of synch), so it is better if the screeching behavior uses the
state of the visual recognition behavior to help it select the formants for a
particular screech.
Here is a drawing of two behaviors:
The method calls used to relate the two are put on an arrow between them.
The direction of the arrow indicates the flow of information, not responsibil-
ity for making that information flow. In fact, normally it is the ‘receiving’
behavior that actively observes information in other behaviors.
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screeching
screeching-now?
pulse-duration
recognize
familiarity-levels
affinity-levels
known,
liked
oo
2.2.4 Behaviors with Triggers or Processes
Mentioning multiple behaviors brings up the possibility of conflicts between
behaviors. For example, what if our monkey is at a surprise party and sees the
main guest walk into the room? The monkey should inhibit her screeching
until someone gives the signal to start shouting. Similarly, if this is to be
a very polite monkey, she shouldn’t start screeching exactly when someone
new comes up to her if she is eating a bite of cake! First she should swallow.
Under BOD, conflict resolution is handled by allowing an action selection
mechanism to determine when things should be expressed. The interface
between when and how is called what. A what is coded as a method on the
object underlying a particular behavior. So for our screeching behavior, we
might want to add a what, ‘inhibit’, which lets plans specify the exceptional
situations where the monkey should stay quiet. Deciding to do a what can
be viewed either as deciding to release or to trigger an action of a particular
behavior.
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On the other hand, some actions of behaviors (such as learning or percep-
tual processing) may run continuously or spontaneously without interference
from the when part of the intelligence. So long as they cannot interfere with
other behaviors, there is no reason to coordinate them. For example, there’s
no reason (unless we build a duplicitous monkey) to control the selection of
formants from the when system. The screeching behavior could be contin-
uously choosing the appropriate screech to make, regardless of whether it is
currently screeching or not, by having a process constantly resetting its state
on the basis of the identity (or lack of known identity) of any person the mon-
key is observing.
2.2.5 Behaviors that Aren’t Objects
Some hows may be easier to build using other means than coding them from
scratch. For example, they may be available in external packages, or they may
be easier to learn than to program. That’s OK too: in that case, both whats
and inter-behavior methods are just an interface to those other programs or
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packages.
Often even in these cases it is useful to have another more conventional
behavior that maintains state determined by the external behavior. For exam-
ple, for our monkey’s face recognition, we might use a commercial package
that returns the identity of the individual as a vector. We might also have a
coded object behavior that learns from experience to categorize these vectors
into friend, enemy, familiar neutral or unfamiliar.
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2.3 Plans: Saying When
More consideration about programming how is given in Chapter 6, and real
examples on working systems are shown in Chapter 7. But for now, we will
turn to problem of deciding when.
In BOD, when is controlled using structures that are read by a special
behavior for action selection. In AI, structures that control action selection
are generally called plans. BOD uses hand-coded, flexible plan structures.
Such plans are often called reactive plans, because with them the agent can
react immediately (without thinking) to any given situation.
2.3.1 The Simplest Plan
The simplest plan is just a list of instructions, for example:
〈get a banana→ peel a banana→ eat a banana〉 (2.1)
Such a list is called a simple sequence, or sometimes an action pattern.
2.3.2 Conditionality
Of course, specifying the complete behavior for the entire lifetime of your
monkey in a sequence would be tedious. (Besides, it’s provably impossible.)
A more common way to specify when is to associate a particular context
which the agent can perceive with a what. Such a pairing is often called a
production rule. The context is called the rule’s precondition and the what is
called its action.
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For example, the plan 2.1 could be changed into a set of rules:
(have hunger) ⇒ get a banana
(have a banana) ⇒ peel a banana
(have a peeled banana) ⇒ eat a banana
(2.2)
I have put the contents of the precondition in parentheses to indicate that they
are really a question. If the question is answered ‘yes’, then the rule should
fire — the action should be executed.
It might look like our new plan is as good as or better than our old plan.
For one thing, we’ve specified something new and critical — when to execute
the plan itself. For another, if somebody hands our monkey a peeled banana,
she will be able to execute the rule ‘eat a banana’ without executing the whole
sequence in plan 2.1.
Unfortunately, it’s not that easy. What if we had another sequence we
wanted our monkey to know how to do. Let’s say that we intend to have our
monkey to a dinner party, and we want her to be able to pass bananas to other
guests2. Here’s the original sequence:
〈get a banana from left→ pass a banana to right〉 (2.3)
But if we translate that into rules:
(left neighbor offers banana) ⇒ get a banana from left
(have a banana) ⇒ pass a banana to right (2.4)
Now we have two rules that operate in the same context, ‘have a banana’.
What should our monkey do?
We could try to help the monkey by adding another piece of context, or
precondition, to each of the rules. For example, all of the rules in plan 2.2
could include the precondition ‘have hunger’, and all the rules in the plan 2.4
could have the condition ‘at a party’. But what if our monkey is at a party
and she’s hungry? Poor monkey!
The problem for the programmer is worse than for the monkey. If we
want to determine what the monkey will do, we might have to add an excep-
tion to rules we’ve already written. Assuming we think being polite is more
important than eating, when we begin writing our party rules, we’ll have to
go back and fix plan 2.2 to include ‘not at a party’. Or, we might have to fix
the behavior that runs the monkey’s rules to know that party rules have higher
priority than eating rules. But what if we want our monkey to eventually eat
at the party?
Thus, although the production rule structure is powerful and useful, it
doesn’t have some of the critical things we have in a sequence. A sequence
2Don’t try this with real monkeys.
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maintains removes ambiguity by storing control context. Thus if our monkey
keeps the steps of plan 2.3 together in a sequence, then when she takes a
banana from the left, she knows to try to pass it to the right. In any other
circumstance, if she has a banana, she never needs to think of passing it.
2.3.3 Basic Reactive Plans
To summarize the previous section:
• Production rules are useful because they facilitate flexible behavior and
the tying of action to context. However, they rapidly become difficult
to manage because of the amount of context needed to differentiate rule
firing.
• Sequences work well because they carry that context with them. A
what embedded in a sequence carries disambiguating information about
things that occurred just before or just after. The sequence itself rep-
resents an implicit decision made by the monkey which disambiguates
the monkey’s policy for some time.
We can combine many of the attributes of these two features using another
structure, the Basic Reactive Plan or BRP. Let’s try to rewrite plan 2.1/2.2
again:
(have hunger) ⇒
x
〈 (full) ⇒ goal
(have a peeled banana) ⇒ eat a banana
(have a banana) ⇒ peel a banana
⇒ get a banana
〉
(2.5)
What this notation indicates is that rules relevant to a particular activity
have been clustered into a BRP. The BRP, like a sequence, limits attention to
a small, fixed set of behaviors. It also encodes an ordering, but this time not
a strict temporal one. Instead, it records a prioritization. Priority increases
in the direction of the vertical arrow on the left. If the monkey already has a
peeled banana, she’ll eat it. If she has a whole banana, she’ll peel it. Other-
wise, she’ll try to get a banana.
The BRP is a much more powerful structure than a simple sequence. If
the monkey eats her banana, and she still isn’t full, she’ll get another one!
Often (as in this case) the highest priority step of a BRP is a special rule
called goal. The goal detects when the BRP’s task is finished. A BRP ends if
either none of its rules can fire, or if it has achieved its goal (if it has one.)
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Notice that when we make a sequence into a BRP, we reverse its order.
This is because the highest priority item goes on the top, so that its precon-
dition gets checked first. Notice also that the last rule doesn’t need a pre-
condition: instead, it’s guarded by its low priority. It will only fire when the
monkey’s action selection attention is in the context of this BRP, and none of
the other rules can fire.
There is more information about BRPs in Chapters 5 and 4.
2.4 Making a Complete Agent
2.4.1 Drive Collections
Plans that contain elements that are themselves plans are called hierarchical.
The natural questions about a hierarchy are “where does it start?” and “where
does it end?” We already know that the plan hierarchies end in behaviors, in
the specification of how.
The start could in principle be any plan. Once that plan ends, the agent’s
intelligence is just over. This makes sense for certain kinds of software agents
that might be called into existence just to perform a certain job. But what if
we are interested in making something like a monkey? Something that lasts
for some time, that decides what to do based on a set of motivations and
principles?
We call this sort of agent a complete agent. And at the start (or root) of its
plan hierarchy, we put a BRP specially designed never to end. This special
designing just involves blocking the two ways BRPs can end. First, the BRP
has no goal, so it never ‘succeeds’ and completes. Second, the BRP must
have at least one element that can always run, so it never fails.
Here’s a BRP that might govern the monkey we’ve been building:
‘life’
x
〈〈 (at a party)(obligations exist) ⇒ be polite
(hungry) ⇒ eat a banana
(friends around) ⇒ make friends comfortable
⇒ wait
〉〉
(2.6)
Notice I added a sense for perceiving obligations. That way, our monkey
can eat even when she’s at a party, so long as she’s not aware of any social
obligations. I didn’t specify a goal, and I included a low-priority behavior
that can always run, so that ‘life’ should never end.
Drive collection is a special name for this top / root BRP. In a BOD agent,
the drive collection also works as the environment monitor, something that
every agent architecture needs (see Chapter 3). Drive collections have some
35
special features to help make the agent particularly reactive; these are ex-
plained in Chapter 4.
2.4.2 The BOD Methodology: Choosing What
The previous parts of this chapter have talked about the elements of a BOD
agent’s architecture. But BOD also has a methodology for constructing agents.
It has two parts: creating an initial specification, then iteratively building the
agent.
Describing and ordering the motivations of a complete agent like I did in
the last section is actually part of the specification process. Here’s what you
need for the entire specification:
1. A high level description of what your agent does.
2. Collections of actions (in sequences and BRPs) that perform the func-
tions the agent needs to be able to do. The Reactive Plans
3. The list of whats (including questions / senses) that occur in reactive
plans. The Primitive Interface (the whats).
4. The objects collecting state needed by the primitives, and the program
code for acquiring and using that state. The Behavior Library.
5. A prioritized list of high-level goals the agent will need to attend to.
The Drive Collection.
And here’s what you need to do to build the agent:
1. Choose a piece of the specification to work on.
2. Code, test and debug plans and behaviors to build that piece.
3. Revise the specification.
4. Go back to 1.
Keep doing this part over and over until your agent does everything you want
it to.
2.4.3 The Principle of Iterative Design
One of the most important things about BOD and iterative design in general
is realizing that specifications are made to be changed. You never really un-
derstand a problem before you try to solve it.
36
Its tempting once you’ve started working on an agent to try to make your
first specification work. But this tends to get messy as you tack fixes onto your
program — some parts will get bigger and more complicated, and other parts
will stay small and never really get used or finished. This kind of program
gets harder and harder to add to, and also can get very hard to debug.
The BOD methodology emphasizes that change will keep happening.
That’s why you take the time in the iterative cycle to revise the specifica-
tion. You want to make sure you are keeping the agent as simple as possible,
and the specification as clear as possible. That’s part of the job of building an
agent.
2.4.4 Revising the Specification
There are some tricks to revising a specification that are specific to the BOD
architecture. In fact, the BOD architecture is designed to help make this
process easy. This section introduces some of the basics; again there will be
more detail later (in Chapter 8).
The main design principle of BOD is when in doubt, favor simplicity. All
other things being equal:
• It’s better to use a sequence than to use a BRP.
• It’s better to use a single primitive than to use a sequence.
• It’s better to use control state than variable state in a behavior.
Now, if these are the rules of thumb, the question is, when do you violate
them? Here are the heuristics for knowing when to violate a rule of thumb:
• Use a BRP when some elements of your sequence either often have to
be repeated, or often can be skipped.
• Use a sequence instead of one primitive if you want to reuse part, but
not all, of a primitive in another plan.
• Add variables to a behavior if control state is unnecessarily redundant,
or has too complicated of triggers.
We’ve already talked about the first rule and heuristic in sections 2.3.2 and
2.3.3. The second heuristic is a basic principle of software engineering: Never
code the same thing twice — Make a generic function instead. There’s a
simple reason for this. It’s hard enough to get code written correctly and fully
debugged once. Doing it again is asking for trouble.
The third rule is the principle of reactive intelligence, and the third heuris-
tic helps explain why you don’t want a fully reactive agent. Sometimes having
memory around makes control so much easier that it’s worth it.
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Let’s do another example. Consider the primitive ‘get a banana’, which
we used in plan 2.5. How does the monkey get a banana? Lets suppose we’ve
coded the monkey to go to the kitchen, climb on the counter, and look in the
fruit bowl. If there’s a bunch, she should break one off; if there’s a loose one,
she should take it; if there’s none, she should throw a fit.
Clearly, a good deal of this could be coded either as a plan, or as a behav-
ior. The principle of BOD is that it should be a behavior, until or unless you
(as the programmer) could be using some of those same pieces again. So, for
example, if you next decide you want your monkey to be able to get you a
glass of water, you now have a motivation to write two plans:
‘get a banana’ ⇒ 〈go to the kitchen→ take a banana〉 (2.7)
‘get glass of water’ ⇒ 〈go to the kitchen→ pour glass of water〉 (2.8)
Notice that these plans are now guarded with not a question, but a plan
element, a what. We have changed a particular what (get a banana) from
being a simple method on a behavior to being a sequence. But we don’t need
to change our old plan (2.5). We just update part of the specification.
2.5 Behavior-Oriented Design as an Agent Archi-
tecture
The fields of autonomous robots and virtual reality have come to be domi-
nated by ‘hybrid’, three-layer architectures. (The process of this dominance
is documented in Chapter 3.)
Hybrid architectures cross the following:
1. behavior-based AI (BBAI), the decomposition of intelligence into sim-
ple, robust, reliable modules,
2. reactive planning, the ordering of expressed actions via carefully spec-
ified program structures, and
3. (optionally) deliberative planning, which may inform or create reactive
plans, or, in principle, even learn new behaviors.
BBAI makes engineering easier by exploiting modularity. Reactive plan-
ning makes BBAI easier to engineer by simplifying the arbitration between
behaviors. Deliberative planning is generally included to reorganize existing
plan elements in the case of ‘unanticipated’ changes in the world. For exam-
ple a planner might choose an alternative route through an office complex if
a door is found shut.
The best description of three-layered hybrid systems I know is this one:
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The three-layer architecture arises from the empirical observa-
tion that effective algorithms for controlling mobile robots tend
to fall into three distinct categories:
1. reactive control algorithms which map sensors directly onto
actuators with little or no internal state;
2. algorithms for governing routine sequences of activity which
rely extensively on internal state but perform no search; and
3. time-consuming (relative to the rate of change of the envi-
ronment) search-based algorithms such as planners.
[Gat, 1998, p. 209]
Gat’s view of three-layer architectures is particularly close to my own
view of agent intelligence, because it puts control firmly in the middle, reactive-
plan layer. The deliberative ‘layer’ operates when prompted by requests. We
differ, however, in that I do not believe most primitive actions can be defined
simply by mapping sensors directly to actuators with little internal state or
consideration for the past.
As I said in Chapter 1, nearly all perception is ambiguous, and requires
expectations rooted in experience to discriminate. This experience may be
extremely recent — for example, a phoneme in speech is much easier to rec-
ognize if you remember the phoneme that immediately preceded it, because
speech production is affected by the starting position of the mouth. Useful
experience may also be only fairly recent, for example remembering where
you set down a banana before you answered the phone. Or it may be the
result of life-long learning, such as learning to recognize a face, or learning
your way around a house or a town.
The primitive actions governed by reactive plans may well be dependent
on any of this information. If action is dependent on completely stateless
primitive modules, then such information can only be utilized either by hav-
ing some ‘higher’ level with state micro-manage the primitive level (which
defeats its purpose) or by using some generic parameter stream to communi-
cate between layers (which removes specialization). Neither solution is good.
Rather, in BOD I recommend fully embracing modularity. Each ‘primitive
act’ is actually an interface to a semi-autonomous behavior module, which
maintains its own state and possibly performs its own ‘time-consuming’ pro-
cesses such as memory consolidation or search in parallel to the main activity
of the complete agent. BOD is still reactive, because at the time of action, the
primitive can do a look-up onto its own current state with minimal computa-
tion.
Thus my view of agent control is very similar to Gat’s, except that:
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Figure 2.1: Behavior-oriented systems have multiple, semi-autonomous skill
modules or behaviors (b1 . . .) which generate actions (a1 . . .) based on their
own perception (derived from sensing indicated by the eye icon on the left).
Actions which affect state outside their generating behavior, whether internal
to the agent or external (indicated by the hand icon on the right), are generally
subject to arbitration by an action selection (AS) system.
1. I increase the number, importance, specificity and potential simplicity
of the modules composing his top layer. I call this the behavior library.
2. I replace the notion of a bottom layer with that of an interface between
the action-selection module of an agent and its (other) behavior mod-
ules.
In the words of the tutorial, Gat’s high level translates into how, his mid-
dle layer translates into when and his reactive layer is reduced simply to their
interface, what. In BOD, dealing with shut doors is the domain of one par-
ticular behavior that knows about maps, not of a general-purpose reasoning
system.
A simple diagram of the BOD architecture can be seen in Figure 2.1. The
important points of this drawing are:
• The behaviors are not controlled by action selection. They are semi-
autonomous. They may act independently to update their own state, or
sometimes even to change the physical world, provided that they are
not likely to interfere with other behaviors.
• Action selection itself may be considered just another specialized be-
havior. The reactive plans are its specialized representation.
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2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I have introduced the basic elements of behavior-oriented de-
sign (BOD). These are the architectural elements: semi-autonomous behav-
iors and hierarchical reactive plans; and the methodological elements: an
initial task decomposition, and a procedure of incremental development.
In the next chapter, I will motivate BOD by looking at evidence from the
AI literature of the utility of certain architectural features. In the chapters
that follow, I will go into considerably more detail on every aspect of BOD.
This is in three parts: planning and reactive plans, behaviors and specialized
learning, and the design process itself. There will also (eventually) be more
monkeys.
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Chapter 3
Background: Critical
Components of Agent
Architectures
3.1 Introduction
All of the working examples in this dissertation have been implemented using
control software written by me. However, my thesis claims that the princi-
ples of behavior-oriented design are general, and the contributions broadly
applicable. This chapter supports this claim in two different ways. First, it
documents many architectures and several different paradigms of AI research
for agent development. This documentation indicates the general utility of the
features of BOD, which were introduced in the previous chapters. Second, it
uses these principles to make predictions and suggestions for the future direc-
tions of these other architectures and paradigms. Some of these suggestions
lead to the work shown in Chapters 5 and 12, which demonstrate extending
existing architectures and projects with the features of BOD.
This chapter does not attempt a full review of the related architecture lit-
erature. Instead, I concentrate on architectures or architectural traditions that
are widely known or used. This increases the amount of selective pressure on
the architectures. Also, the changes that are made to an architecture over time
are particularly telling, so architectures that have a long and well-documented
period of research are particularly interesting.
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3.2 Features and Trends in Complete Agent Ar-
chitectures
3.2.1 Approach
Agent architectures are design methodologies. The assortment of architec-
tures used by the autonomous agents community reflects our collective knowl-
edge about what methodological devices are useful when trying to build an
intelligence. I consider this perspective, derived from Maes [1991a] and
Wooldridge and Jennings [1995], to be significantly more useful than think-
ing of an architecture as a uniform skeletal structure specified by a particular
program. The definition of an agent architecture as a collection of knowledge
and methods provides a better understanding of how a single architecture can
evolve [e.g. Laird and Rosenbloom, 1996, Myers, 1996] or two architectures
can be combined (cf. Chapter 5).
The design knowledge expressed in agent architectures is of two types:
knowledge derived by reasoning, and knowledge derived by experience. Knowl-
edge derived by reasoning is often explicit in the early papers on an archi-
tecture: these ideas can be viewed as hypotheses, and the intelligences im-
plemented under the architecture as their evidence. Knowledge derived by
experience may be more subtle: though sometimes recognized and reported
explicitly, it may be hidden in the skill sets of a group of developers. Worse
yet, it may be buried in an unpublished record of failed projects or missed
deadlines. Nevertheless, the premise of this chapter is that facts about build-
ing intelligence are likely to be found in the history and progress of agent ar-
chitectures. In other words, architectures tend to include the attributes which
have proven useful over time and experience.
Unfortunately, as with most selective processes, it is not always a simple
matter to determine for any particular expressed attribute whether it has itself
proven useful. A useless feature may be closely associated with other, very
useful attributes, and consequently be propagated through the community as
part of a well-known, or well-established architecture. Similarly, dominat-
ing architectures may lack particular useful elements, but still survive due
to a combination of sufficient useful resources and sufficient communal sup-
port. For these reasons alone one cannot expect any particular architecture
to serve as an ultimate authority on design methodology, even if one ignores
the arguments of niche specificity for various architectures. But I do assume
that architectural trends can be used as evidence for the utility of a particular
design approach.
Identifying the design advantage behind such trends can be useful, be-
cause it allows the research community to further develop and exploit the
new methodology. This is truer not only within the particular architecture or
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architectural paradigm in which the trend emerged, but can also benefit the
autonomous control community in general. To the extent that all architectures
face the same problems of supporting the design of intelligence, any develop-
ment effort may benefit from emphasizing strategies that have proven useful.
Many architectures have a larger number of features than their communities
typically utilize. In other words, many architectures are under-specified as
design methodologies. Consequently, even established design efforts may be
able to exploit new knowledge of design strategy without changing their ar-
chitectural software tools. They may be able to make simple reorganizations
or additions to their established design processes.
In this chapter, I demonstrate this approach for evaluating and enhancing
agent architectures. I survey the dominant paradigms of agent architecture
technology: behavior-based design; two- and three-layer architectures; PRS
and the belief, desire and intention architectures; and Soar and ACT-R. I be-
gin by looking at some of the historic concerns about architectural approach
that have shaped and differentiated these communities. I then review each
paradigm and the systematic changes which have taken place within it over
the last 15 years. I conclude with a discussion of these architectures in terms
of the lessons derived from that review, making recommendations for the next
stages of development for each paradigm.
3.2.2 Thesis
To this chapter clearer, I will begin by reiterating the results, which were
introduced in Chapter 1. My analysis indicates that there are several archi-
tectural attributes necessary for producing an agent that is both reactive and
capable of complex tasks. One is an explicit means for ordering action selec-
tion, in particular a mechanism exploiting hierarchical and sequential struc-
turing. Such a system allows an agent with a large skill set to focus attention
and select appropriate actions quickly. This has been a contentious issue in
agent architectures, and this controversy is reviewed below. The utility of
hierarchical control has been obscured by the fact it is not itself sufficient.
The other necessary components include a parallel environment monitoring
system for agents in dynamic environments, and modularity, which seems to
benefit all architectures.
Modularity substantially simplifies the design process by substantially
simplifying the individual components to be built. In this dissertation, I define
modularity to be the decomposition of an agent’s intelligence, or some part
of its intelligence, into a number of smaller, relatively autonomous units. I do
not mean to imply the fully encapsulated modules of Fodor [1983], where the
state and functionality of one module are strictly unavailable to others. The
most useful form of modularity seems to be decomposed along the lines of
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ability, with the module formed of the perception and action routines neces-
sary for that ability, along with their required or associated state.
Fully modular architectures create new design challenges. If sequential
and hierarchical control are avoided, then action selection between the in-
teracting modules becomes difficult. However, an architecture that does al-
low a specialized action-selection system to focus attention appropriately may
fail to notice dangers or opportunities that present themselves unexpectedly.
Agents existing in dynamic environments must have architectural support for
monitoring the environment for significant changes in order for the complete
agent to remain responsive. This environment monitoring may be either a
part of the main action-selection system, or a separate system with priority
over ordinary action selection.
3.3 The Traditional Approach
I will now begin my review with a brief review of traditional AI approaches
to agent organization. A traditional architecture for both psychology and ar-
tificial intelligence is shown in Figure 3.1. This architecture indicates that
the problems of intelligence are to transform perception into a useful mental
representation R; apply a cognitive process f to R to create R′, a representa-
tion of desired actions; and transform R′ into the necessary motor or neural
effects. This model has lead many intelligence researchers to feel free to
concentrate on only a single aspect of this theory of intelligence, the process
between the two transformations, as this has been considered the key element
of intelligence.
This model (in Figure 3.1) may seem sufficiently general as to be both
necessarily correct and uninformative, but in fact it makes a number of as-
sumptions known to be wrong. First, it assumes that both perception and
action can be separated successfully from cognitive process. However, per-
ception is known to be guided by expectations and context — many percep-
tual experiences cannot be otherwise explained [e.g. Neely, 1991, McGurk
and MacDonald, 1976]. Further, brain lesion studies on limb control have
shown that many actions require constant perceptual feedback for control,
but do not seem to require cognitive contribution, even for their initiation
[e.g. Matheson, 1997, Bizzi et al., 1995].
A second problem with this architecture as a hypothesis of intelligence
is that the separation of representation from cognitive process is not neces-
sarily coherent. Many neural theories postulate that an assembly of neurons
processes information from perception, from themselves and from each other
[e.g. McClelland and Rumelhart, 1988, Port and van Gelder, 1995]. This pro-
cessing continues until a recognized configuration is settled. If that configura-
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Figure 3.1: A traditional AI architecture [after Russell and Norvig, 1995].
tion involves reaching the critical activation to fire motor neurons, then there
might be only one process running between the perception and the activity.
If the levels of activation of the various neurons are taken as a representa-
tion, then the process is itself a continuous chain of re-representation. Notice
that the concept of a “stopping point” in cognition is artificial — the provi-
sion of perceptual information and the processing activity itself is actually
continuous for any dynamic agent. The activations of the motor system are
incidental, not consummatory.
3.4 Behavior-Based Architectures
3.4.1 The Society of Mind
Though traceable in philosophy at least as far back as Hume [1748], and in
psychology as far back as Freud [1900], the notion of decomposing intelli-
gence into semi-autonomous independent agencies was first popularized in
AI by Minsky [1985]. Minsky’s model promotes the idea of multiple agen-
cies specialized for particular tasks and containing specialized knowledge.
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Minsky proposes that the control of such units would be easier to evolve as
a species or learn as an individual than a single monolithic system. He also
argues that such a model better describes the diversity and inconsistency of
human behavior.
Minsky’s “agents of mind” are hierarchical and only semi-autonomous.
For example, he postulates, a child might have separate agencies for direct-
ing behavior involving sleeping, eating and playing. These compete for con-
trol. When a victorious agent emerges, its subsidiary agencies in turn com-
pete. Once playing is chosen, blocks compete with dolls and books; if blocks
are chosen, building and knocking down compete during the block-playing
episode. Meanwhile, the agency in charge of eating may overwhelm the
agency in charge of playing, and coherent behavior may be interrupted in
mid-stride as different agencies swap to take control.
The cost of theories that successfully explain the incoherence of human
thought and activity is that they often fail to explain its coherence. Minsky
addresses this by postulating a modular rather than a completely distributed
system of thought. He explains coherent behavior as being the output of a sin-
gle agency or suite of agents, and incoherence as a consequence of competing
agencies. He also recognizes that there can be coherent transitions between
apparently modular behaviors. To address this, he postulates another type
of structure, the k-line. K-lines connect modules associated in time, space,
or as parts of the same entity. He also posits fairly traditional elements of
knowledge representation, frames and knowledge hierarchies, for maintain-
ing databases of knowledge used by the various agents.
3.4.2 Subsumption Architecture
Brooks [1986] took modularity to a greater extreme when he established the
behavior-based movement in AI. In Brooks’ model, subsumption architec-
ture, each module must be computationally simple and independent. These
modules, now referred to as “behaviors,” were originally to consist only of
finite state machines. That is, there are an explicit number of states the be-
havior can be in, each with a characteristic, predefined output. A finite state
machine also completely specifies which new states can be reached from any
given state, with transitions dependent on the input to the machine.
Brooks’ intent in constraining all intelligence to finite state machines was
not only to simplify the engineering of the behaviors, but also to force the
intelligence to be reactive. A fully reactive agent has several advantages. Be-
cause its behavior is linked directly to sensing, it is able to respond quickly
to new circumstances or changes in the environment. This in turn allows it
to be opportunistic. Where a conventional planner might continue to exe-
cute a plan oblivious to the fact that the plan’s goal (presumably the agent’s
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intention) had either been fulfilled or rendered impossible by other events,
an opportunistic agent notices when it has an opportunity to fulfill any of its
goals and exploits that opportunity.
Two traits make the robots built under subsumption architecture highly
reactive. First, each individual behavior can exploit opportunities or avoid
dangers as they arise. This is a consequence of each behavior having its
own sensing and running continuously (in parallel) with every other behavior.
Second, no behavior executes as a result of out-of-date information. This
is because no information is stored — all information is a reflection of the
current environment. Although useful for the reasons expressed, these traits
also create problems for designing agents capable of complex behavior. To
begin with, if there are two behaviors pursuing different goals, then it might
be impossible for both to be opportunistic simultaneously. Consequently, any
agent sophisticated enough to have potentially conflicting goals (such as “eat”
and “escape danger”) must also have some form of behavior arbitration.
Subsumption architecture provides behavior arbitration through several
mechanisms. First, behaviors are organized into layers, each of which pur-
sues a single goal, e.g. walking. Behaviors within the same goal are assumed
not to contradict each other. Higher layers are added to lower layers with the
capability observe their input and suppress and even replace individual behav-
iors’ output if necessary. These actions occur on communications channels
between the behaviors (wires, originally in the literal sense), not in the behav-
iors themselves. All such interference is designed as part of the layer; it does
not affect the inner workings of a behavior, only the expressed consequences
of those workings.
After experimentation, a third mechanism of behavior selection was in-
troduced into subsumption architecture. The description of a behavior was
changed from “a finite state machine” to “a finite state machine augmented
by a timer.” This timer can be set by external behaviors, with the result being
that the behavior is deactivated until the timer runs out. The timer mech-
anism was added to subsumption architecture because of a problem found
during the development of Herbert, the can-retrieving robot [Connell, 1990].
When Herbert had found a can and began to pick it up, its arm blocked its
camera, making it impossible for the robot to see the can. This would al-
low the robot’s “search” behavior to dominate its “pick up can” behavior, and
the can could never be successfully retrieved. With the timer, the “pick up
can” behavior was able to effectively pause all the other behaviors while it
monopolized action selection for a moment.
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3.4.3 Diversification in Behavior-Based AI
The use of the reactive and/or behavior-based approach is still widespread,
particularly in academic robotics and character-based virtual reality. How-
ever, no single architecture is used by even ten percent of these researchers.
Subsumption architecture, described above, is by far the best known of the ar-
chitectures, but relatively few agents have been built that adhere to it strictly.
For example, Mataric´ [1990], Bryson [1992] and Pebody [1995] all include
adaptive extensions; Appleby and Steward [1994] make the behaviors nearly
completely independent — they would now be called agents. Most roboti-
cists, even within Brooks’ own laboratory, seem to have been more inspired
to develop their own architecture, or to develop code without a completely
specified architecture, than to attend to the details of subsumption [e.g. Hor-
swill, 1993, Steels, 1994a, Marjanovic et al., 1996, Parker, 1998, Tu, 1999,
Stone and Veloso, 1999]. Steels [1994b] goes so far as to claim that behaviors
should be built so as to require neither action selection nor subsumption, but
simply to run continuously in parallel with each other1.
Of the many behavior-based architectures inspired by subsumption, the
one that in turn attracted the most attention has been Maes’ spreading acti-
vation network [Maes, 1991a]. Maes’ architecture consists of a number of
nodes, including action nodes, perception nodes, and goal nodes. The nodes
are connected to one another by a two-way system of links. One link specifies
the extent to which the second node requires the first node to have executed,
the other specifies the extent to which the first node enables the second node
to fire. These conduits are used to allow activation to spread both bottom-
up, starting from the perception nodes, and top-down, starting from the goal
nodes. When a single node gets sufficient activation (over a threshold) that
node is executed.
Maes’ greatest explicit hypothetical difference from subsumption archi-
tecture is her belief that agents must have multiple, manipulable goals [see
Maes, 1990b]. Maes’ claim in that paper that subsumption architecture only
allows the encoding of a single goal per agent is mistaken; however the
strictly stacked goal structure of subsumption is sufficiently rigid that her
arguments are still valid. A more implicit hypothesis is the need for a way to
specify sequential behaviors, which her weighting of connections allows. On
the other hand, Maes is very explicitly opposed to the notion of hierarchical
behavior control [Maes, 1991b]. Maes states that using hierarchical methods
for behavior arbitration creates a bottleneck that necessarily makes such a
1I have been told that this strategy was abandoned for engineering reasons, although it was
feasible and still considered in the lab to be a valid hypothesis for biological intelligence. It tends
to require each behavior to model all of the others to a sufficient extent that they do not interfere
with each other. Such modeling was too much overhead for the programmers and was abandoned
in favor of inter-behavior communication.
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system incapable of being sufficiently reactive to control agents in a dynamic
environment.
This hypothesis was disputed by Tyrrell [1993], who showed several flaws
in Maes approach, most notably that it is insufficiently directed, or in other
words, does not adequately focus attention. There appears to be no means
to set the weights between behaviors in such a way that nodes composing a
particular “plan of action” or behavior sequence are very likely to chain in
order. Unrelated behaviors may alternate firing, creating a situation known
as “dithering”. There is actually a bias against a consummatory or goal be-
havior being performed rather than one of its preceding nodes, even if it has
been enabled, because the goal, being in a terminating position, is typically
connected to fewer sources of activation.
Tyrrell’s competing hypothesis is that hierarchy can be exploited in action
selection, providing that all behaviors are allowed to be fully active in parallel,
and that the final decision is made by combining their computation. Tyrrell
refers to this strategy as a free-flow hierarchy and attributes it to Rosenblatt
and Payton [1989]. Tyrrell [1993] gives evidence for his hypothesis by com-
paring Maes’ architecture directly against several hierarchical ones, of both
free-flow and and traditional hierarchies, in a purpose-built artificial life en-
vironment. In Tyrrell’s test world, a small animal needs to balance a large
number of often conflicting goals of very different types. For example, it
must eat, maintain body temperature, sleep in its home at night, avoid two
different types of predators, and mate as frequently as possible. Simulations
cover up to 10 days of life and involve thousands of decision cycles per day.
Using extensive experimentation, Tyrrell demonstrates substantial advantage
for all of the hierarchical architectures he modeled over Maes’ approach.
Tyrrell also shows statistically significant superiority of the free-flow hi-
erarchy over its nearest strictly-hierarchical competitor, which was in fact the
most simple one, a drive-based model of control. He claims that a free-flow
hierarchy must be an optimal action selection mechanism, because it is able to
take into account the needs of all behaviors. These sorts of cooperative rules
have been further refined. For example, Humphrys [1997] suggests choos-
ing a course that minimizes the maximum unhappiness or disapproval of the
elements tends to lead to the optimal solutions. Such thoroughly distributed
approaches have been challenged by my work. Bryson [2000a] suggests that
simplicity in finding an optimal design, whether by a programmer or by a
learning process such as evolution, outweighs the advantage of cooperative
negotiation. My action-selection system uses a hierarchical controller where
only a small subset of nodes, corresponding in number to the elements in the
top layer in the hierarchy, actively vie for control of the agent. Further, these
nodes do not compete on the basis of relative activation levels, but are acti-
vated by threshold and strictly prioritized. Thus on any particular cycle, the
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highest priority node that has threshold activation takes control. Within the
winner’s branch of the hierarchy, further competitions then take place. This
is very similar to a traditional hierarchy, excepting parallel roots and some
other details of execution, yet Bryson [2000a] shows a statistically signifi-
cant improvement over the Tyrrell [1993] results using the same system for
evaluation.
Blumberg [1996] presents another architecture which takes considerable
inspiration from both Maes and Tyrrell, but also extends the control trend
further towards conventional hierarchy. Blumberg’s system, like Tyrrell’s,
organizes behaviors into a hierarchy while allowing them to be activated in
parallel. However, in Blumberg’s system the highest activated module wins
and locks any critical resources it requires, such as legs if the module regu-
lates walking. Nodes that are also active but do not require locked resources
are allowed to express themselves. Thus a dog can both walk and wag its tail
at the same time for two different reasons. The hierarchy is also exploited
to focus attention in the voting system. Not every behavior participates in
the vote, a fact that was initially minimalized [Blumberg, 1996], but more re-
cently has become a stated feature of the system [Kline and Blumberg, 1999].
Blumberg’s architecture is being used by his own and other research groups
(including Brooks’ [Breazeal and Scassellati, 1999b]) as well as a major com-
mercial animation corporation, so its future development should be of signif-
icant interest.
RCS [Albus, 1997] also uses a hierarchy to organize behaviors, but in
this case there is a strict precedence between layers of the hierarchy. Fur-
ther, their number is predetermined (five), with layer membership determined
by the temporal extent of actions. This layered decomposition of behaviors
in terms of temporal was subsequently incorporated into Ymir [Tho´risson,
1999], which used three layers. These architectures have been used for large,
real-time projects with multiple developers. RCS in particular has been used
for multi-developer military projects, where its modularization of both action
selection as well as behavior probably facilitates development. The way these
architectures utilize hierarchy is in some ways more like the layered architec-
tures discussed in the next section, but their distributed action selection makes
them similar to behavior-based systems.
Summary
All behavior-based systems are modular; the modular design strategy to a
large part defines the paradigm. Most behavior-based systems rely on their
modularity as their source of reactiveness — any particular behavior may
express itself opportunistically or when needed. This has, however, lead to
difficulties in action selection that seem to have limited the complexity of the
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tasks addressed by these systems. Action selection mechanisms vary widely
between individual architectures, indicating that the field has not settled on a
stable solution. However, several architectures are now incorporating hierar-
chical and or sequential elements.
3.5 Multi-Layered Architectures
The achievements of behavior-based and reactive AI researchers have been
very influential outside of their own communities. In fact, there is an almost
universal acceptance that at least some amount of intelligence is best modeled
in these terms, though relatively few would agree that all cognition can be
described this way. Many researchers have attempted to establish a hybrid
strategy, where a behavior-based system is designed to work with a traditional
AI planner, which deduces the next action by searching a knowledge base for
an act that will bring it closer to a goal. Traditionally, planners have micro-
managed, scripting every individual motion. By making their elements semi-
autonomous behaviors which will react or adapt to limited uncertainty, the
planners themselves can be simplified. The following is a recent account of a
project from the late 1980s:
The behavior-based plan execution was implemented bottom up
to have as much useful capability as possible, where a useful ca-
pability is one which looked like it would simplify the design
of the planner. Similarly, the planner was designed top down
towards this interface, clarifying the nature of useful capabili-
ties at which the behavior-based system should aim. This design
method greatly reduced the complexity of the planner, increas-
ing the complexity of the agent much less than this reduction,
and thus reduced the overall system complexity. It also produced
a robust system, capable of executing novel plans reliably de-
spite... uncertainty.
[Malcolm, 1997, Section 3.1]
Malcolm’s system can be seen as a two-layer system: a behavior-based
foundation controlled by a planning system. More popular of late have been
three-layer systems, as introduced in Section 2.5 above. Two- and three-
layer systems are similar, except that there is a middle layer that consists of
precoded plan fragments, sometimes referred to as “implicit knowledge”, in
contrast to the “explicit” reasoning by the top-level planner. Another distinc-
tion is that the middle layer is often considered reactive, in that it does not
create plans, but selects them based on the situation; while the top layer is a
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traditional constructive planner. In most systems, the top-layer planner ma-
nipulates or generates this intermediate representation level rather than acting
directly on the behavior primitives.
One currently successful layered robot architecture is 3T [Bonasso et al.,
1997], which features Reactive Action Packages (RAPs) [Firby, 1987], for
its middle layer. RAPs is a system for creating reactive, flexible, situation-
driven plans, and itself uses a lower layer of behavior primitives. 3T inte-
grates this system with a constructive planner. 3T has been used on numerous
robots, from academic mobile robots, to robotic arms used for manipulating
hazardous substances, previously controlled by teleoperation, to maintenance
robots for NASA’s planned space station. Leon et al. [1997] uses 3T in sim-
ulation to run an entire space station, including farming and environmental
maintenance. Hexmoor et al. [1997] and Kortenkamp et al. [1998] provide
fairly recent reviews of many two- and three-layer architectures.
3T may seem a more likely tool for modeling of human-like intelligence
than the behavior-based models discussed earlier, in that it has something
approximating logical competence. However, planning has been mathemat-
ically proven an unrealistic model of intelligence because it relies on search
[Chapman, 1987]. Search is combinatorially explosive: more behaviors or a
more complex task leads to an exponentially more difficult search. Though
there is no doubt that animals do search in certain contexts (e.g. seeking
food, or for a human, choosing a gift), the search space must be tightly con-
fined for the strategy to be successful. A better model of this sort of process
is ATLANTIS [Gat, 1991], which is controlled by its middle layer, and only
operates its top, planning layer on demand. This model is in fact quite similar
to the Norman and Shallice [1986] model of human action selection, where
conscious control is essentially interrupt driven, triggered by particularly dif-
ficult or dangerous situations. Although the alternative model, with the top
level being the main controller, is more typical [Bonasso et al., 1997, Albus,
1997, Hexmoor et al., 1997, Malcolm, 1997], Gat’s model would also seem a
more natural extension of the behavior-based approach. It is also notable that
Bonasso et al. [1997] report a number of 3T projects completed using only
the lower two layers.
Another incompatibility between at least early behavior-based work and
the layered system approach is the behavior-based systems’ emphasis on
emergence. For a hybrid system, emergent behavior is useless [Malcolm,
1997]. This is because an emergent behavior definitionally has no name or
“handle” within the system; consequently the planning layer cannot use it. In
humans at least, acquired skills can be recognized and deliberately redeployed
[Karmiloff-Smith, 1992]. Hexmoor [1995] attempts to model both the devel-
opment of a skill (an element of the middle layer) from actions performed de-
liberately (planned by the top layer) and the acquisition of deliberate control
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of skills. His hypothesis of requiring both these forms of learning are prob-
ably valid, but his actual representations and mechanisms are still relatively
unproven. Another group researching the issue of learning behaviors and as-
signing their levels is that of Stone and Veloso [1999]. Veloso’s group has
had a series of highly successful entrants into various leagues of robot soc-
cer; their architecture is thus also under strenuous selective pressure. It also
seems to be converging to modularity in the areas which are most specialized,
such as communication and learning, while having a directed, acyclic graph
(DAG) for general action selection over preset plans.
Summary
Two- and three-layer architectures succeed at complex tasks in real environ-
ments. They generally have simplified behavior modules as their first (lowest)
layer, and reactive plans in their second layer. The plan layers are carefully
organized in order to maintain reactivity, although some architectures rely
on the bottom-level behaviors for this function, and others do not operate in
dynamic environments. Modularity has generally been limited to the lower
level, though in some architectures the top-level planner can also be seen as a
specialized module. Current research indicates there are still open questions
concerning the optimal kind of planning for the top layer, and how to ma-
nipulate and shift information between representations, particularly learned
skills.
3.6 PRS — Beliefs, Desires and Intentions
Although robotics has been dominated by three-layer architectures of late,
the field of autonomous agents is dominated, if by any single architecture,
by the Procedural Reasoning System, or PRS [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987,
d’Inverno et al., 1997]. PRS also began as a robot architecture, but has proven
sufficiently reliable to be used extensively for tasks such as defense simula-
tions. It was originally developed at roughly the same time as subsumption
architecture, as a part of a follow-up program to the longest running robot
experiment ever, Shakey [Nilsson, 1984]. PRS is designed to fix problems
with traditional planning architectures exposed by the Shakey project. Such
problems include:
• Constructing a complete plan before beginning action. This is a nec-
essary part of the search process underlying constructive planning — a
planner cannot determine whether a plan is viable before it is complete.
Many plans are in fact formed backwards: first selecting the last action
needed to reach the goal, then the second last and so on. However,
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besides the issues of opportunism already discussed, many details of a
real problem cannot be known until the plan is executed. For example,
when crossing a room full of people, the locations of the people are not
determined until the time of the actual crossing.
• Taking too long to create a plan, thereby ignoring the demands of the
moment. The standard example is trying to cross a road — a robot will
not have time to replan if it suddenly spots a car; it needs to reactively
move out of the way.
• Being unable to create plans that contain elements other than primitive
acts — to take advantage of skills or learned procedures.
• Being unable to manipulate plans and goals. Plans may need to be
abandoned, or multiple goals pursued simultaneously.
Obviously, this list is very similar to the problems the behavior-based pro-
grammers attempted to solve. There are, however, two main differences in
approach. First, PRS, like the layered architectures, maintains as a priority
the ability to construct plans of action. The architecture allows for incorpo-
rating specialized planners or problem solvers. The second difference is that
PRS development is couched very much in psychological terms, the opposite
of Brooks’ deprecation of conscious impact on intelligent processes. PRS is
referred to as a BDI architecture, because it is built around the concepts of
beliefs, desires and intentions.
Many researchers appreciate the belief, desires and intentions approach
in concept, without embracing PRS itself. For example, Sloman and Logan
[1998] consider the notions of belief, desire, intention and emotion as central
to an agent, but propose expressing them in a three-layer architecture. Slo-
man’s top layer is reflective, the middle deliberative, and the bottom layer
reactive. This is similar to Malcolm [1997] or the first and third layers of 3T
[Bonasso et al., 1997], but with an additional layer dedicated to manipulating
the goals of Malcolm or Bonasso’s top layers, and considering its own current
effectiveness. This particular role assignment for the layers of a three-layer
architecture is also proposed in Figure 3.2, below.
The PRS architecture consists of four main components connected by
an interpreter (sometimes called the “reasoner”) that drives the processes of
sensing, acting, and rationality. The first component is a database of beliefs.
This is knowledge of the outside world from sensors, of the agent’s own in-
ternal states, and possibly knowledge introduced by outside operators. It also
includes memories built from previous knowledge. The second component is
a set of desires, or goals. These take the form of behaviors the system might
execute, rather than descriptions of external world state as are often found in
traditional planners. The third PRS component is a set of plans, also known
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as knowledge areas. Each plan is not necessarily completely specified, but is
more likely to be a list of subgoals useful towards achieving a particular end,
somewhat like BOD’s POSH action selection. These may include means by
which to manipulate the database (beliefs) to construct a next action or some
new knowledge. The final main component is a stack of intentions. Inten-
tions are simply the set of plans currently operating. A stack indicates that
only one plan is actually driving the command system at a time, but multiple
plans may be on the stack. Typically, ordering of the stack is only changed if
one plan is interrupted, but new information may trigger a reorganization.
Like multi-layer architectures, PRS works from the hypothesis that a sys-
tem needs both the ability to plan in some situations, such as navigation, and
the ability to execute skilled acts for situations where search is not reason-
able, such as avoiding trucks. In some sense, each plan is like a behavior
in behavior-based AI. Behavior-based AI is essentially a retreat to allowing
programmers to solve in advance the hard and important problems an agent
is going to face. A procedure to solve an individual problem is usually rel-
atively easy to design. Thus some modularity can be found in the design of
the knowledge areas that make up the plan library. On the other hand, PRS
does not see specialized state and representations dedicated to particular pro-
cesses as worth the tradeoff from having access to general information. It has
moved the procedural element of traditional planners closer to a behavior-
based ideal, but not the state. It only allows for specialized or modularized
data by tagging. The interpreter, goal list and intention stack are the action-
selection device of PRS.
PRS and its variants exist both as a planning engine and as a set of devel-
opment tools. They are used by industry and the US government as well as
for research. PRS has gone through a number of revisions; in fact the original
project seems to be dying. One large change in the basic structure of the orig-
inal PRS was the adoption of the ACT formalism for its plan libraries, which
can also be used by a conventional constructive planner [Wilkins et al., 1995].
This move can be seen as a part of a general trend in current PRS research
to attempt to make the system easier to use — the idea of a planner is to al-
low plan libraries to be generated automatically. There is also a “PRS-lite”
[Myers, 1996] which uses easily combinable “fuzzy behaviors”. A number
of labs have worked on formalizing PRS plans in order to make its planning
provably correct [e.g d’Inverno et al., 1997]. However, these efforts had dif-
ficulty with the reactive element of the architecture, the meta-reasoning. The
original development lab for PRS, SRI, is now focusing effort on a much more
modularized AI architecture, built under a multi-agent paradigm [Wilkins and
Myers, 1998]. Some PRS systems that are still in active use are derived from
UM-PRS [e.g Huber, 1999]. One modification these systems have made is
providing for the prioritization of the reactive plans in order to simplify meta-
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reasoning.
The pre-history of PRS, the Shakey project, also has relevant evolution-
ary trends [Nilsson, 1984]. Although Shakey had a traditional planner (called
STRIPS), over the term of the project the concept of triangle tables was devel-
oped. A triangle table decomposes a plan into its steps and assumptions, then
creates a contingency table allowing the plan to be restarted from any point.
Perception is then used to determine which element of the plan should be ex-
ecuted next. This allows action selection to be reactive within the confines
of the plan, rather than relying on memory of what steps should have already
been executed. This approach leads naturally into teleo-reactive plans [Nils-
son, 1994], another recently developed form of storage for skilled behaviors
developed by planners. Benson [1996] describes using this as the basis of a
system that learns to fly airplanes in flight simulators, and the architecture is
being used at a number of research laboratories.
The Shakey project also moved from having multiple world models in
its first implementation to having a single storage place for predicates of ob-
served data. Any predicate used to form a new plan was rechecked by ob-
servation. This development under the selective pressure of experimentation
lends credence to the mandate of reactive AI to simplify stored models.
Summary
PRS and its related BDI architectures have been much more popular than
behavior-based systems in some academic settings. This may be because they
are easier to program. They provide significant support for developing the
action-selection mechanism, a hierarchical library of plans, and a separate,
specialized mechanism for reprioritizing the agent’s attention in response to
the environment. Particularly when taken over their long-term history, how-
ever, these architectures have converged on some of the same important prin-
ciples such as simplified representations (though not specialized ones) and
modularization (at least in the plan libraries.) Current research trends indi-
cate that designing the agent is still a critical problem (see further Chapter 5).
3.7 Soar and ACT-R
Soar [Newell, 1990] and ACT-R [Anderson, 1993] are the AI architectures
currently used by the largest number of researchers, not only in AI, but also in
psychology and particularly cognitive science. Soar is the most ‘cognitive’ ar-
chitecture typically used in U.S. Department of Defense simulations, though
even so it is not used extensively due to its high computational overhead.
These architectures are fundamentally different from the previously reviewed
57
architectures. Both are also older, dating to the late 1970s and early 1980s
for their original versions, but both are still in active development [Laird and
Rosenbloom, 1996, Anderson and Matessa, 1998]. The Soar community in
particular has responded to the behavior-based revolution, both by participat-
ing directly in competitions with the approach [Kitano et al., 1997] and even
by portraying their architecture in three layers (see Figure 3.2).
Impasses and Subgoals
Decision Procedure
Working Memory
Reflective Level
arbitrary subgoal processing
of impassed deliberation
Deliberative Level
sequential selection and 
application of operators 
to states
Reactive Level
parallel productions
matching working memory
Input/Output Level
fixed transduction of 
input and output
Production Memory
Faster
Cycle
Time
More 
Fexible
Processing
Figure 3.2: Soar as a three-layer architecture) [after Laird and Rosenbloom,
1996].
Soar and ACT-R both characterize all knowledge as coming in two types:
data or procedures. Both characterize data in traditional computer science
ways as labeled fields and procedures in the form of production rules.
Soar is a system that learns to solve problems. The normal procedure is
to match its production rules against the current state of the world, find one
that is applicable, and apply it. This is automatic, roughly equivalent to the
middle or bottom layer of a three-layer architecture. If more than one pro-
duction might work, or no production will fire, or nothing has changed since
the previous application of a production, then Soar considers itself to be at an
impasse. When Soar encounters an impasse, it enters a new problem space
of trying to solve the impasse rather than the current goal. The new prob-
lem space may use any means available to it to solve the problem, including
planning-like searches. Soar has several built-in general purpose problem
solving approaches, and uses the most powerful approach possible given the
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current amount of information. This process is thus something like the way
ATLANTIS [Gat, 1991] invokes its top level. Soar, however, allows the pro-
cess to recurse, so the meta-reasoner can itself hit an impasse and another
new reasoning process is begun.
Soar includes built-in learning, but only of one type of information. When
an impasse is resolved, the original situation is taken as a precondition and
the solution as a procedure, and a new rule is created that takes priority over
any other possible solution if the situation is met again. This is something like
creating automatic skills out of declarative procedures, except that it happens
quickly, on only one exemplar. This learning system can be cumbersome,
as it can add new rules at a very high rate, and the speed of the system is
inversely related to the number of rules.
Soar addresses the combinatorics of many productions in two ways. First,
Soar has the concept of a problem space, a discrete set of productions in-
volved in solving a particular goal or working in a particular context. This
makes the system roughly hierarchical even in its non-impasse-solving mode.
Soar also has carefully crafted optimizations, such as the RETE algorithm
[Forgy, 1982] for optimizing production firing. Nevertheless, many indus-
trial users of the system choose not to exploit the learning built into Soar.
ACT-R is essentially simpler than Soar: it does not have the impasse
mechanism nor does it learn new skills in the same way. Nevertheless, ACT-
R is used extensively for cognitive modeling, and has been used to replicate
many psychological studies in decision making and categorization [Ander-
son, 1993]. ACT-R also faces the difficulty of combinatorics, but it takes
a significantly different approach: it attempts to mimic human memory by
modeling the probability that a particular rule or data is recalled. Besides the
two sets of “symbolic” knowledge it shares with Soar, ACT-R keeps Bayesian
statistical records of the contexts in which information is found, its frequency,
recency and utility [Anderson and Matessa, 1998]. It uses this information to
weight which productions are likely to fire. It also has a noise factor included
in this statistical, “sub-symbolic” system, which can result in less-likely al-
ternatives being chosen occasionally, giving a better replication of the unpre-
dictability of human behavior. Using alternatives is useful for exploring and
learning new strategies, though it will often result in suboptimal performance
as most experiments prove to be less useful than the best currently-known
strategy.
Soar, like PRS, is used on an industrial level. However, the fact that it is
losing popularity within the cognitive science research community to ACT-R
is attributed by researchers largely to the the fact that ACT-R is significantly
easier to work with. This is largely because Soar was designed primarily
to learn — researchers compared programming Soar to teaching by brain
surgery. One simplification made in ACT-R proved to be too extreme. Orig-
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inally it did not have problem spaces, but over the course of research it was
found that hierarchical focusing of attention was necessary to doing anything
nearly as complex as modeling human mathematical competences, the pri-
mary goal of ACT-R’s development team [Anderson, 1993]. ACT-R does not
seem to be used in industrial or real-time situations.
Soar has also evolved significantly [Laird and Rosenbloom, 1996]. In par-
ticular, when moving to solve problems in a dynamic, real-world domain, it
was found to be critical to allow programmers to specify chains or sequences
of events explicitly, rather than in terms of simple productions (see further
Section 2.3.2). The encoding of time and duration was another major chal-
lenge that had to be overcome when Soar moved into robotics — a problem
that also needed to be addressed in early versions of PRS and RAP, the middle
layer of 3T [Myers, 1996]. ACT-R has not yet been adapted to the problems
of operating in a dynamic world: representing noisy and contradictory data,
and reasoning about events over time.
Summary
Despite coming from significantly different paradigms and research commu-
nities, the long and well-documented histories of Soar and ACT-R exhibit
many of the same trends as the other paradigms previously examined. Since
both systems at least simulate extreme distribution, (their control is based al-
most entirely on production rules) they are necessarily very reactive. In fact,
Soar had to compromise this feature to be able to provide real-time control.
Modularity of control if not data is provided in problem spaces, which can be
hierarchical, and Soar now provides for explicit sequential action selection.
Soar’s generic representations were also found to be not entirely satisfactory.
There has been forced specialization of procedure types due to the new bench-
mark tasks of the 1990’s, particularly mobile robotics. Soar still suffers from
an extreme overhead in programming difficulty, but is also still in widespread
use. ACT-R exploits a niche in the research community as a simpler though
similar form of learning system, and has been further specialized to improve
its ability to model human cognition.
3.8 Discussion and Recommendations
There have been complaints within the autonomous control community about
the over-generation of architectures: what is wanted by users are improve-
ments on systems with which they are already familiar, rather than a continu-
ous diversification. This argument contains some truth. However, it overlooks
the perspective stated in the introduction: an agent architecture is a design
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methodology, and a design methodology is not simply a piece of software.
Although some architectural features will conflict, in many cases there is no
reason architectures cannot be combined, or one architecture implemented
within another. I discuss and demonstrate this in Chapter 5.
Behavior-based architectures began with many of the advantages of mod-
ularity and reactive systems, but development of complex control software
in them has been hampered by the lack of specific control architectures for
supporting hierarchical and sequential ordering of action selection. This is
largely due to theoretical opposition: Is a system truly autonomous if it is
forced to carry out a plan? Is centralized control biologically plausible? The
answer to both of these questions is almost certainly “yes”; see for example
Barber and Martin [1999] and Bryson [2000b] respectively for some discus-
sion. Regardless, it can be observed empirically that all autonomous agents
do still have and require action selection mechanisms. In behavior-based sys-
tems, these systems are often distributed across the behaviors. This may lead
to some improvement of robustness, but at a considerable cost in programma-
bility and ease of debugging.
The shift to layered architectures may therefore seem a natural progres-
sion for behavior-based AI, but I have some reservations about this model.
Many of the systems have the deliberate or constructive planner in ultimate
control, which may be intuitive but has not yet been demonstrated to be desir-
able. The frequent lack of such a layer within this research tradition, and the
success of PRS and Soar with something more like a middle layer in primary
control of action selection, are good indications that primary action selection
should probably emphasize reactive planning rather than deliberation.
A further concern is that layered systems, and indeed some of the more
recent behavior-based systems such as HAP [Bates et al., 1992, Reilly, 1996]
or the free-flow hierarchy architectures reviewed above, have denigrated the
concept of a “behavior” to a mere programming language primitive, thus los-
ing much of the advantage of modularity2.
Behaviors were originally designed as essentially autonomous entities
that closely couple perception and action to achieve a particular competence.
Unfortunately, they were also conceived as finite state machines, with no
internal variable state. In nature, perception is universally accompanied by
memory and learning: much of development in mammals is dedicated to
learning to categorize and discriminate. This is why I believe that behav-
iors should also contain state appropriate to their competence, and further
that this state and learning should be at the center of behavior decomposition,
much as it is at the center of modern object decomposition in object-oriented
2Blumberg [1996] partially addresses this by creating “clusters of behaviors”. I believe that
these clusters are closer to the appropriate level of abstraction for a behavior than what he refers
to as “behaviors”.
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design.
My primary suggestion for behavior-based AI is further attention to eas-
ing the design of action selection. I also suggest experimenting with lim-
ited functional modules for abilities such as operating sequential plans and
smoothing motor output. This development would be parallel to the nearly
universal, though still reductionist, use of state in this paradigm. My rec-
ommendation for three-layered architectures is that they look for ways to in-
crease support of modularity in their systems, and that they follow the lead of
ATLANTIS for focusing action-selection control in the middle layer. It is still
not clear whether it is a better idea for a system to separate action selection
from goal manipulation, as Soar and PRS do, rather than using one system for
both, as do 3T and most behavior-based architectures. BOD is an example of
the latter approach.
PRS is in some ways similar to a three-layer architecture with the empha-
sis on the middle layer — the building of the plan library. In particular, the
software version of PRS distributed by SRI has a fairly impressive GUI for
supporting the editing and debugging of this level of intelligence. As might
be gathered from the discussion of three-layer architectures above, I consider
this type of support very useful.
Unfortunately, PRS still leaves two important levels of abstraction largely
unsupported and difficult to manage. The construction of primitives is left to
the user, to be done in the language of the PRS implementation; in the case of
SRI’s implementation, this is a reduced set of common lisp. My suggestions
for behavior-based and three-layer architectures applies equally here: primi-
tives should be ordered modularly. They can in fact be built from methods on
objects with proprietary state, not shared by the PRS database system. I rec-
ognize that this might offend PRS purists, particularly because it might have
consequences for the theoretical work on proving program correctness that
relies on the database. Nevertheless, I stand by my claim that state is a part
of perception. Having some state proprietary to a module should be no more
difficult than having an external sensor proprietary to a primitive function; in
fact it is exactly equivalent.
The other design level that is surprisingly neglected is the hierarchical
organization and prioritization of the various elements of the plan library. Al-
though it is possible to organize plans in the file space (a collection of plans
may be saved in a single file) and in lisp by placing them in packages, there is
no GUI tool that allows for viewing more than one plan at a time. There is no
tool for ordering plans within clusters or agents. Consequently, there is no vi-
sual idiom for prioritizing plans that might otherwise be simultaneously able
to fire. Prioritization must be handled in poorly documented lisp code that is
triggered during the meta-rule section of the main processing cycle. Provid-
ing a tool to address this would make it far simpler to program a reactive plan
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structure like the BRP (see Section 2.3.3 and Chapter 5).
PRS-lite actually addresses both of these complaints, though not in the
manner recommended above. It supports “fuzzy” behaviors as primitives,
which have their own design methodology, and it attempts to eliminate the
need for meta-reasoning or prioritization by a combination of simplifying
the task and increasing the power of the goal descriptions [Myers, 1996].
Whether these solutions prove adequate, the fact that these areas are a focus
of change indicates agreement on the areas of difficulty in using PRS.
Of the paradigms reviewed, I have the least personal experience with Soar
and ACT-R, having only experienced them through tutorials and the anec-
dotes of programmers. Given their very different background and structure,
they appear to have remarkably similar design issues to those experienced un-
der the early behavior-based architectures. This is perhaps unsurprising since
both systems are thoroughly distributed. The parallel between the story of
the augmenting of subsumption architecture recounted above and the story
of the augmentation of Soar with time and sequencing in order to facilitate
robot control recounted in Laird and Rosenbloom [1996] is also striking. My
suggestions for improving Soar are consequently essentially my recommen-
dations for agent architectures in general: to focus on making agents eas-
ier to design via enhancing the ease of use of modular decomposition and
pre-programmed action selection, while still maintaining Soar’s provision for
reactivity and opportunism.
3.9 Conclusions
Every autonomous agent architecture seems to need:
• A modular structure and approach for developing the agent’s basic be-
haviors, including perception, action and learning.
• A means to easily engineer individual competences for complex tasks.
This evidently requires a means to order action selection in both se-
quential and hierarchical terms, using both situation-based triggers and
agent-based priorities derived from the task structure.
• A mechanism for reacting quickly to changes in the environment. This
generally takes the form of a system operating in parallel to the ac-
tion selection, which monitors the environment for salient features or
events.
In addition to the technical requirements just listed, the central theme of
this chapter is that agent architectures are first and foremost design method-
ologies. The advantages of one strategy over another are largely a conse-
quence of how effectively programmers working within the approach can
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specify and develop the behavior of the agent they are attempting to build.
This stance is not necessarily antithetical to concerns such as biological plau-
sibility or machine learning: natural evolution and automatic learning mecha-
nisms both face the same problems of managing complexity as human design-
ers. The sorts of bias that help a designer may also help these other processes.
Similarly, where it is understood, natural intelligence serves as a knowledge
source just as well as any other successful agent. This will be discussed fur-
ther in Chapter 11. The next several chapters will explain how BOD provides
for these characteristics, beginning with structured action selection.
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Chapter 4
Parallel-rooted, Ordered,
Slip-stack Hierarchical
(POSH) Reactive Plans
4.1 Introduction
Behavior-oriented design consists of three equally important elements:
• an iterative design process,
• parallel, modular behaviors, which determine how an agent behaves,
and
• action selection, which determines when a behavior is expressed.
This chapter describes in detail the Parallel-rooted, Ordered, Slip-stack Hi-
erarchical (POSH) reactive plans that underlie the action selection for BOD
agents. This chapter describes how to implement POSH action selection di-
rectly in a standard programming language. The next chapter discusses im-
plementing key elements of POSH control in other agent architectures. Be-
haviors and the BOD methodology itself will be covered in the succeeding
chapters.
I begin with an aside for the theorists and purists who may still doubt that
planning is necessary in a behavior-based architecture.
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4.2 Basic Issues
I have already motivated the use of reactive planning both by argument (in
Chapter 1) and by induction from the history of agent architectures (Chap-
ter 3). In this section I tie up a few loose ends for researchers who still object
either to the term or to planning in principle.
4.2.1 What does ‘Reactive Planning’ Really Mean?
The terms ‘reactive intelligence’, ‘reactive planning’ and ‘reactive plan’ ap-
pear to be closely related, but actually signify the development of several
different ideas. Reactive intelligence controls a reactive agent — one that can
respond very quickly to changes in its situation. Reactive intelligence has
sometimes been equated with statelessness, but that association is exagger-
ated. Reactive intelligence is however associated with minimal representa-
tions and the lack of deliberation [Brooks, 1991b, Agre and Chapman, 1990,
Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]. As I said in Chapter 1, reactive intelligence
is essentially action selection by look-up.
Reactive planning is something of an oxymoron. The reason the term
exists is that early AI systems used (conventional, constructive) planning for
action selection, so much so that ‘planning’ became synonymous with ‘action
selection’. Many researchers who are generally considered to do reactive AI
hate the term ‘reactive planning’ and refuse to apply it to their own work.
But it really just means ‘reactive action selection’. When reactive planning
is supported by architecturally distinct structures, these structures are called
reactive plans. As documented in Chapter 3, not all reactive intelligence uses
reactive plans.
I embrace the term ‘reactive planning’ for several reasons. First, it has
wide-spread acceptance in the general AI community. Second, some the
problems of action selection are sufficiently universal that ‘planning’ work-
shops often are interesting for reactive planners like myself. Similarly, there
are common representational issues for constructed and reactive plans. Fi-
nally, the move to actually using explicit reactive plans makes using the term
‘reactive planning’ seem somewhat more natural, though it is still misleading.
4.2.2 Isn’t Having Any Kind of Plans Bad?
I have addressed elsewhere at length [Bryson, 2000b] the concerns of some
researchers that any sort of hierarchically structured plan must be insuffi-
ciently reactive or not biologically plausible. This belief has been prevalent
particularly amongst practitioners of behavior-based or ‘new’ AI [e.g. Maes,
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1991b, Hendriks-Jansen, 1996] and of the ‘dynamical hypothesis’ of cog-
nitive science [e.g. Kelso, 1995, van Gelder, 1998]. Hierarchical plans and
centralized behavior arbitration are biologically plausible [Dawkins, 1976,
Tanji and Shima, 1994, Hallam et al., 1995, Byrne and Russon, 1998, Prescott
et al., to appear]. They are also sufficiently reactive to control robots in com-
plex dynamic domains [e.g. Hexmoor et al., 1997, Bryson and McGonigle,
1998, Kortenkamp et al., 1998] and have been shown experimentally to be as
reactive as non-hierarchical, de-centralized systems [Tyrrell, 1993, Bryson,
2000a]. Although they do provide a single failure point, this can either be
addressed by standard Multi-Agent System (MAS) techniques [e.g. Bansal
et al., 1998], or be accepted as a characteristic of critical systems, like a power
supply or a brain. Finally, as demonstrated by coordinated MAS as well as by
BOD (e.g. Chapter 6 below), they do not necessarily preclude the existence
of semi-autonomous behaviors operating in parallel.
This last point is the most significant with respect to the contributions of
this dissertation. Modularity is critical to simplicity of design, and parallelism
is critical to a reactive agent. BOD supports all of these attributes.
4.3 Basic Elements of Reactive Plans
Reactive plans provide action selection. At any given time step, most agents
have a number of actions which could potentially be expressed, at least some
of which cannot be expressed simultaneously, for example sitting and walk-
ing. In architectures without centralized action selection such as the Sub-
sumption Architecture [Brooks, 1986] or the Agent Network Architecture
(ANA) [Maes, 1990b], the designer must fully characterize for each action
how to determine when it might be expressed. For engineers, it is generally
easier to describe the desired behavior in terms of sequences of events, as
this is characteristic of our own conscious planning and temporally-oriented
memories.
POSH plans contain an element to describe simple sequences of actions,
called an action pattern. Action patterns supply quick, simple control in situ-
ations where actions reliably follow one from another.
Of course, control is often complicated by the non-determinism of both
the environment and an agents’ own capabilities. Several types of events may
interrupt the completion of an intended action sequence. These events fall
into two categories:
1. Some combination of opportunities or difficulties may require the cur-
rent ‘sequence’ to be reordered: some elements may need to be re-
peated, while others could be skipped.
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2. Some event, whether a hazard, an opportunity or simply a request, may
make make it more practical to pursue a different sequence of actions
rather than finishing the current one.
POSH action selection addresses these forms of non-determinism with
a fundamental reactive-planning idiom, the Basic Reactive Plan (BRP). The
BRP will be formally described in this section; its relevance to reactive plan-
ning in general will be examined in Chapter 5.
In POSH, the first situation described above is handled by a BRP deriva-
tive called a competence. A competence allows attention to be focussed on a
subset of plan steps that are applicable in a particular situation. The compe-
tence and the action pattern address the second requirement for agent archi-
tectures (after modularity) described in Chapter 3 (see page 63), structures to
facilitate the appropriate focus of action-selection attention.
The second situation above is addressed by another variant of the BRP,
the drive collection. A drive collection constantly monitors the environment
for indications that the agent should switch between plans. This addresses
the third requirement from Chapter 3, the need for an environment monitor
or alarm system. In POSH, drive collections are continuous with the rest of
action selection; one forms the root of an agent’s plan hierarchy.
The remainder of this section provides formal descriptions of sequences
and BRPs. The following section will detail the POSH elements refining
these basic idioms.
4.3.1 Simple Sequences
One structure fundamental to reactive control is the simple sequence of prim-
itive actions: ι1, ι2, . . . ιn. Including the sequence as an element type is useful
for two reasons. First, it allows an agent designer to keep the system as simple
as possible, which both makes it more likely to succeed, and communicates
more clearly to a subsequent designer the expected behavior of that plan seg-
ment. Second, it allows for speed optimization of elements that are reliably
run in order, which can be particularly useful in sequences of preconditions
or in fine motor control.
Executing a sequential plan involves priming or activating the sequence,
then releasing for execution the first primitive act ι1. The completion of any
ιi releases the following ιi+1 until no active elements remain. Notice that this
is not equivalent to the process of chaining, where each element is essentially
an independent production, with a precondition set to the firing of the prior
element. A sequence is an additional piece of control state; its elements may
also occur in different orders in other sequences [see further Section 2.3.2
(rules about bananas), and Lashley, 1951, Houghton and Hartley, 1995].
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Depending on implementation, the fact that sequence elements are re-
leased by the termination of prior elements can be significant in real time
environments, and the fact that they are actively repressed by the existence
of their prior element can increase plan robustness. This definition of se-
quence is derived from biological models of serial ordering (e.g. [Henson
and Burgess, 1997]).
4.3.2 Basic Reactive Plans
The next element type supports the case when changes in circumstance can
affect the order in which a plan is executed. Because this idiom is so charac-
teristic of reactive planning, I refer to the generic idiom as a Basic Reactive
Plan or BRP1.
A BRP step is a tuple 〈pi,ρ,α〉, where pi is a priority, ρ is a releaser, and α
is an action. A BRP is a small set (typically 3–7) of plan steps {〈pii,ρi,αi〉∗}
associated with achieving a particular goal condition. The releaser ρi is a
conjunction of boolean perceptual primitives which determine whether the
step can execute. Each priority pii is drawn from a total order, but is not
necessarily unique. Each action αi may be a primitive action, another BRP or
a sequence as described above.
The order of expression of plan steps is determined by two means: the
releaser and the priority. If more than one step is operable, then the priority
determines which step’s α is executed. If more than one step is released with
the same priority, then the winner is determined arbitrarily. Normally, how-
ever, the releasers ρi on steps with the same priority are mutually exclusive.
If no step can fire, then the BRP terminates. The top priority step of a BRP
is often, though not necessarily a goal condition. In that case, its releaser, ρ1,
recognizes that the BRP has succeeded, and its action, α1 terminates the BRP.
The details of the operation of a BRP are best explained through an exam-
ple. BRPs have been used to control such complex systems as mobile robots
and flight simulators [Nilsson, 1984, Correia and Steiger-Garc¸a˜o, 1995, Ben-
son, 1996]. However, for clarity we draw this example from blocks world.
Assume that the world consists of stacks of colored blocks, and that an agent
wants to hold a blue block2. A possible plan would be:
1BRPs occur in other architectures besides BOD, see Section 5.2.
2This example is due to Whitehead [1992]. The perceptual operations in this plan are based
on the visual routine theory of Ullman [1984], as implemented by Horswill [1995]. The example
is discussed further in Chapter 6.
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x
〈 Priority Releaser ⇒ Action4 (holding block) (block blue) ⇒ goal
3 (holding block) ⇒ drop-held, lose-fixation
2 (fixated-on blue) ⇒ grasp-top-of-stack
1 (blue-in-scene) ⇒ fixate-blue
〉
(4.1)
In this case priority is strictly ordered and represented by position, with
the highest priority step at the top. I will refer to steps by priority.
In the case where the world consists of a stack with a red block sitting on
the blue block. If the agent has not already fixated on the blue block before
this plan is activated (and it is not holding anything), then the first operation
to be performed would be element 1 because it is the only one whose releaser
is satisfied. If, as a part of some previous plan, the agent has already fixated
on blue, 1 would be skipped because the higher priority step 2 has its releaser
satisfied. Once a fixation is established, element 2 will trigger. If the grasp is
successful, this will be followed by element 3, otherwise 2 will be repeated.
Assuming that the red block is eventually grasped and discarded, the next
successful operation of element 2 will result in the blue block being held, at
which point element 4 should recognize that the goal has been achieved, and
terminate the plan.
This single reactive plan can generate a large number of expressed se-
quential plans. In the context of a red block on a blue block, we might expect
the plan 1–2–3–1–2–4 to execute. But if the agent is already fixated on blue
and fails to grasp the red block successfully on first attempt, the expressed
plan would look like 2–1–2–3–1–2–4. If the unsuccessful grasp knocked
the red block off the blue, the expressed plan might be 2–1–2–4. The reac-
tive plan is identically robust and opportunistic to changes caused by another
agent.
The most significant feature of a BRP is that it is relatively easy to en-
gineer. To build a BRP, the developer imagines a worst-case scenario for
solving a particular goal, ignoring any redundant steps. The priorities on
each step are then set in the inverse order that the steps might have to be ex-
ecuted. Next, preconditions are set, starting from the highest priority step, to
determine whether it can fire.
The process of setting preconditions is simplified by the facts that
• the programmer can assume that the agent is already in the context of
the current BRP, and
• no higher priority step has been able to fire.
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For example, step 3 does not need the precondition (not (block blue)), and no
step needs to say “If trying to find a blue block and nothing more important
has happened then...”
If an action fails repeatedly, (e.g. grasp-top-of-stack above) then a BRP
like the above might lead to an infinite loop. This can be prevented through
several means. A competence (described below) allows a retry limit to be set
at the step level. Other related systems (e.g. Soar [Newell, 1990]) sometimes
use generic rules to check for absence of progress or change. Soar determines
lack of progress by monitoring its database.
On a more complete agent level, such ‘rules’ might be modeled as mo-
tivations pertaining to boredom or impatience. Section 7.6.3 demonstrates a
BOD agent using specialized episodic memory to keep track of its progress;
Chapter 10 demonstrates the modeling of an agent’s motivations for this sort
of bookkeeping.
4.4 POSH Plan Elements
The previous section explained the basic elements of reactive planning, the
sequence and the BRP. In Chapter 5 I will discuss how such fundamental ar-
chitectural concepts are identified, and will more generally discuss extending
existing architectures with them. That chapter concentrates on the BRP, and
details both what existing architectures do and don’t support it. I also de-
scribe implementing the BRP in several architectures capable of supporting
it. This chapter, however, is devoted to explaining POSH action selection in
the context of BOD.
4.4.1 Action Patterns
In POSH, I call the simple sequence an action pattern (AP). An AP doesn’t
differ significantly from the sequence described above. The current imple-
mentation of POSH action selection allows action patterns to contain parallel
or unordered elements. This change was introduced because such structures
seem ubiquitous in the literature, and again serves as documentation to future
developers of the fact that there is no particular reason for some ordering.
However, I have never yet had reason to use this feature.
4.4.2 Competences
A competences is a form of BRP. Like an AP, a competence focuses atten-
tion on a particular set of elements suited to performing a particular task. A
competence is useful when these elements cannot be ordered in advance.
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Competences are archetypical BRPs. The only difference between the
POSH competence and the formal definition of BRP described above is that
a competence allows for the specification of a limit to the number of retries.
This limit can be set individually for each competence step. Thus a compe-
tence step is really a quadruple 〈pi, ρ, α, η〉, where η is the optional maxi-
mum number of retries. A negative η indicates unlimited retries. I initially
experimented with optional ‘habituation’ and ‘recovery’ values which oper-
ated on the priority level of the competence step. This was inspired by neural
and spreading activation [e.g. Maes, 1991a] models of action selection, which
are considered desirable because of the biological plausibility. However, the
difficulty of managing the design of such strategies convinced me to be bio-
logically plausible at a different level of abstraction.
Competences also return a value: > if they terminate due to their goal trig-
ger firing, and ⊥ if they terminate because none of their steps can fire. These
values are irrelevant when POSH action selection is implemented using the
version of drive collections described next. However, it becomes occasionally
relevant in Section 4.6.3 below.
4.4.3 Drive Collections and the Slip-Stack
A reactive agent must be able to change the current focus of its action-selection
attention — to deal with context changes (whether environmental or internal)
which require switching between plans, rather than reordering steps within
them. Some hybrid architectures control this from their ‘highest’ level, con-
sidering the problem the domain of deliberation or introspection. However,
BOD treats this problem as continuous with the general problem of action
selection, both in terms of constraints, such as the need for reactiveness, and
of solution.
The third element type in BOD, the drive collection, is also an elabora-
tion of the BRP. A ‘step’, or in this case, drive element, now has five elements
〈pi,ρ,α,A,ν〉. For a drive, the priority and releaser pi and ρ are as in a BRP,
but the actions are different. A is the root of a BRP hierarchy, while α is
the currently active element of the drive. When a drive collection element is
triggered, the α is fired, just as in a standard BRP. However, if the α is a com-
petence and triggers a child, β which is also a POSH element (a competence
or action pattern), then α for that drive collection is assigned the value of β.
On the other hand, if the α is a competence or action pattern and it terminates,
or if this is the first time the drive element has fired, then α is replaced with
A, the root of the hierarchy.
This policy of having only one active POSH element assigned to each step
of the drive collection is one of the key features of POSH to plans — the slip-
stack hierarchy. The slip stack defeats the overhead of ‘hierarchy bottleneck’
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that Maes [1991b] warns of. For any cycle of the action selection, only the
drive collection itself and at most one other compound POSH element will
have their priorities examined3.
The slip-stack hierarchy improves reaction time by eliminating the stack
that might be produced when traversing a plan hierarchy. The slip-stack also
allows the agent to occasionally re-traverse its decision tree and notice any
context change. I have found this to be a good balance between being per-
sistent and being reactive, particularly since urgent matters are checked per
cycle by the drive collection. The slip-stack also allows the hierarchy of BRPs
to contain cycles or oscillations. Since there is no stack, there is no obligation
for a chain of competences to ever terminate.
The fifth member of a drive element, ν, is an optional maximum frequency
at which this element is visited. This is a convenience for clarity, like the retry
limit η on the competence steps — either could also be controlled through
preconditions. The frequency in a real-time system sets a temporal limit on
how frequently a drive element may be executed. For example, a mobile robot
might have its highest priority drive-element check the robot’s battery level,
but only execute every two minutes. The next highest priority might be check-
ing the robot’s sensors, but this should only happen several times the second.
Other, lower-priority processes can then use the remaining interspersed cycles
(see Section 7.6.2 below).
In a non-real-time system, the frequency is specified in actual number of
cycles (see Section 4.5.1 below).
One further characteristic discriminates drive collections from compe-
tences or BRPs. Only one element of a competence is expected to be op-
erating at any one time, but for a drive collection, multiple drives may be
effectively active simultaneously. If a high-priority drive takes the attention
of the action-selection mechanism, the program state of any active lower drive
is preserved. In the case of our robot, if the navigation drive is in the process
of selecting a destination when the battery needs to be checked, attention re-
turns to the selection process exactly where it left off once the battery drive
is finished. Further, remember that action primitives in our system are not
stand-alone, consumatory acts, but are interfaces to semi-autonomous behav-
iors which may be operating in parallel (see Chapter 6). Thus the action
‘move’ in our robot’s plan might merely confirm or transmit current target
velocities to already active controllers. A moving robot does not need to stop
rolling while its executive attends to its batteries or its sensors.
3This is the most basic form of a slip stack. The current version, which holds a bit more
context state, is described below in Section 4.6.3.
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4.5 An Example of a Complete POSH Hierarchy
This section illustrates the workings of a POSH system with an example. The
next section will show the implementation of this system, and also explains
the current, enhanced version of the drive collection used in some of the ex-
tended examples of this dissertation.
4.5.1 Managing Multiple Conflicting Goals
Tyrrell [1993] created an extensive artificial life (Alife) test bed for action
selection, which he called simply the SE for simulated environment. Tyrrell’s
SE postulates a small rodent trying to live on a savannah, plagued by many
dangers, both passive and active, and driven to find nourishment, shelter, and
reproductive opportunities. The rodent also has very limited sensing abili-
ties, seldom being certain of anything but its immediate environment. It can
see further during the day by standing on its hind legs, but this increases its
visibility to predators.
Here is the list of goals Tyrrell specifies for agent in the SE:
1. Finding sustenance. In addition to water, there are three forms of nutri-
tion, satisfied in varying degrees by three different types of food.
2. Escaping predators. There are feline and avian predators, which have
different perceptual and motion capabilities.
3. Avoiding hazards. Passive dangers in the environment include wander-
ing herds of ungulates, cliffs, poisonous food and water, temperature
extremes and darkness. The environment also provides various forms
of shelter including trees, grass, and a den.
4. Grooming. Grooming is necessary for homeostatic temperature control
and general health.
5. Sleeping at home. The animal is blind at night; its den provides shelter
from predators and other hazards, and helps the animal maintain body
temperature while conserving energy.
6. Reproduction. The animal is male, thus its reproductive task is reduced
to finding, courting and inseminating mates. Attempting to inseminate
unreceptive mates is hazardous.
These problems vary along several axes: homeostatic vs. non-homeostatic,
dependency on external vs. internal stimuli, periodicity, continual vs. occa-
sional expression, degree of urgency and finally, whether prescriptive or pro-
scriptive with regard to particular actions. In addition to these problems, the
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environment is highly dynamic. Food and water quantities, temperature and
light vary, and animals move. Sensing and action are uncertain. Perception in
particular is extremely limited and severely corrupted with noise; the animal
usually misperceives anything not immediately next to it, unless it chooses
to spend time and expose itself by rearing up and “looking around” in an
uncovered area.
The success of the rodent is considered to be the number of times it mates
in a lifetime. This is highly correlated with life length, but long life does not
guarantee reproductive opportunities.
life (D)
flee (C) (sniff predator >)
freeze (see predator>) (covered>)
(hawk >)
hold still
run away (see predator >) pick safe dir go fast
look observe predator
mate (C) (sniff mate >)
inseminate (courted mate here >) copulate
court (mate here >) strut
pursue pick dir mate go
triangulate (getting lost >) pick dir home go
home [1::5] (late >) (at home ⊥) pick dir home go
check [1::5] look around
exploit (C) (day time >)
use resource (needed res avail >) exploit resource
leave pick dir go
sleep at home (at home >)
(day time ⊥)
sleep
Figure 4.1: Priorities for juggling contradictory goals in Tyrrell’s SE.
The plan in Figure 4.1 has been demonstrated not only adequate in that
environment, but significantly better than any of the action-selection mecha-
nisms Tyrrell himself tested [Bryson, 2000b,a]. Here I am using a different
notation for the plan in order to make the full hierarchy apparent. The vertical
lines are BRPs with priority directly related to height on the page, as usual. D
indicates a drive collection, C a competence. Each branch is labeled with its
name, as in the priority lists following plan 7.4 (green-on-green) above. This
is followed by any preconditions for that branch. Two of the drive-collection
elements also have a scheduling factor: since this was a discrete time-step Al-
ife system rather than a real time system, scheduling is per N cycles, so [1 :: 5]
means that if this element is the highest priority, and has not fired within the
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past 5 cycles, it will fire. Boxes indicate action patterns, which for the C++
implementation of my control system were the only structure that could hold
primitives, so they are sometimes only one element long.
Because Tyrrell [1993] focussed on action selection, his environment pro-
vides primitives not only for action and perception, but also for roughly keep-
ing track of its own location relative to its den. Like the other senses, this
is noisy and the animal can get lost if it spends too long away from its home
without taking time to learn landmarks. The only additional behaviors I added
were one for choosing the direction of motion, which would avoid as many
hazards as possible in a particular context, and one for exploiting the benefits
of a particular location, which ate, drank, basked or groomed as was oppor-
tune and useful. Some of these had initially been part of the control hierarchy,
but the savannah proved sufficiently lush that specific goals relating to hunger,
thirst or cleanliness proved unnecessary complications.
The most difficult part of the decision process for the rodent is deter-
mining whether to attend to predators when one was sensed. If every vague
sensing is attended to, the animal gets nothing else done, particularly not mat-
ing which is a multi-step process dependent on staying near another roaming
agent. But if the wrong sightings are ignored, the animal gets eaten. The
solution above has the animal attempt to escape if it is fairly certain there is
a predator around, and try to increase its certainty if it is more marginally
certain. Since the relationship between these variables was nonlinear (and
there were a separate pair for the two kinds of predators) I used a sort of two-
generation genetic algorithm to set the variables: I set the variables randomly
on a large number of animals who got one life span, then took the top 12
performers and ran them through 600 lifespans to see which performed con-
sistently the best. Here again is an example of having the developer doing the
learning rather than the agent.
For a more complete account of the development process for this agent
see Bryson [2000b].
4.5.2 Exploiting the Slip-Stack Hierarchy
The slip-stack hierarchy is exploited by any plan with nested competences
(e.g. the plan in Figure 7.5) in that response time is saved because only the
currently-active competences’ priorities are examined. The slip stack is also
designed to enable cyclic graphs in POSH hierarchies.
I must admit that I have not found it strictly necessary to use this capacity
yet. I have used it only to alternate between competences in a pilot study of
emulating rat navigation run in a robot simulator. But this method of creating
oscillation was gratuitous; it could also have been done within a drive hier-
archy (see Chapter 10 for an example.) I believe the reason I have not used
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competence cycles yet is a combination of two considerations — the sorts of
domains I have been working in, and the deliberately shallow level of con-
trol complexity. For example, natural language is a domain where complex
control occurs in redundant structures, but I have so far done no serious nat-
ural language applications. Also, ALife simulations such as Tyrrell’s above
allow complexity to be masked as a single primitive. In a more realistic sim-
ulation, courting and inseminating would probably be chained competences,
each with multiple sorts of indications for transitions between behavior pat-
terns from both the agent itself and from its partner in copulation.
The main reason to use chained competences rather than a single master
competence or separate drive elements is to force an ordering of competences.
Two competences that are both under the same drive element can never be ex-
ecuted at the same time. Using chains of competences are in this way analo-
gous to using sequences rather than production rules (see Section 2.3.2), only
with more complex elements. APs should generally not be used to sequence
actions that take longer than a couple of hundred milliseconds, because they
monopolize the action selection and make the agent less reactive. Actions of
a long or uncertain duration should be represented using competences (see
Section 6.2). Also, APs of course cannot have sub-components with flexi-
ble, BRP-like ordering. If a BRP needs to be sequenced, then they should be
sequenced using competence chaining.
4.6 How POSH Action Selection Works
For thoroughness, this section begins with a pre-history of POSH control. I
then describe the simple implementation of POSH described above and used
in the experiments described in Chapter 7. Next I describe a more recent
elaboration of POSH structure that was used for the examples in Chapters 9
and 10. This section concludes with a summary4.
4.6.1 Early History and Caveats
In Chapter 3 I argue that the record of changes to an architecture is an im-
portant source of information about the fundamental nature of the problem of
designing intelligent agents. For this reason, this section includes some doc-
umentation of the history of my architectures implementing POSH design.
This subsection is not critical to understanding current POSH systems.
There have been four implementations leading to the current version of
POSH action selection. The first was in Common Lisp Object System (CLOS),
4Source code for both implementations described here is available on line. Please see Ap-
pendix A.
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the second in object-oriented perl (ver. 5.003), the third in C++, and the fourth
is in CLOS again. The first was called Braniff, and the third Edmund. The
fourth is a simplified version of SoL, which is described in Section 12.3.2.
The language shifts were partly motivated by circumstances, and partly by
the fact that I like changing languages on rewrites, because it forces a com-
plete rewrite and rethinking of assumptions as you shift between program-
ming paradigms. I also strongly dislike strong typing, because it slows down
development significantly and inhibits creativity. Despite the fact that the ver-
sion of perl I was using was very buggy, and the initial research platform (a
mobile robot) for the perl and the C++ versions of the architecture were the
same, and that I had programmed professionally in C and C++ for years, de-
velopment of behavior libraries slowed by a factor of approximately 5 when
I switched to C++. Fortunately, most of the difficult libraries were already
constructed before I made the change, and translation was relatively simple.
In Braniff, each action pattern was divided into four sub-sections, any of
which could be nil. These subsections were: triggering perceptual checks,
perceptual actions (those that changed attention, but not the environment),
pre-motor perceptual checks, and motor actions. I simplified this to a single
homogeneous sequence that terminated if any element failed (whether a per-
ception check or an action). This proved a poor idea because of scheduling.
The sequences are now broken into two parts — trigger sequences, where
all elements are checked atomically within the scheduler, and action patterns,
which allow a control cycle between the execution of each element. An obvi-
ous extension to my current system would be the creation of another primitive
class, trigger-actions, which would be the only kind of actions that could oc-
cur in triggers, and would be constrained to operate very quickly. However,
as I stated earlier, I dislike unnecessary typing, so have left timing issues as a
matter of heuristics.
Braniff did not initially have drive collections, only competences. The
competence elements each had a fixed priority between 0 and 100. They
could also have a value by which their priority was reduced so that an ele-
ment that was tried repeatedly would ‘habituate’ and allow other strategies
to be tried, or eventually allow the entire competence to fail. When I intro-
duced drive collections, they had a similar system, but also with a recovery
factor, so that over time a drive element might be operated again. Compe-
tence elements never recover, but each time a competence is first invoked by
a drive its elements start over from the original set of priorities. During the
development of Edmund, all of these systems were simplified. Habituation of
a competence element is now discrete — it simply will not fire after a fixed
number of attempts. Scheduling in the drive collections is now in terms of
frequency. The reason for these simplifications is that they are much simpler
to design and manage. Shifting priority order lead to unnecessary complica-
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tions in most situations. Where variable motivation levels are useful (as in the
drive system of Tu [1999] or Grand et al. [1997]) they can be easily modeled
in the behavior system (see Chapter 10).
4.6.2 A Simple Implementation of POSH Control
This section documents in pseudo-code the implementation of the drive col-
lection as described in Section 4.4.3. This is the final version of the third,
C++ implementation of POSH mentioned in the previous section, sometimes
referred to as Edmund [e.g. Bryson and McGonigle, 1998].
For every cycle of the action scheduler, the following code is executed.
‘This de’ means ‘this drive element’, α and A are as defined in Section 4.4.3.
@drive-elements = priority_sort (elements (drive_root));
do (forever) { // unless ‘return’ is called
result = nil;
for this_de in @drive-elements {
if (trigger (this_de) and not-too-recent (frequency (this_de))) {
if goal (this_de)
{ return (succeed); }
// if α is a primitive, will get fail or succeed
// if it is another POSH element, then execute it next time.
result = execute ( α(this_de));
if (typeof (result) == (‘competence’ or ‘action pattern’))
{ α(this_de) = // slip stack -- replace own alpha...
// with a local copy of control state (see below)
executable_instance_of (result); }
if (result == (fail or succeed))
{ α(this_de) = A(this_de); } // restart at root
// otherwise, will execute same thing next time it triggers
}
} // end of for
if (result == nil) // nothing triggered
{ return (fail); }
} // end of do
An executable instance of a POSH composite type is just an instance
with disposable state for keeping track of things like which element was last
executed in an action pattern, or how many times an element has been exe-
cuted in a competence (if that element habituates.)
Executing an action pattern then is just:
result = execute (element (instance_counter));
instance_counter += 1;
if ((result == fail) or (instance_counter == sequence_length))
{ return (result); }
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else
{ return (continue); }
And a competence looks very much like the drive collection, except simpler
(assume my elements are pre-sorted):
for this_ce in @my_elements {
if (trigger (this_ce) and not-too-many (number_tries (this_ce))) {
if goal (this_ce)
{ return (succeed); }
if (typeof(α(this_ce)) == (‘competence’ or ‘action pattern’))
{ return ( α(this_ce)); }
else
{ return (execute( α(this_ce)));}
}
} // end of for
return (fail); // nothing triggered
The maximum cycle rate for this architecture in Gnu C++ on a 486 run-
ning Linux with primitive actions doing disk writes was over 3,000Hz. On
the other hand, a primitive that takes time can obviously slow this down ar-
bitrarily. In the robot example in Section 7.6 below, with sonar sensing done
at 7Hz, the cycle rate was about 340Hz. This was still more than enough to
operate the robot plans shown in Chapter 7 (Figures 7.2 and 7.5), but it indi-
cates that if the robot had to do some heavy thinking, the sonar update task
should have been moved to another process.
4.6.3 POSH Control with an Action Scheduler
My experiences with programming robots in this architecture (documented in
Section 7.6.3) eventually motivated me to change the way drive collections
operate. In particular, the plan in Figure 7.2 assumes that a competence el-
ement can fail if the competence it calls fails the first time through. In the
architecture above, this clearly isn’t true.
Another motivation was the behavior of action patterns. If a robot sus-
pends a drive-element to do something very rapid, such as a sonar check or a
speech act, then the action pattern should continue from where it left off, so
that the POSH action selection can simulate pseudo-parallelism. However, if
the robot instead diverts its attention to a long activity, such as disengaging
from an impact, restarting an action pattern from the middle may be irrele-
vant. This isn’t disastrous — if the action pattern fails and if it is still needed
it can be restarted. However, it is evidence that the solution to the first prob-
lem might not be based simply on increasing the fixed size of a slip stack, but
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rather on allowing a POSH element to persist for only a fixed amount of time
without action selection attention. This solution no longer strictly guarantees
a maximum number of compound elements will be checked. However, it is
more psychologically plausable, in that it models that some sort of priming
or activation remains for a period after a decision is made.
I found a device that allowed me to implement this form of action selec-
tion in Ymir [Tho´risson, 1999]. (See Sections 5.5.1 and 12.3.2.) The current
version of POSH action selection does not retain all of Ymir, but only two
elements: a schedule and a bulletin board. The bulletin board is a form of
short-term recent episodic memory for action selection. It is also useful for
debugging, this is discussed further in Section 8.4.3.
The Ymir control cycle was essentially two-phased. On every cycle:
• add anything needed to the schedule, then
• pass through the schedule
– executing anything pending that you can execute, and
– deleting anything pending that has timed out.
Here is the modified version of POSH that takes advantage of the sched-
uler:
@drive-elements = priority_sort (elements (drive_root));
do (forever) { // unless ‘‘return’’ is called
result = nil;
for this_de in @drive-elements {
if (trigger (this_de) and not-too-recent (frequency (this_de))) {
if goal (this_de)
{ return (succeed); }
result = execute_schedule (this_de);
if (result == nil)
{ add_to_schedule (executable_instance_of (A(this_de)));
result = >; // indicate something happened
}
} // end of for
if (result == nil) // only happens if nothing triggered
{ return (fail); }
} // end of do
Notice that the drive no longer needs to keep track of α — the current
action is now maintained on the action scheduler. On the other hand, compe-
tences and action patterns now need a new bit of state, a timeout, to indicate
how long they should be kept on the schedule.
If you put an action pattern on the schedule, you do something like this:
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put_on_schedule (executable_instance_of (element[0]));
for (iii = 1; iii < action_pattern_length; iii++) {
temp = executable_instance_of (element[iii]);
add_precondition (temp, succeeded (element[iii - 1]));
put_on_schedule (temp);
} // end of for
Here we assume that either executable instance of or put on schedule
somehow reads the timeout for the action-pattern, and computes the time
limit from the current time. If an element fails, the other elements will sit
for a while, but will be cleaned up at some time. Meanwhile, since nothing
could fire, their drive element may have already restarted their root.
A competence is significantly different. It simply puts itself (not any of
its elements) on the schedule when first invoked. When executed, it does this:
for this_ce in @my_elements {
if (trigger (this_ce) and (not-too-many (number_tries (this_ce)))) {
if goal (this_ce)
{ record (succeed); }
else
{ temp_el = executable_instance_of (α(this_ce)));
add_to_schedule (temp_el);
temp_comp = executable_instance_of (me);
add_precondition (temp_comp, terminate (element[iii - 1]));
add_to_schedule (temp_comp); }
} // end of if
} // end of for
record (fail); // nothing triggered
Notice outcomes are now recorded (on the bulletin board) rather than re-
turned. Also, notice that the parent waits for its child to terminate, then au-
tomatically will go through this same process again. If the child is another
competence, it is unlikely to terminate before the parent is cleaned up. How-
ever, it can, and in that case it will continue without the drive-element needing
to restart from the beginning.
One disadvantage of this system is that now execution of nearly all ac-
tions is dependent on searching this short-term memory, the bulletin board.
As such, performance of this system becomes highly dependent on the dura-
tion of this short-term-memory. For debugging, I often have the short term
memory set to 10 minutes, but for production I have it set to only 2 seconds.
The maximum cycle rate for this architecture in Xanalys (formerly Harlequin)
LispWorks on a 400MHx MMX PII with actions some of which wrote to disk
is about 50 Hz if the bulletin board only trims entries after 2 minutes, but it
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runs over 260 Hz with trimming at half a second. Even at half-second trim-
ming, checking the bulletin board still takes nearly 70% of the lisp system
time.
These rates could doubtless be further optimized. For example, I could
more closely follow the example of Ymir [Tho´risson, 1999] and use more
than one bulletin board for different sorts of events. This might drop the
bulletin board search time by an order of magnitude. But speed hasn’t been a
high priority issue yet, even though I am now running some real-time, multi-
agent simulations. Currently, there is more value in building debugging tools
than reducing cycle time.
4.6.4 Summary: Critical Features for POSH Systems
I have presented two different implementations of POSH action selection in
this section. They are both valid, and have different strengths. The for-
mer is faster and cleaner, the latter is slightly more biologically plausible,
and has good handles for debugging. Either will support the BOD process.
The critical aspects of POSH are in both: it supports the BRP, it limits stack
growth and allows cycles in its hierarchy, it supports pseudo-parallelism and
the changing of attention to higher priorities, and it restarts a plan hierarchy
from its root if it terminates.
4.7 Conclusions
The most expedient solution to the design problem of reactive planning is
to categorize action selection into three categories: things that need to be
checked regularly, things that only need to be checked in a particular con-
text, and things that one can get by not checking at all. These categories
correspond to the three types of POSH plan elements: drive collections, com-
petences, and action patterns.
This chapter presented a detailed description of POSH action selection,
including formal descriptions of the fundamental elements, an extended ex-
ample of a control hierarchy, implementation details and a design history. In
the next chapter I discuss the relationship between POSH control and other
architectures with particular focus on the BRP. More generally, that chapter
demonstrates how to transfer technological advances between agent architec-
tures. The following chapters will address the other aspects of BOD modular
behaviors and specialized learning, and the agent development process.
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Chapter 5
Architectural Idioms:
POSH Action Selection in
Other Architectures
5.1 Introduction
In order for a field as a whole to advance, key discoveries must be communi-
cated throughout the field’s research community. In Chapter 3 I demonstrated
some cross-paradigm analysis, but the procedure was time consuming, and
even so omitted many architectures.
In this chapter I propose a meta-methodological strategy for the problem
of incorporating the advances of new architectures into established develop-
ment efforts. My proposal is simple: a researcher, after having developed a
new architecture, should express its major contributions in terms of one or
more of the current ‘standard’ architectures. The result of this process is a set
of differences that can be rapidly understood by and absorbed into established
user communities.
In Chapter 3 I discussed the general applicability of the principles be-
hind the BOD methodology. Since BOD modularity rests on object-oriented
design, if there is an impediment to fully applying BOD in a particular ar-
chitecture, it is usually the lack of POSH action selection. In this chapter,
as a demonstration of the general meta-methodology of transmitting informa-
tion across architectures, I make an example of implementing one of the key
fundamentals of POSH control. Specifically, I describe my experiences im-
plementing BRPs in three different architectures — Ymir Tho´risson [1999],
PRS-CL Myers [1997,1999] and JAM Huber [1999], a Java-based extension
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of UM-PRS; I also discuss a hypothetical implementation in Soar1.
This chapter begins with a discussion of to what extent BRPs already exist
in other architectures. It concludes with a discussion of the roles of architec-
ture, methodology, and toolkit in the problem of intelligent agent design.
5.2 The BRP in Other Reactive Architectures
The operation of the BRP seems so central to reactive planning, that one
would expect it to be expressible in most reactive architectures. And indeed,
the BRP has been developed several times, with varying levels of indepen-
dence [Fikes et al., 1972, Nilsson, 1994, Correia and Steiger-Garc¸a˜o, 1995,
Bryson and McGonigle, 1998]. Presumably Nilsson [1994] was inspired at
least in part by his own previous work with Fikes et al. [1972], however there
is a considerable lag between these developments. I personally was not aware
of Fikes’ work before I read about Shakey [Nilsson, 1984] in 19952. I found
Nilsson’s teleo-reactive plans [Nilsson, 1994] and Correia’s action selection
system shortly thereafter.
Yet despite the fact that some of these implementations have had con-
siderable influence in AI, it is not yet a common attribute of planning sys-
tems calling themselves ‘reactive.’ As this chapter will demonstrate, I have
found this feature surprisingly lacking in several architectures, and totally in-
expressible in others. In effect, architectures using plan-scripting languages
like PRS [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987] or RAP [Firby, 1995] seem to expect
that most of behavior can be sequenced in advance, and that being reactive is
only necessary for dealing with external interruptions by switching plans. On
the other hand, architectures such as subsumption [Brooks, 1991b] or ANA
[Maes, 1990b] expect that there is so little regularity in the arbitration of be-
havior that all actions must be considered for execution at all times. The only
architecture that I have found with a well-established research community
and that works at a similar level of reactiveness to POSH is the teleo-reactive
architecture Nilsson [1994].
1This chapter makes frequent reference to architectures that were introduced and described
in Chapter 3.
2Leslie Pack Kaelbling first saw the similarity between my work and Fikes’ triangle tables,
and recommended I read the Nilsson [1984]. Triangle tables are essentially BRPs automatically
expanded out of sequential plans. Effectively, a new, shorter plan is generated that starts at each
step of the initial sequence and continues to the goal. This allows the plan to be restarted at any
juncture if an action fails, and accounts for the tables’ triangular shape.
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5.3 Architectures, Idioms and Progress in Agent
Design
Because, as I argued in Chapter 1, the development of production-quality
agents always requires the employment of human designers, there is a high
cost associated with switching architectures during a project. In fact, there is a
high cost even for making changes to an architecture. The engineers respon-
sible for building systems in an upgraded architecture require time to learn
new structures and paradigms, and their libraries of existing solutions must
be ported to or rewritten under the new version. These problems alone deter
the adoption of new architectures. They are further exacerbated by the cost,
for the architect, of creating documentation and maintaining a production-
level architecture, and for the project manager, of evaluating new architec-
tures. Nevertheless, new architectures often hold important insights into the
problems of designing intelligence. In this section, I discuss somewhat for-
mally the circumstances under which insights from one architecture can be
transfered to another.
Consider the problem of expressing a feature of one architecture in an-
other. There are two possible outcomes. A feature f1, of architecture A1 may
be completely expressible in A2. Assuming that this expression is not trivial
(e.g. one line of code) then A1 constrains A2 in some way. On the other hand,
if f1 cannot be expressed in A2 without altering the latter architecture, then
A1 extends A2. These conditions are not mutually exclusive — two architec-
tures generally both constrain and extend each other, often in multiple ways.
Identifying these points of difference allows one architecture to be described
in terms of another.
When I speak of the relative expressive power of two architectures, I am
not really comparing their linguistic expressibility in the classical sense. Al-
most all agent architectures are Turing-complete; that is, a universal comput-
ing machine can be constructed within almost any agent architecture. This
universal computing machine can then be used as an implementation substrate
for another agent architecture. So, in the formal sense, all agent architectures
are inter-reducible. I am concerned instead with the kinds of computational
idioms that are efficaciously expressible3 in a particular architecture. In this
sense, an architecture A1 may be considered to extend A2 when there is no
way to express reasonably succinctly the attributes of A1 in A2.
If, on the other hand, a feature f1 of A1 can be translated into a coding
3In computational complexity theory, the notion of reducibility is augmented with the asymp-
totic worst case complexity of the reduction. So, for example, in the theory of NP-completeness,
polynomial-time reducibility plays a crucial role. The notion of efficacious expressibility does
not rely on any criterion so sharply defined as the computational complexity of the reduction
computation, but is intended to evoke a similar spectrum of reduction complexity.
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i f1 of A2 with reasonable efficiency, then that coding i f1 is an idiom. As
I explained above, the existence of such an idiom means A1 constrains A2.
This notion of constraint may seem counterintuitive, because new features of
an architecture are usually thought of as extensions. However, as I argued
in the introduction, extending the capabilities of the developer often means
reducing the expressibility of the architecture in order to biases the search for
the correct solution to the problem of designing an agent.
Although in my example A1 is constrained relative to A2 due to feature
f1 of A1, adding the idiom i f1 is unlikely to constrain A2. A2 retains its full
expressive power so long as the use of i f1 is not mandatory. For an example,
consider object-oriented programming. In a strictly object-based language
such as smalltalk, OOP is a considerable constraint, which can consequently
lead to effective and elegant program design. In contrast, C++ has added the
features of objects, but still allows the full expression of C. Thus, for the C++
programmer, the elegance of OOP is an option, not a requirement.
An idiom is a compact, regularized way of expressing a frequently useful
set of ideas or functionality. I borrow the notion of idiom both from natural
language and computer science, though in computer science, the term ‘id-
iom’ (or ‘design pattern’) is sometimes used for a less rigorous mapping than
I mean to imply. An architecture can be expressed as a set of idioms, either
on programming languages or sometimes on other architectures. Researchers
seeking to demonstrate that their architecture makes a contribution to agent
design might do well to express their architecture in terms of idioms in famil-
iar architectures. In this way, the architecture can be both readily understood
and examined. I demonstrate this approach in the following two sections.
It is important to observe that this meta-methodology is different from
though related to the practice of publishing extensions of architectures. First,
I do not discourage the practice of building entirely new architectures. If an
architecture has been built as an entity, it is more likely to have significant
variation from standard architectures, potentially including vastly different
emphases and specializations for particular tasks. These specializations may
turn out to be generally useful contributions, or to be critical to a particular
set of problems. Second, the idiomatic approach emphasizes the search for
generally applicable strategies. Generality here does not necessarily mean
across all possible problems, but it should mean an idiomatic solution relevant
across a number of different underlying architectures. Thus even if an idiom
is developed in the context of a well known architecture, it would be useful
if, on publication, the researcher describes it in terms of general applicability.
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5.4 Identifying a Valuable Idiom
How does one find a useful architectural feature, and how does one distin-
guish whether it is worth expressing as an idiom? Features are distinguished
by the methodology described in Section 5.3, by comparison and reduction
of an architecture to one or more others. Features can be idioms if they can
be expressed in other architectures. Idioms are valuable within an architec-
ture if they perform useful functions; they are valuable to the community if
they are not yet regular features of existing architectures or methodologies.
In this section, I illustrate the process of identification by going through the
history of the identification of the BRP in my own research. I also give two
counter-examples from the same source.
As introduced in Chapter 2 and described in Chapter 4, the three structural
elements of BOD’s POSH reactive plans are action patterns, competences and
drive collections. To illustrate the search for valuable idioms, I consider a re-
duction of each of these three features in the context of Subsumption Archi-
tecture (SA) [Brooks, 1986], the Agent Network Architecture (ANA) [Maes,
1991a], the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987]
and Soar [Newell, 1990].
Although deceptively simple, action patterns actually required extensions
to the original versions of each of the above architectures except PRS. Within
SA, a sequence can only be expressed within a single behavior, as part of its
FSM. As described in Chapter 3, when the need for behavior sequencing was
discovered, a mechanism for suppressing all but one behavior was developed
[Connell, 1990]. ANA explicitly represents the links of plans through chains
of pre- and post-conditions, but with no privileged activation of a particular
plan’s elements. This sequencing strategy is inadequate [Tyrrell, 1993], and
has been improved in more recent derivative architectures [Rhodes, 1996,
Blumberg, 1996]. Soar initially represented sequences only as production
chains. This mechanism is insufficient in real-time applications. The prob-
lem has now been addressed with a dedicated sequencing mechanism that
monitors durations [Laird and Rosenbloom, 1996]. PRS, on the other hand,
has a reactive plan structure, the Act, which allows for the coding not only of
sequences, but of partial plans. Although an action pattern could therefore be
seen as an idiom on an Act, I have no strong reason to argue that this partic-
ular reduction in power is useful. In conclusion, there is evidence from the
history of multiple architectures that an action pattern is an important feature.
However, it is not one that can easily be implemented as an idiom, because it
generally extends rather than constrains architectures that lack a trivial way
to express it.
As for a parallel mechanism for allowing attention shifts, some imple-
mentation of this feature is ubiquitous in reactive architectures (again, see
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Chapter 3). SA assumes that all behaviors operate in continuous parallel,
and can always grasp attention. ANA is similar — each behavior is always
evaluated as a possible next act. PRS addresses both control and reactiv-
ity on each cycle: it first persists on the currently active plan, then engages
meta-reasoning to check whether a different plan deserves top priority. Soar
also seems to have struck a balance between persistence and reactivity. Be-
ing production based, it is naturally distributed and reactive, similarly to SA
and ANA. Persistence is encouraged not only by the new seriating mecha-
nism mentioned above, but primarily by clustering productions into problem
spaces. A problem space is actually somewhat like a BRP in that it focuses
attention on a subset of possible productions. Because all of these architec-
tures have means for monitoring the environment and switching attention,
introducing drive collections on top of these mechanisms does not have clear
utility.
The BRP is a different matter4. First, despite the several examples from
the planning literature mentioned earlier, it is not present as a single fea-
ture in any of these four architectures. To implement them in SA or ANA
would require extensions, for much the same reason as the implementation
of sequences requires extensions. There is no intrinsic way to favor or order
a set of expressed actions in either architecture except by manipulating the
environment. PRS and Soar, on the other hand, contain sufficient ordering
mechanisms that implementing a BRP idiom should be tractable.
In summary, the value of an idiom is dependent on two things. It must be
expressible but not trivially present in some interesting set of architectures,
and it must be useful. Utility may be indicated by one’s own experience, but
also by the existence of similar features in other architectures. With respect
to the BRP, it is present in several architectures in the literature, and I have
independently found its programming advantages sufficient to lead me to im-
plement it in several architectures besides BOD. The next section documents
these efforts.
5.5 Expressing BRPs in Other Architectures
As I explained in Chapter 4, the BRP along with the sequence are fundamental
to POSH action selection. As the previous section showed, the BRP (at least
in its basic, competence-like form) is a good candidate for an idiom providing
an architecture already has a viable mechanism to support simple sequencing.
In this section, I document the implementation of feature as an idiom on a
number of architectures. Section 5.6 will discuss how to best exploit such
4The fact drive collections are in fact BRPs is irrelevant at this point. They were eliminated
in the previous paragraph due to their function, not their mechanism.
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new architectural features.
5.5.1 Ymir
My first effort to generalize the benefits of POSH action selection was not
in a widely-used standard architecture, but was rather in another relatively
recent one, Ymir ([Tho´risson, 1999] see also [Bryson and Tho´risson, 2000]).
Ymir is designed to build complex agents capable of engaging in multi-modal
dialog. A typical Ymir agent can both hear a human conversant and observe
their gestures. The agent both speaks and provides non-verbal feedback via
an animated character interface with a large number of degrees of freedom.
Ymir is a reactive and behavior-based architecture. Its technical emphasis
is on supporting interpretation of and responses to the human conversant on
a number of different levels of time and abstraction. These levels are the
following:
• a “reactive layer”, for process-related back-channel feedback and low-
level functional analysis. To be effective, this layer must be able oper-
ate within 100 millisecond constraints,
• a “process control layer”, which deals with the reconstruction of dia-
logue structure and monitoring of process-related behaviors by the user,
and
• a “content layer”, for choosing, recognizing, and determining the suc-
cess of content level dialogue goals.
Ymir also contains a key feature, the action scheduler, that autonomously
determines the exact expression of behaviors chosen by the various layers.
This serves to reduce the cognitive load, accelerate the response rate, and
ensure that expressed behavior is smooth and coherent.
Although Ymir excels at handling the complexity of multimodality and
human conversations, it does not have a built in capacity for motivation or
long-term planning. Ymir is purely reactive, forming sentences for turn tak-
ing when prompted by a human user.
Because of Ymir’s action scheduler, the implementation of drives, action
patterns and BRPs was significantly different from my then-current imple-
mentation of POSH action selection (see Section 4.6.2). The scheduler could
be relied on to “clean up” behaviors that had been triggered but were not ex-
pressed after a timeout, but it could also be signaled to allow their lifetimes
to be renewed.
I have already detailed my ultimate solution to implementing BRPs in
this context (see Section 4.6.3). Ymir actually lacked sequences, bit I im-
plemented them simply by posting all of the elements to the schedule, each
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with a unique tag, and all but the first with a precondition requiring that its
predecessor complete before it began operating.
The BRP is implemented as an Ymir behavior object which is posted to
the action-scheduler. When executed, the BRP selects a step (as per Sec-
tion 4.3.2) and adds the step to the scheduler. The BRP then adds itself to
the scheduler with the termination of its child as a precondition. The original
copy of the BRP then terminates and is cleaned up by the scheduler. If the
child or its descendents maintain control for any length of time, the ‘new’
parent BRP will also be cleaned up (see further Section 4.6.3). Otherwise,
the BRP persists in selecting plan elements until it either terminates or is ter-
minated by another decision process.
The implementation of POSH action selection in Ymir was so clean, and
the action-scheduler feature so apparently useful, that I wound up adopting
these features back into my own POSH implementation after finishing work
with Ymir, as documented in Section 4.6.3.
5.5.2 PRS-CL
My next implementation of BRPs came during a project exploring the use
of reactive planning in dialogue management. Because this was a relatively
large-scale project, a well-established architecture, PRS, was chosen for the
reactive planning. Because of other legacy code, the language of the project
was Lisp. Consequently, we used the SRI implementation of PRS, PRS-CL
[Myers, 1997,1999]. PRS-CL provides not only an implementation of PRS,
but also documentation and a set of GUI tools for developing and debugging
PRS-CL agent systems. These tools are useful both for creating and debug-
ging the main plan elements, the Act graphs.
Acts are roughly equivalent to action patterns described above, but sig-
nificantly more powerful, allowing for parallel or alternative routes through
the plan space and for cycles. I initially thought that a BRP would be best
expressed within a single Act. However, there is no elegant way to express
the inhibition of lower priority elements on an Act choice node. Instead, I
implemented the BRP as a collection of Acts which are activated in response
to the BRP’s name being asserted as a goal. This results in the activation of
all the Acts (steps) whose preconditions have been met.
PRS-CL has no built-in priority attribute for selecting between Acts. Se-
lection is handled by meta-rules, which operate during the second half of the
PRS control cycle (as mentioned in Section 5.4). I created a special function
for the meta-rule that selects which of the Acts that have been triggered on a
cycle is allowed to persist. This function is shown in Figure 5.1.
The BRP function I built for PRS-CL depends on a list of priority lists,
where each priority list is associated with the name of the BRP. This is some-
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(defun BRP (list-of-ACTs)
(let* ((comp-list (consult-db ’(prs::speaker-competence prs::x.1)))
(current-BRP (BRP-name (first comp-list)))
(current-priorities (priorities-from-name current-BRP)))
; loop over priorities in order, terminate on first one available
; to fire (as indicated by presence in list-of-ACTs)
(do ((priorities current-priorities (rest priorities))
(result))
; this is the ‘until’ condition in a lisp ‘do’ loop ---
; if it is true, the ‘do’ returns a list containing ‘‘result’’
((setf result (BRP-find-ACT (first priorities) list-of-ACTs))
(list result))
; if we have no priorities, we return something random
(unless (and priorities list-of-ACTs)
(return (set-randomly list-of-ACTs))))
))
)) ; defun BRP
Figure 5.1: BRP prioritization implemented as a function for PRS-CL meta-
reasoning. Since relative priority is situation dependent, the BRP function
must query the database to determine the current competence context. Priori-
ties are maintained as a list of Act names, each associated with a BRP name.
what unfortunate, because it creates redundant information. The Act graphs
contain similar information implicitly. Any such replication often leads to
bugs caused by inconsistencies in long-term maintenance. Ideally, the prior-
ity lists would be edited and maintained within the same framework as the
Acts are edited and maintained, so that consistency could be checked auto-
matically.
The fact that PRS-CL and its associated tool set emphasize the construc-
tion of very complex plan elements in the form of Acts, but provide relatively
little support for the construction of meta-rules or the manipulation of plans
as hierarchies, would seem to reflect an expectation that switching attention
during plans is an unusual exception. Normal behavior is based on the execu-
tion of the elaborate Act plans. This puts PRS-CL near the opposite end of the
reactive planning spectrum from architectures such as Subsumption (SA). As
I described in the beginning of this chapter, SA assumes that unpredictability
in action scheduling is the norm, and predictably sequenced actions are the
exception. The BRP reflects a moderation between these two extremes. The
BRP expects and handles the unexpected, but provides for the specification
of solutions that require multiple, ordered steps.
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5.5.3 JAM / UM-PRS
I was not entirely happy with PRS-CL, so I began exploring other architec-
tures for the same dialogue project. JAM is a Java based extension of UM-
PRS, which is in turn a C++ version of PRS that is more recently developed
than PRS-CL. The control cycle in all three languages is similar. JAM and
UM-PRS have somewhat simplified their analog of the Act so that it no longer
allows cycles, but it is still more powerful than POSH action patterns. The
JAM Act analog is called simply a “plan”; for clarity, I will refer to these as
JAM-plans.
JAM-plans do have a notion of priority built in, which is then used by
the default meta-reasoner to select between the JAM-plans that have been
activated on any particular cycle. My current implementation of BRPs in JAM
is consequently a simplified version of the BRP in PRS-CL. A JAM BRP also
consists primarily of a set of JAM-plans which respond to an “achieve” goal
with the name of the BRP. However, in JAM, the priority of a step within
the BRP is specified by hand-coding priority values into the JAM-plans. This
is simpler and neater than the PRS-CL solution described above (and works
more reliably). On the other hand, losing the list structure results in the loss
of a single edit point for all of the priorities of a particular competence. This
again creates exposure to potential software bugs if a competence needs to be
rescaled and some element’s priority is accidently omitted.
Both PRS implementations lack the elegance of the Ymir and BOD solu-
tions in that Acts or JAM-plans contain both local intelligence in their plan
contents, and information about their parent’s intelligence, in the priority and
goal activation. In POSH plans, all local information can be reused in a num-
ber of different BRPs, potentially with different relative priorities. The Ymir
BRP implementation also allows for this, because the BRP (and sequence)
information is present in wrapper objects, rather than in the plans themselves.
I have not yet added this extra level of complexity in either PRS-CL or JAM,
but such an improvement should be possible in principle. However, I did
not find the advantages of working within these architectures sufficient to
compensate for the difficulties, so I returned to maintaining my own action-
selection system.
5.5.4 Soar
I have not actually implemented a BRP in Soar yet, but for completeness with
relation to the previous section, I include a short description of the expected
mechanism. Much as in PRS, I would expect each currently operable mem-
ber element of the BRP to trigger in response to their mutual goal. This could
be achieved either by preconditions, or exploiting the problem space mecha-
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nism. In Soar, if more than one procedure triggers, this results in an impasse
which can be solved via meta-level reasoning. I assume it would be relatively
simple to add a meta-level reasoning system that could recognize the highest
priority element operable, since Soar is intended to be easily extendible to
adapt various reasoning systems. This should operate correctly with or with-
out chunking. This should also avoid the problem I had with PRS of including
priority information on the individual steps.
The Soar impasse mechanism is also already set for monitoring lack of
progress in plans, a useful feature in BRPs mentioned in Section 4.3.2. In
POSH competences, retries are limited by setting habituation limits on the
number of times a particular plan step will fire during a single episode (see
Section 4.4.2). Ymir also supplies its own monitoring system; I have not yet
addressed this problem in PRS-CL or JAM implementations.
5.6 Architecture, Methodology, or Tool?
An agent architecture has been defined as a methodology by which an agent
can be constructed [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1995]. However, for the pur-
pose of this discussion, I will narrow this definition to be closer to what seems
to be the more common usage of the term. For this discussion, an architec-
ture is a piece of software that allows the specification of an agent in an ex-
ecutable format. This actually moves the definition of architecture closer to
the original definition of agent language, as a collection of “the right primi-
tives for programming an intelligent agent” [Wooldridge and Jennings, 1994].
A methodology is a set of practices which is appropriate for constructing an
agent. A tool is a GUI or other software device which creates code suitable
for an architecture (as defined above), but code which may still be edited. In
other words, the output of an architecture is an agent, while the output of a
tool is code for an agent. A methodology has no output, but governs the use
of architectures and tools.
This chapter emphasizes the use of idioms to communicate new concepts
throughout the community regardless of architecture. In natural language, an
idiom can be recognized as a phrase whose meaning cannot be deduced from
the meanings of the individual words. If an idiom is built directly into an
architecture, as a feature, there may be an analogous loss. Some features may
be impossible to express in the same architecture, such as the BRP and fully
autonomous behavior modules. Features implemented directly as part of an
architecture reduce its flexibility. However, if a feature is implemented as an
idiom, that can be overridden by direct access to the underlying code, then
the problem of conflicting idioms can be dealt with at a project management
level, rather than through architectural revision.
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Accessibility to different idioms may explain why some architectures,
such as SA or ANA, despite wide interest, have not established communities
of industrial users, while others, such as Soar and PRS, have. Soar and PRS
are sufficiently general to allow for the expression of a number of method-
ologies. However, as I said earlier, generality is not necessarily the most
desirable characteristic of an agent development approach. If it were, the
dominant agent “architectures” would be lisp and C. Bias towards develop-
ment practices that have proven useful accelerates the development process.
I believe GUI toolkits are therefore one of the more useful ways to com-
municate information. They are essentially encoded methodologies: their
output can be generalized to a variety of architectures (see further [DeLoach
and Wood, 2001]). A toolkit might actually be an assemblage of tools chosen
by a project manager. Each tool might be seen as supporting a particular id-
iom or related set of idioms. A GUI tool that would support the BRP would
need to be able to parse files listing primitive functions, and existing sequen-
tial plans and BRPs. A new BRP could then be created by assembling these
items into a prioritized list with preconditions. This assemblage can then be
named, encoded and stored as a new BRP. Such a tool might also facilitate the
editing of new primitive elements and preconditions in the native architecture.
Of course, not all idioms will necessarily support or require GUI inter-
faces. Ymir’s action scheduler, discussed in Section 5.5.1, is a structure that
might easily be a useful idiom in any number of reactive architectures if they
are employed in handling a large numbers of degrees of freedom. In this
case, the “tool” is likely to be a stand-alone module that serves as an API
to the agent’s body. Its function would be to simplify control by smooth-
ing the output of the system, much as the cerebellum intercedes between the
mammalian forebrain and the signals sent to the muscular system.
What then belongs in an architecture? I believe architectures should only
contain structures of extremely general utility. Program structures which
might be best expressed as architectural attributes are those where profes-
sional coding of an attribute assists in the efficiency of the produced agents.
This follows the discussion of agent languages given in [Meyer, 1999]. Ex-
amples of such general structures are the interpreter cycle in PRS or the pro-
duction system and RETE algorithm in Soar. Other structures, such as the
BRP, should be implemented via idioms, and tools developed to facilitate the
correct generation of those idioms.
Again, I do not discourage the development of novel architectures. An
architecture may be a useful level of abstraction for developing specialized
ideas and applications. However, when distributing these inventions and dis-
coveries to the wider community, tools and idioms may be a more useful de-
vice. Note that a specialist in the use of a particular tool could be employed on
a number of projects in different languages or architectures with no learning
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overhead, provided the tool’s underlying idioms have already been expressed
in those languages or architectures.
5.7 Conclusions and Discussion
In this chapter I have argued that methodology is the main currency of agent
design. Novel architectures are useful platforms for developing methodology,
but they are not very useful for communicating those advances to the com-
munity at large. Instead, the features of the architecture should be distilled
through a process of reduction to more standard architectures. This allows for
the discovery of both extensions and idioms. Idioms are particularly useful,
because they allow for methodological advances to be absorbed into estab-
lished communities of developers. Given that this is the aim, I consider the
development of tools for efficiently composing these idioms to often be a bet-
ter use of time than attempting to bring an architecture to production quality.
As an ancillary point, the discussion of reactivity in Section 5.5.2 above
demonstrates that this process of reduction is a good way to analyze and de-
scribe differences in architectures. This process is analogous to the process
of “embedding” described in [Hindriks et al., 1999] (see also [Hindriks et al.,
2001]), and the comparisons done in Chapter 3. The reductions in that chapter
were not particularly rigorous. Doing such work with the precision of [Hin-
driks et al., 1999] might be very illuminating, particularly if the reductions
were fully implemented and tested. A particularly valuable unification might
be one between a BDI architecture such as UM-PRS or JAM and Soar, since
these are two large communities of agent researchers with little overlapping
work.
The agent community’s search for agent methodology is analogous to
(though hopefully more directed than) evolution’s search for the genome.
When we find a strategy set which is sufficiently powerful, we can expect an
explosion in the complexity and utility of our agents. While we are search-
ing, we need both a large variety of novel innovations, and powerful methods
of recombination of the solutions we have already found. This chapter has
focussed on the means of recombination. I presented a definition of idiom,
explained the process I used to determine that the BRP is an important one,
and then described my experiences in implementing the BRP in three archi-
tectures. I also discussed the issue of publication — if one’s top priority is
communicating one’s advances in engineering, then I recommend distribut-
ing:
• Descriptions of that advance in at least one (preferably several) differ-
ent architectures, languages or paradigms, and
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• Toolkits which can be adapted to a variety of languages and architec-
tures, rather than a particular architecture.
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Chapter 6
Modularity and Specialized
Learning
6.1 Introduction
Chapter 4 focussed on the organization of behavior — what actions should
occur in what order, what motivations should be met in what circumstances.
I have argued that the best means to address these issues is through hand-
crafted reactive plans. However, whether plans are created by human design,
by automated planning, by social learning or by evolutionary search, their
construction still battles problems of combinatorics and complexity. Regard-
less of how good a representation is chosen, and how good a method of con-
struction, the plausibility of generating useful reactive plans depends on the
size of the space that must be searched for an appropriate plan.
There are two ways to limit this search space. One is to limit the com-
plexity of the full task specification. If we are building a nut-cracker, we
could require it to understand natural language so it could be instructed to
find, open and deliver a nut, or we could just use a good-sized rock. The
power of simple approaches and simple agents has been thoroughly explored
in the reactive-planning literature [e.g. Brooks and Flynn, 1989]. It will not
be discussed at length in this dissertation, although I believe it is a critically
useful insight, and one supported by the BOD process.
The other way to limit the required complexity of the reactive plan is to
increase the power of the plan’s primitives. This is essentially delegation, and
of course comes with a trade off. In order to make it as easy as possible to
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create a particular agent, we must strike a balance between the complexity of
building the reactive plans, and the complexity of building the plan primitives.
Behavior-oriented design helps to do this in three ways:
1. by making it as easy as possible to design powerful plans,
2. by making it as easy as possible to design powerful primitives, and
3. by co-developing the plans and primitives simultaneously.
Co-developing the plans and primitives encourages the designer to make the
necessary tradeoffs as they become apparent. This is the topic of Chapter 8.
The next two chapters focus on designing powerful primitives as sim-
ply as possible. BOD does this by exploiting principles of modular software
engineering. This chapter explains the roles of modularity and specialized
learning in a BOD agent. I propose a decomposition of the possible roles
of adaptation in intelligent control, and illustrate these with a toy example.
The following chapter, Chapter 7, goes into more detail on each type of rep-
resentation, and presents two working systems as examples. The first is a
blocks-world assembly simulation, the second a map-building autonomous
mobile robot.
6.2 Behaviors
The fundamental capabilities of the BOD agents are constructed as a behavior
library. Behaviors are software modules expressing a particular capacity of
an agent in terms of:
• the actions needed to execute the capacity,
• perceptual information needed to inform these actions, and
• the variable state required to support either perception or action.
Behaviors are normally encoded as objects in an object-oriented language
such as Java, C++, Python or the Common Lisp Object System (CLOS).
However, they can also be independent processes or software packages, so
long as a simple interface is built to the reactive planning system.
There are two types of interface between action selection and behaviors:
• action primitives, which reference actions the behaviors are able to ex-
press, and
• sense primitives, which reference perceptual state the behaviors main-
tain.
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Perception, which is built into behaviors, has two major functions in a
BOD agent. It is used directly by the behavior to determine how an action
is expressed, and indirectly through action selection to determine when an
aspect of behavior should be expressed. Perception can also trigger action
directly with a behavior, provided this cannot interfere with the workings of
any other behavior (see Figure 2.1, page 40).
POSH action selection will wait until a primitive returns. This allows
a primitive’s duration to reflect the duration of an act, which is a necessary
feature for action patterns (see Section 4.3.1). However, the duration of any
pause in the action selection sets the limit for the granularity of the reactive-
ness of the entire agent. Consequently, for an act of any significant duration,
it is better to use an action primitive that simply prompts the possibly already
engaged activity of the behavior. This can be complemented with the use of
sense primitives to allow the POSH system to determine when the action has
finished, or should be finished.
Examples of both approaches can be seen in the mobile robot controller
shown in Section 7.6.2. When the robot actually hits an obstacle, it engages in
an extended action pattern to disengage itself which may take over a minute.
Higher level drives are only checked between items of the action pattern.
On the other hand, during normal navigation, the action primitive ‘move’
merely adjusts or confirms target velocities. The forward-motion behavior is
expressed continuously until progress is blocked, but action selection operates
normally throughout this behavior expression.
6.3 Learning
This chapter talks about the role of specialized learning in simplifying the
specification of an agent. It is important to understand that from an engineer-
ing perspective, the distinctions between learning and other forms of adapta-
tion are somewhat arbitrary. Consequently, I mean to use the term ‘learning’
in a broader sense than is conventional. Learning here denotes any mean-
ingful, persistent change in computational state. By “meaningful” I mean
affecting expressed behavior. By “persistent” I mean lasting longer than a
transition between control states. Learning in this sense encompasses more
than just “lifetime learning” — semantic or category acquisition that persists
for the lifetime of the agent. It also includes more transient knowledge acqui-
sition, such as short-term memory for perceptual processes.
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Time Scale of Human Action Face-to-Face Interaction
Scale Time Units System World Levels
(sec) (theory)
107 months
106 weeks Social Band
105 days
104 hours Task ⇑
103 10 Minutes Task Rational Band ‖
102 minutes Task ‖
101 10 sec Unit Task ⇑ ⇓ Conversation
100 1 sec Operations Cognitive Band ⇓ Turn
10−1 100 ms Deliberate Act m Back Channel
10−2 10 ms Neural Circuit
10−3 1 ms Neuron Biological Band
10−4 100 µs Organelle
Figure 6.1: The different time courses for different behaviors involved in a
dialogue. Conversations can take from∼ 10 seconds to hours, turns take only
∼ 1–30 seconds, and back-channel feedback (often subliminal) happens in ∼
100–300 msec. After Tho´risson [1999], after categories in Newell [1990].
Figure 6.1, for example, shows the large number of different time-scales
on which events happen, and for which memory is required in order to re-
spond appropriately. This figure shows the different time scales for the con-
stituent behaviors of human conversation, including gestures. Each process-
ing level requires its own information, but there is no reason for memory of
this information to persist significantly longer than the process that attends to
it. There are reasons of capacity for limiting the duration of these memories.
Indeed, the nature of language processes almost certainly reflects evolution-
ary optimizations in the face of capacity limits [Kirby, 1999].
This section motivates the use in BOD of highly specialized representa-
tions and a wide variety of time durations. I intend to make it clear that such
learning is a significant part of both natural and artificial intelligence. The
following sections will discuss the use of state and learning in BOD. The
relationship between BOD and other models of natural and artificial intelli-
gence is discussed at greater length in Chapters 11 and 3 respectively.
6.3.1 Learning in Animals
Animals are our primary working example of what we consider intelligence
to be [Brooks, 1991a, McGonigle, 1991]. Autonomous-agent research more
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than most branches of artificial intelligence has always acknowledged the ex-
tent to which it exploits the solutions of natural intelligence [see for example
Meyer et al., 2000, Dautenhahn and Nehaniv, 1999].
Earlier this century, behaviorists (psychologists and animal researchers
who concentrated on laboratory experiments), proposed that animals learn
only through a general process of being able to create associations.
The [behaviorists’ general process assumption] position is that
all learning is based on the capacity to form associations; there
are general laws of learning that apply equally to all domains of
stimuli, responses, and reinforcers; the more frequent the pair-
ings between the elements to be associated, the stronger the as-
sociative strength; the more proximate the members of an asso-
ciation pair, the more likely the learning.
[Gallistel et al., 1991]
Learning by association, also called ‘conditioning’, does appear to be a
general learning mechanism with parameters that hold across species, pre-
sumably indicating a common underlying mechanism. However, behaviorist
research itself eventually demonstrated that animals cannot learn to associate
any arbitrary stimulus with any arbitrary response. Pigeons can learn to peck
for food, but cannot learn to peck to avoid a shock. Conversely, they can learn
to flap their wings to avoid a shock, but not for food [Hineline and Rachlin,
1969]. In related experiments, rats presented with “bad” water learned dif-
ferent cues for its badness depending on the consequences of drinking it. If
drinking lead to shocks, they learned visual or auditory cues and if drink-
ing lead to poisoning they learned taste or smell cues [Garcia and Koelling,
1966].
These examples demonstrate highly specific, constrained and ecologically
relevant learning mechanisms. For example, the content of the associations
rats are able to make biases their learning towards information likely to be
relevant: poison is often indicated by smell or taste, while acute pain is often
the consequence of something that can be seen or heard. Such results were
originally interpreted as constraints placed on general learning to avoid dan-
gerous associations, but research has since indicated the inverse. Specialized
systems exist to form important associations [Roper, 1983]. For example,
poison avoidance in the rats is handled by a specific one-shot-learning mech-
anism in the olfactory section of their amygdala.
The current ethological hypothesis is that learning by an individual organ-
ism serves as a last resort for evolution [Roper, 1983, Gallistel et al., 1991].
It is introduced only when behavior cannot be fully predetermined, because
the competence involved requires flexibility on a less than evolutionary time
scale. Further, such learning is not necessarily associative. Barn owl chicks
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learn to calibrate acoustically the precise location of prey (necessary because
it is dependent on the shape of the individual bird’s head) and bees learn
the ephemeris of the sun for navigation (dependent on season and latitude).
Rats learn navigation through unfamiliar environments regardless of the pres-
ence of explicit reward [Blodgett, 1929, Tolman and Honzik, 1930, Tolman,
1948, Adams, 1984]. These examples suggest that animals may be born with
limited units of variable state which are instantiated during development by
observing the world.
Variable instantiation can also take the form of perceptual learning or cat-
egorization. Vervet monkeys have three distinctive warning cries for preda-
tors which require different defensive action. These cries are dedicated to
pythons, martial eagles, and leopards. Baby vervets make cries from a very
early age, but across more general objects. For example, they may give the
‘eagle’ cry for anything in the sky, the ‘leopard’ cry for any animal, the
‘python’ cry for a stick on the ground. They are born attending to the sorts of
stimuli they need to be aware of, but learn fine discrimination experientially
[Seyfarth et al., 1980].
It should be noted that animal learning is not quite as clean as this short
and admittedly biased review implies. For example, evolutionary-modeling
research on the Baldwin Effect suggests that there is little selective pressure to
genetically hard-code things that are consistently and universally learned by
individuals of a species [Hinton and Nowlan, 1987]. Further, although animal
learning is specialized, individual elements are not necessarily constrained
to a single purpose or behavior. A single adaptive solution or mechanism
may be leveraged by multiple processes once established. Nevertheless, the
dominance of specialized learning theory in ethology is sufficient to have
elicited the following description from de Waal [1996] for a popular science
audience:
The mind does not start out as a tabula rasa, but rather as a check-
list with spaces allotted to particular types of incoming informa-
tion.
[de Waal, 1996, p.35]
In a BOD system, these “spaces” are the variable state at the heart of the
behaviors.
6.3.2 Reactive and Behavior-Based Modeling of Intelligence
The most convincingly animal-like artificial agents have typically been pro-
duced under the reactive and behavior-based approaches to artificial intelli-
gence [e.g. Blumberg, 1996, Tu, 1999, Sengers, 1999]. However, none of
these have systematically supported the exploitation of multiple, interacting
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forms of specialized learning as the previous section suggests animals have.
This section reviews the history of reactive and behavior-based approaches to
in order to explain why.
The reactive approach to AI requires that an agent respond more or less
directly to each situation, without the intervention of detailed deliberation or
planning between sensation and action. Although this approach runs counter
to many intuitive notions of rationality and intelligence, it has proved effec-
tive for problems ranging from navigation-based robot tasks [Connell, 1990,
Horswill, 1993] to playing video games [Agre and Chapman, 1987] to mod-
eling human perception and problem solving [Ballard et al., 1997].
In behavior-based AI many small, relatively simple elements of intelli-
gence act in parallel, each handling its own area of expertise [Brooks, 1991b,
Mataric´, 1997]. In theory, these simpler elements are both easier to design and
more likely to have evolved. The apparent complexity of intelligent behavior
arises from two sources: the interaction between multiple units running in
parallel, and the complexity of the environment the units are reacting to.
The central design problem for behavior-based systems is thus behavior
arbitration: determining which parallel module controls physical behavior at
any one time. This is a problem not only for design but also during develop-
ment. It can be very difficult to determine if faulty behavior is the result of
one or more behaviors operating simultaneously.
The central problem of reactive planning is somewhat different. In what is
sometimes called the external Markov assumption, fully reactive planning ex-
pects that the next action can be entirely determined by external state. Unfor-
tunately, this is false (recall the monkey holding the banana in Section 2.3.2).
Most intelligent agents will often find themselves experiencing identical en-
vironments as the result of different original initiatives that should require the
agent to select different behaviors. For example, the offices in a laboratory
where a robot operates may be connected by a single hallway. The hallway
is essentially the same environment whichever office the robot needs to en-
ter next. Further, even if situations are different, they may appear the same
to the limited perception of the robot, a problem sometimes referred to as
perceptual aliasing.
Behavior-based systems are not necessarily reactive. Minsky [1985] in-
tended planning and complex representation to be parts of the elements of
his “society of agencies”. Reactive systems, on the other hand, are likely to
be at least partly behavior-based. Decomposing intelligence into large units
decreases the number of actions to be selected between. This makes reacting
easier.
In practice, behavior-based systems do tend to be reactive. This is be-
cause the first widely known example of behavior-based AI was also strongly
reactive and confounded the two paradigms. This is the Subsumption Ar-
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chitecture [Brooks, 1989]. Although Brooks himself championed specialized
learning early [Brooks, 1991b, pp. 157–158], in the same paper he states:
We do claim however, that there need be no explicit representa-
tion of either the world or the intentions of the system to generate
intelligent behaviors for a Creature. . . Even at a local level we
do not have traditional AI representations. We never use tokens
which have any semantics that can be attached to them. . . There
are no variables that need instantiation in reasoning processes.
There are no rules which need to be selected through pattern
matching. There are no choices to be made. To a large extent,
the world determines the action of the Creature.
[Brooks, 1991b, p. 149]
“The world is its own best model” became a mantra of behavior-based AI.
This is a view that I largely agree with, but not to the extreme of this quotation,
and even less so the extreme to which it was interpreted.
Another problem with behavior-based AI was that, in their struggle to
minimize state, the early architects of reactive systems [e.g. Brooks, 1991b,
Maes, 1989] complicated both learning and control unnecessarily by con-
founding the flow of information with the flow of control. BOD divides the
issues of control, or when a behavior is expressed, from perception and ac-
tion, or how it is expressed. One of the most significant contributions of this
dissertation is the integration of behavior-based control and systematic sup-
port for developing specialized learning and representations. This integration
is deceptively obvious from the perspective of object-oriented design, but it is
a significant advance in the state-of-the-art for behavior-based architectures.
6.4 State and Learning in BOD
An autonomous agent in a dynamic environment should be as reactive as
possible. Learning is applied when programming control is otherwise pro-
hibitively complex. For example, if the triggers that discriminate the set of
elements of a competence become too convoluted, either because of multiple
dependencies or multiple steps to find those dependencies, it will be easier to
reduce the triggers to one or two statements based on new perceptual state.
In general, learning should be used as little as possible. In particular,
an obvious indication that it has been overused is if the agent cannot learn re-
quired perceptual information reliably. The BOD thesis that intelligent agents
can best be developed through the use of specialized learning modules is re-
ally a restatement of the well-established result that learning is dependent on
bias [Kaelbling, 1997]. We attempt to maximize bias by minimizing learning
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and constraining each necessary adaptive element individually. When learn-
ing cannot be performed reliably, a further constraint is needed. Notice that
the additional information for that constraint may take the form of more per-
ceptual state rather than more control.
The introduction of new perceptual state also implies that some new be-
havior will be needed to keep the state continuously updated, or at least make
it appear to be so, so that some value is always available on demand. The
BOD approach emphasizes the separate flow of control from the flow of data,
but the continuous flow of data is not eliminated. Remember again Figure 2.1
(page 40) which shows the behaviors as autonomous units, with action se-
lection as a filter on their expressed acts. The reactive hierarchical control
architecture is developed in conjunction with the behaviors it triggers. New
perceptual requirements driven by the action selection can in turn motivate
new state and learning, which requires new behavior modules.
6.4.1 Types of State
Learning and knowledge are expressed in different types of state which we
can divide into four categories:
Control State State in the form of the currently active behavior or behav-
iors, and the paths that activation can follow. Control state is analogous to
a program counter — it records the immediate past in terms of action selec-
tion and determines, in combination with sensory information, the agent’s
next act. Conventional AI systems hold control state in a plan, in which a
program pointer determines what the next step should be. Some plan-less
behavior-based architectures [e.g. Brooks, 1991b] hold similar state in finite
state machines (FSMs), though here the information is distributed amongst
behaviors.
Deictic Variables Simple, pointer-like variables which refer to a particular
object to which the agent is currently attending. Deictic variables allow a sys-
tem to generalize over cases where particular plans embodied in control state
may operate. An example from ethology is the classic work on imprinting by
Lorenz [1973]: a gosling will follow and learn from whatever mother-shaped
thing it sees (possibly a baby-buggy) during a critical period after hatching.
Upon reaching adulthood, a male goose will try to mate with similar objects.
There is considerable evidence that humans use similar strategies [Ballard
et al., 1997, Horowitz and Wolfe, 1998]. Rhodes [1995] has shown how de-
ictic representation significantly extends purely reactive architectures.
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Perceptual and Motor Memory Specialized systems and representations
where information can accumulate. Perceptual memory may last for only
a fraction of a second, or for the lifetime of the agent. Perception requires
memory because very little information is available in each snapshot of sen-
sory information. Motor control may require memory if fine-tuning cannot
be specified in advance.
Meta-State State about other internal state, or learning to learn. Although
the distinction between learning and learning to learn may seem obscure, it
is supported by biological research. For example, Bannerman et al. [1995]
demonstrates that maze-learning ability is intact in mice that have lost hip-
pocampal learning, provided they have prior experience in learning mazes.
Many researchers have suggested such ability is critical to developing human-
like intelligence [e.g. Elman et al., 1996].
6.4.2 Choosing Representations in BOD
This decomposition of state is roughly analogous to the decomposition of
control state presented in Section 2.3. In this case, favoring simplicity is
favoring a more reactive representation. Intelligence is more reactive when it
relies on simpler representations.
• Control state is the simplest element of this typology. It is not neces-
sarily reactive, but reactive systems all have some element of control
state, made reactive by using constant sensory monitoring to determine
the branches between state. Control state does not represent the world,
except indirectly. It must deal with its environment. Consequently,
information about the environment can be deduced from the control
structure.
• Deictic variables are set to represent or at least reference some par-
ticular object in or aspect of the environment. As such, they restrict
attention and make control more manageable. They should be used
when control structures would otherwise be replicated. Replication of
control state is cumbersome and unreliable in terms of an evolving sys-
tem, since multiple instantiations may need to have the same updating.
It also consumes program space and programmer time.
• Excessive control state may also indicate the need for perceptual mem-
ory. Determining the appropriate context for a behavior must not re-
quire too many control steps, or the system will become complicated
and slow. This situation indicates that the sensory information for
determining the context should be consolidated into a representation.
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Such representations can be updated by processes parallel to the con-
trol structure, while the interface to the control system can be reduced
to a single “sensory” check. Determining the need for adaptive state for
motor control is similar. Perceptual state serves as the basis of behavior
decomposition in BOD (see Section 7.6.4).
• State needed for motor control may also be stored in behaviors. Al-
though none of the experiments described in this dissertation have used
the strategy, there are many examples in the AI literature of learned
control that could be of use to a BOD agent. Examples include the
learned passing and kicking behaviors of Stone and Veloso [1999]’s
soccer-playing agents, Schaal and Atkeson [1994]’s learned arm con-
trol, and the models learned for video agents by Baumberg and Hogg
[1996] and Brand et al. [1997]. Other related work includes the fuzzy
behaviors used in the robot of Konolige and Myers [1998], and the
vector maps used byArkin [1998]. We have already discussed includ-
ing such often-self-contained algorithms into a BOD agent (see Sec-
tion 2.2). In Chapter 12 I describe integrating BOD into an architecture,
Ymir [Tho´risson, 1999], with a special behavior for micro-managing
motor control.
• Meta-state is necessary for an agent to learn from or redescribe its own
experience or alter its own processes. Karmiloff-Smith [1992] proposes
that redescription of knowledge is central to human development. For
example, the ability to learn a skill as a unit by rote then decompose
its components for reuse in a different strategy. Norman and Shallice
[1986] argue that deliberation is a way to bring increased attention to
bear on routine processes, thus increasing their precision or reliability.
BOD does not really support the use of meta-state, though its might be
modeled essentially as perceptual state. The main purpose of BOD is to re-
place the long, frequently arcane process of development by an organism
with a long, but hopefully orderly process of development by an engineer.
Perhaps because of this emphasis, I have not yet found a simple heuristic for
determining when meta-learning is necessary or preferable to a new phase of
human design. Possible future extensions to BOD to support meta-learning
are discussed briefly in Section 7.7 and more extensively in Chapter 11.
6.5 Trading Off Control and Learning
To demonstrate the differences between representational styles, let’s think
about an insect robot with two ‘feelers’ (bump sensors), but no other way of
sensing its environment.
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Figure 6.2: An insect-like robot with no long-range sensors (e.g. eyes) needs
to use its feelers to find its way around a box.
6.5.1 Control State Only
This plan is in the notation from Chapter 2, except that words that reference
other bits of control state rather than primitive actions are in bold face. As-
sume that the ‘walk’ primitives take some time (say 5 seconds) and move the
insect a couple of centimeters on the diagram. Also, assume turning traces
an arc rather than happening in place (this is the way most 6 legged robots
work.) Below is probably the simplest program that can be written using
entirely control state.
walk ⇒
x
〈 (left-feeler-hit) ⇒ avoid-obstacle-left
(right-feeler-hit) ⇒ avoid-obstacle-right
⇒ walk-straight
〉
(6.1)
avoid-obstacle-left ⇒ 〈walk backwards→ walk right→ walk left〉 (6.2)
avoid-obstacle-right ⇒ 〈walk backwards→ walk left→ walk right〉 (6.3)
6.5.2 Deictic State as Well
If we are willing to include a behavior with just one bit of variable state in it,
then we can simplify the control state for the program.
In this behavior, the bit hit-left? serves as the deictic variable the-side-I-
just-hit-on. Avoid-hit and compensate-avoid turn in the appropriate direc-
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deictic-avoid
hit-left?
avoid-hit, feeler-hit,
compensate-avoid
oo
feeler info
oo
tion by accessing this variable. This allows a reduction in redundancy in the
plan, including the elimination of one of the action patterns.
walk ⇒
x〈 (feeler-hit) ⇒ avoid-obstacle⇒ walk-straight
〉
(6.4)
avoid-obstacle ⇒ 〈walk backwards→ avoid hit→ compensate avoid〉
(6.5)
6.5.3 Specialized Instead of Deictic State
Instead of using a simple reference, we could also use a more complicated
representation, say an allocentric representation of where the obstacle is rela-
tive to the bug that is updated automatically as the bug moves, and forgotten
as the bug moves away from the location of the impact. Since this strategy
requires the state to be updated continuously as the bug moves, walking must
be a method (find-way) on this behavior.
specialized-avoid
local-mapstore-obstacle
back-up, find-wayoo
feeler info
oo
walk ⇒
x〈 (feeler-hit) ⇒ react-to-bump⇒ find-way
〉
(6.6)
react-to-bump ⇒ 〈store-obstacle→ walk backwards〉 (6.7)
If this is really the only navigation ability our bug has, then the vast in-
crease in complexity of this behavior does not justify the savings in control
state. On the other hand, if our bug already has some kind of allocentric rep-
resentation, it might be sensible to piggy-back the feeler information on top
of it. For example, if the bug has a vector created by a multi-faceted eye
representing approximate distance to visible obstacles, but has bumped into
something hard to see (like a window), it might be parsimonious to store the
bump information in the vision vector, providing that updating the informa-
tion with the bug’s own motion isn’t too much trouble. Again, insects actually
seem able to do this [e.g. Hartmann and Wehner, 1995], and some robots also
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come with primitive odometric ‘senses’ that make this easy, providing preci-
sion is not important. This is in fact the model of bump detection used in the
extended real robot model described in Section 7.6.2.
6.5.4 State for Meta-Learning
How would the bug’s control look if it used a representation suitable for meta-
reasoning? Honestly, not sufficiently different from the control for the spe-
cialized robot to make it worth drawing. The primary difference would be
that the representation wouldn’t be any kind of simple allocentric map, but
would rather have to be a more universal representation, such as logic pred-
icates or a homogeneous neural representation. This would allow the same
operators to act on any knowledge the bug happens to store.
The problem with universal representations is roughly the same as the
problem with production rules (see Section 2.3.2). In order for the informa-
tion to be useful, it has to be tagged with a great deal of information about
the context in which it is to be used. Although this strategy has been demon-
strated feasible [Newell, 1990, Georgeff and Lansky, 1987], it loses the ad-
vantages of modularity. The programmer loses the localization of related
state and program code; the machine learning algorithm loses its specialized,
helpfully biased representation. If the data is being stored in a neural network,
then the same problems apply, only more so. Developing modularity in neural
networks is still very much an open question [Wermter et al., 2001]. Essen-
tially, both these universal representations have problems of combinatorics.
BOD addresses combinatorics by using modularity and hierarchy.
6.6 Conclusions
This chapter has discussed the fundamental role of behaviors, state and learn-
ing in a BOD system. It has also shown that state can appear in a variety of
forms, facilitating highly specialized learning, in a variety of degrees of per-
sistence and kinds of representation. The next chapter further illustrates the
uses of each of the four types of state identified here, with references from
related literature as well as working examples I implemented under BOD.
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Chapter 7
Learning by Design
7.1 Introduction
Chapter 6 introduced and explained modularity and specialized learning in
behavior-oriented design. It decomposed variable state for agents into four
categories: control state, deictic representations, perceptual or motor learn-
ing, and meta-reasoning. This chapter explores each of these in more depth,
with extended examples for deictic and perceptual learning in particular.
7.2 Control State
One of the myths of artificial intelligence is that the early experimenters in
reactive planning advocated stateless systems. In fact, the fundamental units
of subsumption architecture [Brooks, 1991b] are augmented finite state ma-
chines. At each moment every behavior records a particular state of execu-
tion, and this state helps determine what that behavior will do next.
The most reactive behaviors do respond directly and continually to fac-
tors in the environment. For example, in the first few Braitenburg Vehicles
[Braitenberg, 1984] motor speed directly correlates to light or heat intensity.
The Polly vision-based obstacle-avoidance algorithm also determines speed
and direction by the apparent distance to obstacles in each individual visual
frame. [Horswill, 1993].
However, even simple behaviors may require some kind of stored inter-
nal state, and often sequential control. For example, many of the insect-like
robots first built under subsumption architecture would back off and turn
away from obstacles detected by bumping their antennae1. The environmen-
1Not the best known one though: Genghis just tried to lift its front leg over the obstacle
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tal state to which the robot reacts is only detected while the antenna is bent,
but the behavior determined by that state must be perpetuated over the pe-
riod of backing up after the antenna is disengaged. A variety of solutions to
this problem were described in the last section of the previous chapter (Sec-
tion 6.5), using varying combinations of control, deictic, perceptual and meta
state.
In a conventional AI system, the initial collision would have resulted in a
persistent internal representation of the collision point as an assumed obsta-
cle, and the registration of this knowledge would have resulted in a planner
selecting a new behavior (such as exploring the obstacle) or a new trajectory.
In a fully reactive agent, the collision is registered only temporarily in control
state. One behavior is forced into a different state, which results in different
expressed actions for the agent as a whole. Once normal behavior is resumed,
the event will be forgotten.
This disposing of information may appear wasteful, but in practice the
information is difficult to record accurately and is often transient. The supe-
riority of the reactive approach to local navigation has been shown empiri-
cally [e.g. Maes, 1990a, Bonasso et al., 1997]. A more significant criticism,
however, is that this approach exchanges the complexity of adequately repre-
senting the environment for complexity in designing an agent’s control. As
Chapter 3 documents, AI developers have largely moved away from systems
that rely purely on control state.
7.3 Deictic Representation
One of the problems of traditional representation has been the number of
items that a system needs to represent if it represents a complete world model.
A solution to this problem that is gaining acceptance is the use of deictic vari-
ables [see e.g. Ballard et al., 1997, Horswill, 1997]. A deictic variable is a
permanent memory structure with changeable external reference that can be
incorporated into plans. For example, representing a blocks world problem
might conventionally require individually labeling each block. Deictic vari-
ables provide a restricted set of labels such as the-block-I’m-holding or even
the-green-block-I-most-recently-saw.
Deictic variables were popularized in the work of Agre and Chapman
[Agre and Chapman, 1990, Chapman, 1990] who used them to write a reac-
tive system that successfully plays computer games. The ideas behind deictic
variables can also be found in Minsky’s pronemes [Minsky, 1985], in visual
attention [Ullman, 1984], and apparently in the philosophical work of Hei-
degger [Dreyfus, 1992]. Whitehead [1992] uses deictic variables to simplify
[Angle, 1989, Brooks, 1989]. Nevertheless, the same problem holds.
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reinforcement learning. Horswill [1995] uses them in combination with a live
visual image to produce a system that answers prolog-like queries (“Is there
a green block on a red block?”) about a scene using no other representation
other than the visual signal itself.
The benefits deictic representations bring to reactive architectures are
similar to what it brings to more traditional representations, though possi-
bly more substantial. One of the common criticisms of reactive planning is
that it transfers the complexity of data representation into control complexity.
Thus the reduction of complexity brought about by using deictic variables
for a reactive system is not in terms of amount of data, but in the size of the
control architecture, the number of behaviors, or the number of reactive plans
[Horswill, 1997, Rhodes, 1996].
7.4 Braniff: Examples of Deictic Representation
Deictic representation requires two things. First, it requires some state to be
allocated for the variable. This does not necessarily have to be added in code.
For a real robot, the reference of the variable may be what is in the hand,
where the camera is centered, or what the vision system’s tracking is fixated
on. Thus in a real robot, the deictic variable state may be situated either in the
external world (e.g. the place right in front of the robot), within the robot’s
mechanism, within its RAM, or it may refer to state in a peripheral system
such as a visual routine processor. The second thing deictic representation
requires are primitives for setting and sampling that variable.
The following examples are based on the work of Whitehead [1992].
Whitehead worked in a simulated blocks world, where he attempted to have
a simulated robot arm learn to pick a green block out of a stack. Whitehead’s
work was at the the time of these experiments one of the leading pieces of
work in one of the leading machine-learning algorithms, reinforcement learn-
ing (RL). Also, I had access to a beta version of an advanced vision system,
the visual routine processor (VRP) [Horswill, 1995] that actually performed
all the sensing primitives assumed by Whitehead’s thesis. This system was
connected to the VRP observing LEGO Duplo blocks, but unfortunately never
to a functioning robot hand. The results in this section are primarily from a
simple blocks-world simulator I wrote as an interim solution.
In the code that follows, the bold face represents the names of program
structures. Everything else was a primitive action in Whitehead [1992] and
was mapped to primitive actions in the VRP.
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7.4.1 Grab Green
Grab-green produces the behavior produced by Whitehead’s dissertation. It
looks like this (⊥ stands for false):
grab-green ⇒x
〈 (action-frame-color ’green)(action-frame-in-hand) ⇒ goal(object-in-hand) ⇒ lose-block
(attn-frame-color ’green) (frames-vertically-aligned ⊥) ⇒ move-action-frame-to-green
(attn-frame-color ’green) ⇒ grasp-stack-top
(green-in-scene) ⇒ move-attn-frame-to-green
〉
(7.1)
grasp-stack-top ⇒
〈move-action-frame-to-stack-top→ grasp-object-at-action-frame〉 (7.2)
lose-block ⇒
〈move-action-frame-to-table→ (action-frame-tabel-below)→ place-object-at-action-frame〉
(7.3)
This is obviously an elaboration of the BRP 4.1 explained in detail in
Chapter 42.
Whitehead originally used two attention markers — deictic variables for
the visual system first hypothesized by Ullman [1984]. Ullman believed that
the visual system had a limited number of these markers (countable by de-
termining how many independent objects a person can track, usually about
four.)
Whitehead constrained one marker to be purely for visual attention, while
the other governs action by the hand. Constraining the types of primitives ap-
plied to each marker reduced the size of the search space for his RL algorithm,
which was still severely tasked to order the primitives appropriately.
The markers can be moved to attractive ‘pop-out’ attributes, such as color,
compared to each other, moved relative to each other, and so on. The markers
also follow any object to which they are attending. So, for example, in the
above plan, the attention frame is still on the block after it has been grasped
and thus moves to the robot’s hand.
Notice that this program also effectively uses the hand as a third deictic
variable, though one external to the ‘mind’ that therefore requires the other
variables to be directed at it in order to analyze it.
This program works: it succeeded in grasping a green block for any initial
block configuration so long as there was a green block, and terminated if there
was no green block present.
2This is not the original code. My original code for this competence actually contains longer
sequences because I was not yet astute at programming with competences. In fact, I was debug-
ging both the code and concept for a competence while I was developing this plan. There were
consequently redundant checks that, for example, that the hand was not grasping anything, and
were in fact separate steps for grasping the top block on the stack depending on whether or not it
was green.
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7.4.2 Green on Green
This program illustrates a simple BRP hierarchy. Early in his dissertation,
Whitehead said his goal was to pile a red block on a green block, but this
problem was never demonstrated or revisited. It was the logical next test for
the action-selection system. However, since I had only implemented grabbing
green blocks, I started with green on green.
The preconditions in this plan are often to long to fit on a single line.
When they seem to guard a ‘+’, this actually means they are continued onto
the next line.
green-on-green ⇒x
〈
(attn-frame-home) ⇒+
(attn-frame-shape ’block) (attn-frame-color ’green) ⇒+
action-trace-up-from-attn (action-frame-shape-block) ⇒+
(action-frame-color ’green) (frames-synched ⊥) ⇒ goal
(object-in-hand) (attn-frame-home) (attn-frame-color ’green) ⇒ place-green-on-green
(object-in-hand) (attn-frame-home) (attn-frame-table-below) ⇒ place-first-green
(object-in-hand ⊥) (attn-frame-home) (attn-frame-shape ’table) ⇒ look-away grab-green
(object-in-hand ⊥) (attn-frame-home) (attn-frame-shape ’block) ⇒+
(attn-frame-color ’green) ⇒ look-away grab-green
(attn-frame-home ⊥) ⇒ move-attn-frame-home
(object-in-hand ⊥) (attn-frame-home) (attn-frame-shape ’block) ⇒ clear home
(object-in-hand) ⇒ lose-block
〉
(7.4)
There is actually more information in the BRP than this notation repre-
sents. For one, each element is labeled with a name so that it is easier to see
what that element does. For another, some elements actually have equivalent
priority. Here is the list of the elements’ names, with elements of shared pri-
ority on the same line. Notice that the elements are in the same order as they
are above, this is simply another representation with different information.
green-on-green-goal
place-green-on-green, place-first-green
check-home, get-another-green, get-first-green
clear-home, lose-block
So in this plan, if a green block is on another green block, the goal has
been reached. Otherwise if it is holding a green block, it places it on the first
green block if one exists, or on the goal location if it does not. If the agent is
not grasping a green block, it will either check the status of its home, or get
a green block, if it can. If it can’t because there is a wrong block on its goal
location, it will pick that block up. If it can’t because it’s already holding a
block (which can’t be green at this point) then it drops the block.
This plan requires several sub elements:
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grab-green ⇒x
〈 (action-frame-color ’green)(action-frame-in-hand) ⇒ goal(object-in-hand) ⇒ lose-block
(attn-frame-color ’green) (attn-frame-home)⇒ move-action-frame-to-green
(attn-frame-color ’green)) ⇒ grasp-stack-top
(attn-frame-color ’green) (frames-vertically-aligned ⊥) ⇒ move-action-frame-to-green
(green-in-scene) ⇒ move-attn-frame-to-green
〉
(7.5)
grab-green-goal
lose-block, veto-green
unbury-green
synch-on-green
find-green
This has one additional element to plan 7.1: if the attention frame has
‘popped’ to a block on the home pile, then it looks for another one. This is
necessary because of the stochastic nature of the low-level visual routines —
there is no other way to constrain their search without forcing the home tower
to be in a different visual field from the source piles for the robot.
place-green-on-green ⇒〈
move-attn-frame-to-hand→move-action-frame-to-attn→move-attn-frame-home→
(action-frame-color ’green)→ (action-frame-in-hand)→move-action-frame-to-attn→
action-trace-up-from-attn→ place-object-at-action-frame
〉
(7.6)
place-first-green ⇒〈
move-attn-frame-to-hand→move-action-frame-to-attn→move-attn-frame-home→
(action-frame-in-hand)→ (action-frame-color ’green)→ (attn-frame-table-below)→
move-action-frame-to-attn→ place-object-at-action-frame
〉
(7.7)
clear-home ⇒〈
move-action-frame-to-attn→move-action-frame-to-stack-top→
(frames-vertically-aligned)→ grasp-object-at-action-frame
〉
(7.8)
In coding this plan several things became evident. First, managing the
attention variables was very important. It was easy to accidently build plans
that iterated between rules that simply shifted the visual attention around (e.g.
between check-home and look-for-green). This emphasizes the utility of se-
quences. Visual pointers were only moved in an established context; other-
wise they were left in canonical locations. Notice I added a primitive look-
away which simply ensured the markers were not focussed on any blocks3.
3I never encountered this difficulty in any other domain, though the rest of my domains were
more conventionally reactive with animal-like problems. The problem of getting ‘caught in a
loop’ is also frequent in children who are trying to master complex procedures (and I have also
seen it in chimpanzees). I am not certain yet what characterizes the sorts of problems that can
generate loops: perhaps it is the unnatural regularity of the perceptual stimuli (the blocks) or the
discrete nature of the possible acts.
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Second, stacking takes more state than the simple grab-green. Another
‘external’ deictic variable is added, home, the place the critical pile is being
made. The state of the block stack in the home location indicates the next task
for the robot, whether to pick up a green block, a red block, or whether the
stack is complete. This may explain why Whitehead [1992] never returned
to this task; his reinforcement learning system was already challenged by
the number of free variables in the original task. Ballard et al. [1997] cite
Whitehead’s difficulties as a possible explanation for the small number of
‘visual markers’ or pieces of free visual state humans seem to have evolved.
In addition to the stack location and the two visual markers, without the
mechanism of a subgoal a fourth marker would have been necessary. In or-
der to gauge the state of the stack, a marker must check its contents. If that
marker detects that the stack contains a green block, this can trigger the com-
petence to grasp a green block, which uses both visual markers. If there were
no separate competence, another marker would be needed to make regular
comparisons to the top of the home stack. This demonstrates an interchange
of control state and deictic state, again with considerable combinatorial ram-
ifications.
7.4.3 The Copy Demo
The copy demo is a famous early experiment in robotics conducted at MIT
[Horn and Winston, 1976, Chapman, 1989]. The principle is simple — if the
robot sees a stack of blocks, it should try to replicate that stack. The code for
this task is actually slightly simpler than for green-on-green, if one discounts
the replications to account for all three colors. The extra complexity of tracing
two stacks is compensated for by not having to represent the goal entirely in
the control structure. Also, since the competence and simulation mechanism
was by this time fully debugged, the original replication of the demo took less
than three hours to write and debug.
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copy-demo ⇒x
〈
(frames-horizontally-aligned) (attn-frame-goal) ⇒+
(action-frame-home) (attn-frame-color ⊥) (action-frame-color ⊥) ⇒ goal
(frames-horizontally-aligned) (frames-color-synched) ⇒+
(attn-frame-goal) (action-frame-home) ⇒ check-next-goal
(frames-horizontally-aligned) ⇒+
(attn-frame-color red) (action-frame-color ⊥) ⇒ look-away grab-red
(frames-horizontally-aligned) ⇒+
(attn-frame-color blue) (action-frame-color ⊥) ⇒ look-away grab-blue
(frames-horizontally-aligned) ⇒+
(attn-frame-color green) (action-frame-color ⊥) ⇒ look-away grab-green
(object-in-hand)⇒ lose-block
(object-in-hand ⊥) (attn-frame-home) (attn-frame-shape ’block) ⇒ clear home
⊥⇒ start-over
〉
(7.9)
The priorities again:
copy-demo-goal
check-next-goal
add-blue, add-red, add-green, place-block
lose-block
clean-home
start-over
If the the stack has not been replicated, then check the next goal, or if that
has been done, get the appropriately colored block, unless you are holding
one already, in which case drop it, or unless you need to clear the goal stack
(if you’ve previously made an error), or in the worst case, reset your visual
pointers to a reasonable place to start another action.
This all requires a couple of sequences:
check-next-goal ⇒〈
move-action-frame-to-attn→ action-trace-up-from-attn→
move-attn-frame-to-action→move-action-frame-home→ synch-up〉
〉
(7.10)
start-over ⇒〈
move-attn-frame-goal→move-action-frame-home〉 〉 (7.11)
The copy-demo task required yet another special place: the goal stack.
It also requires grab-color and lose-block as above (7.5 and 7.3), and also a
small new competence for horizontally synchronizing the visual markers.
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sync-action-up ⇒x
〈 (frames-horizontally-aligned) ⇒+(attn-frame-goal) (action-frame-home) ⇒ goal
(action-frame-color ⊥) (attn-frame-goal) ⇒ move-action-frame-home
(frames-horizontally-aligned ⊥) ⇒+
(action-frame-home) (attn-frame-goal) ⇒ move-action-frame-up
〉
(7.12)
Again, much of sync-action-up is redundant, in response to some of the
bugs in the beta VRP. Its main purpose is simply to move the action frame to
the level of the attention frame.
The replications for color are a consequence of my staying as faithful as
possible to the original constraints of Whitehead’s project so that additional
state requirements would be clear. They could be replaced with a single ex-
tra deictic variable, the-color-I’m-attending-to. This example consequently
shows clearly the way internal, external, and control state can trade off or be
used to compensate for one another.
These plans also have the longest action patterns or sequences of any I’ve
since built. This is because the constraints of the project made building more
natural operators impossible, and because the nature of the constraints made
many situations extremely perceptually ambiguous. Under BOD, one would
normally make the behaviors supporting the primitives much more power-
ful to simplify the control. These programs thus illustrate clearly perceptual
ambiguity (e.g. the block color) being compensated for by control state.
7.5 Perceptual State
Perception is a psychological abstraction for the level at which processed sen-
sory information is used for cognition. The abstraction is clearest in humans:
what we perceive is what we remember and report. This is famously open to
illusion and distortion. What we sense must be present in environment, e.g.
light and sound. Perception is driven by expectation and therefore dependent
both on learning and on context [Carlson, 2000]. We can learn to discrimi-
nate differences without having any explicit knowledge of what those differ-
ences are [Bechara et al., 1995a]. In some cases, this learning requires no
feedback, simply exposure to the appropriate stimulus [Sundareswaran and
Vaina, 1994].
Perception makes a similar contribution to reducing plan complexity to
that of deictic representation. Here, the reduction is not only by collapsing
similar plans into one, but by substantially increasing the power and informa-
tion content of plan elements. Arguably, the main contribution of reactive,
behavior-based AI has been a change in the basis for action selection in an
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intelligent agent. Plans relying on complex internal models of the world have
been replaced by distributed actions relying directly on fast, cleverly special-
ized perceptual routines.
Perceptual state definitionally reduces reactivity, since it relies on “old”
information. However, it plays the same important role as structured con-
trol state in that it preserves information already experienced to disambiguate
control decisions.
7.6 Edmund: Examples of Perception and Spe-
cialized Learning in a Robot
The problems of perception are more intuitively obvious when the agent is
working with physical sensors, like we animals do. The following examples
are taken from a BOD system I used to control a mobile robot, shown in
figure 7.1. This work was conducted in The Laboratory for Cognitive Neu-
roscience and Intelligent Systems of the University of Edinburgh. The first
example deals with determining from multiple, inaccurate sensors how the
robot can best proceed forward. It was conducted in 1996–7 and has pre-
viously been reported [Bryson and McGonigle, 1998, Bryson, 2000b]. The
second deals with combining multiple strategies, several using learning, for
navigating around a complex space. This work was conducted in 1997–8, and
has not been previously reported.
7.6.1 The Robot
The robot I used is shown in Figure 7.1 is a commercially available Nomad
2000. The robot has 3 different drive velocities to control: its speed, its
direction, and the rotation of its sensing turret. The sensing turret has 16
faces, each with a sonar located at the top (about a meter off the ground)
and an infrared sensor near the bottom (about a quarter of a meter above the
ground). Below the turret is the wheel base which is surrounded by 20 bump
sensors, staggered across two rings of ten sensors each.
The infrared sensors are useful from 2cm to 30cm away from the robot;
the sonar sensor are useful for distances greater than 20cm. However, both
sorts of sensors have difficulties. Infrared works by bouncing light, and thus
gives much stronger readings (which look nearer) for light and reflective ob-
jects. Sonars work by bouncing sound, and may be fooled by a number of
factors, including refraction away from the robot prior to reflection to the sen-
sor, or reflection into a different sensor than emitted the initial signal. Sonar
readings therefore can be very erratic, while infrared readings can be system-
atically distorted. Further, neither sensor necessarily provides coverage for
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Figure 7.1: The Nomad 200 robot running in a laboratory at the University
of Edinburgh. In this picture it has just encountered a desk — the surface
is too low for the sonar sensors to detect when proximate, and the leg too
dark for the infra-red sensors, so the robot had to learn about the desk with its
bumpers.
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the entire height of its facet of the robot.
Bump sensors are relatively accurate, but require hitting an obstacle hard
enough to register through a fairly strong rubber bumper. By this point the
robot is usually thoroughly engaged with the obstacle (its bumper is effec-
tively gripping it), and needs to move directly opposite from the impact to
extract itself. The robot also has odometric sensors which determine how far
and in what direction it has moved; these are also inaccurate over any great
distance, both because of slippage and because the robot tends to slowly ro-
tate anti-clockwise at a rate of a few degrees every 50 meters.
life (D)
talk [1/120 Hz]
(worth talking >)
speak
sense (C) [7 Hz]
bump (bumped
>)
yelp reg bump back off clear bump lose direction
look compound sense
walk (C)
halt (has direction >)
(move view ’blocked)
lose direction
start (has direction ⊥) pick open dir
continue move narrow (move view ’clear) correct dir
wait snore sleep
Figure 7.2: The plan for just keeping the Nomad moving in a crowded envi-
ronment.
7.6.2 Example: Modular Learning and Perception
The plan in Figure 7.2 is the reactive plan for controlling the robot as it moves
forward. This uses the same representation as plan 4.1, except that since it is
a real-time agent, scheduling is in Hertz.
In this section, we will be concentrating on the primitives in the sense
competence and in the continue action pattern (under the walk competence).
However I will briefly introduce the whole plan. In several aspects, such as
the bump action pattern and the representation underlying compound sense
and move, it bears a strong resemblance to the much simpler Plan 6.6. Talk
provides information about the battery level if the charge level has fallen by
a 10% increment (e.g. it’s at 69% now and last time talk was called it was
in the 70s.) Wait should never trigger, but is there for debugging purposes,
and was indeed called a number of times. Having a lowest-priority drive
that conspicuously announces itself (in this case, by saying “Z Z Z” through
the robot’s speech card) keeps the program running so a debugger can check
internal state. If no element of a drive collection triggers, like any other BRP
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the drive collection simply terminates.
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Figure 7.3: The behaviors involved in moving forward. Notation as in Sec-
tion 2.2. See text for explanation.
The behaviors used to support sense and continue are shown in Fig-
ure 7.3. Again, bold face indicates primitives that occur in the POSH action-
selection scripts. The main behaviors are Direction, which determines speed
as well as orientation of motion, and C-Sense, which represents the robot’s
best estimate of how much free space it has around it.
The C-sense state is a simple vector of 16 integer values (one for each
face) representing inches to the next obstacle in that direction. Every time
compound sense is called (roughly 7 times a second) this representation is
updated. C-Sense combines information from the robot’s three sensor sys-
tems, essentially taking the shortest value from each. The exception to this
is the infra-red reading, which has a maximum value of 15 inches. Infra-red
readings of greater than 12 inches are ignored. Sonar readings are accurate
to a much greater distance, but are inaccurate under 5 inches. Also, the sonar
is situated at the top of the robot, and the infra-red near its base, so the two
systems sometimes report different obstacles that occur at different heights.
Sonar is susceptible to a number of confounding effects which can make
the readings grossly inaccurate. A simple, fairly robust solution employed on
this robot is to not believe a reading that changes radically unless it persists for
at least half a second. Given that sensing occurs at 7 Hz, this requires a three-
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event perceptual memory. This is represented and processed in P-Memory.
Bumps are a more difficult problem. As already described in Section 6.5,
touch sensors necessarily require storing state until the obstacle is success-
fully navigated around. For the reasons described just above in Section 7.6.1,
this can actually take several minutes. The behavior Bump retains records of
impacted obstacles until the robot has moved several feet away from them,
rather than for a fixed time. It also calculates the original location of the
bump (given the bumper number and the robot’s radius) and the face and dis-
tance on which to appropriately represent that object’s location. Of course,
bumps are necessarily points while obstacles are not, but the robot’s tendency
to move a good distance around any known obstruction generally clears the
full obstacle. If not, it may be represented by multiple impacts.
Since the robot’s libraries were written in C++, I took advantage of the
concepts of class and instance variable state. Thus there can be any num-
ber of bump instances representing the actual impacts, while Bump propper
keeps track of them. Similarly, there is a direction for each face of the robot.
The direction behaviors include permenant state representing a mask applied
to the C-Sense vector when that direction is controlling behavior. Velocity is
determined by the distance to the nearest obstacle, but obstacles to the sides
of the direction of motion are discounted, and to the rear are ignored. Simi-
lar discounts apply for steering corrections around obstacles. Direction keeps
track of the current ‘intended’ direction of motion, and also the actual direc-
tion. Actual direction may be changed by move in order to avoid an obstacle.
If the view is clear, correct dir gradually transfers the current direction back
to the preferred one.
7.6.3 Example: Episodic Memory and Navigation
The plan in Figure 7.2 allows the robot to be fully autonomous from the con-
trol standpoint, and very easy to herd around a room in practice. However,
my ambition was to make the robot able to learn tours through the labora-
tory through a few simple demonstrations or instructions. I achieved this goal
for relatively small tours, but scaling it to long-term navigation of the entire
multi-room laboratory space required further perceptual routines for recog-
nizing locations and recalibrating orientation. Location recognition proved
straight-forward using sonar signatures, but the work was never completed
due to lack of development time. This section shows only the additions and
changes made to the wandering agent’s architecture that allowed the robot to
learn and follow a short route.
The behaviors developed for the small-tour version are shown in Fig-
ure 7.4. From a BOD standpoint, these behaviors are compositionally the
same as those in Figure 7.3. However because their state changes more slowly
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Figure 7.4: Behaviors supporting the plan for more informed navigation.
and persists longer, their adaptations coincide better with the conventional
definition of ‘learning’. The robot learns a map over the lifetime of the agent
and also has short-term episodic recall to help it select an appropriate direc-
tion.
The new behavior DP-Land is for recognizing decision points, locations
where there are clearly more than two directions (forward and back) the robot
could move in. As the plan in Figure 7.5 shows, the robot ‘loses direction’
any time it either finds it can no longer move in at least approximately its
currently intended direction, and whenever it enters a new decision point.
When the robot does not have a direction, it attempts to remember a direction
that previously worked from somewhere nearby this location. If it hasn’t
already recently tried moving in that direction and failed, then that direction
is chosen. Otherwise, if the robot has no clear record of why it stopped, it
may have been halted by a sonar apparition or some other transient problem,
so it may try continuing in its current direction. Or it may try a further afield
neighbor.
If the pick direction competence fails, then the robot asks for instruction.
Every time the robot selects a direction, it records the direction, its current
approximate location, and the current time in E-Memory, episodic memory.
This is trimmed after a fixed number of events (16) which is greater than the
number of tries the robot would ever attempt for one scenario before asking
directions. Any decision or instruction which is successful (persists for at
least a few inches of motion) is stored in long-term memory located in the
behavior DP-Map.
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walk (C)
halt (has direction >)
(move view ’blocked)
lose direction
cogitate route (C)
enter dp (in dp ⊥) (entered dp ⊥) lose direction greet dp
leave dp (in dp >) (entered dp >) dismiss dp
pick direction (C)
look up (untried near neighbor >) pick near neighbor
keep going (continue untried >) pick previous direction
desperate look up
(untried far neighbor >)
pick further neighbor
start (has direction ⊥) ask directions
continue move narrow (move view ’clear) correct dir
Figure 7.5: Changes in the walk competence for more informed navigation.
See Section 7.6.4 for comments on slip-stack operation and this competence.
7.6.4 Learning from the Robot Experiments
I have argued elsewhere [Bryson et al., 2001b] that robots are sometimes
over-rated as an experimental platform, particularly relative to other gener-
ally accessible complex platforms such as virtual reality or standardized sim-
ulations. However, it is impossible to deny their power both as engaging
demonstrations, but also as ‘intuition pumps’ [Dennett, 1987]. I had two of
the key insights of this dissertation while working on this robot.
Perceptual Learning and Behavior Decomposition
The robot examples above illustrate several different motivations for behavior
decomposition — that is, for why one element of memory may be distinct
from another.
• The original signal is very different (e.g. light vs. sound vs. an impact).
• The memory needs to record events that occur at different rates.
• Old memories needs to decay or be forgotten at different rates.
• Patterns from the memory emerge at different rates.
• Different representations are simplest or most minimal.
It was during one of my reimplementations of the POSH architecture
(from PERL 5.003 to C++) that I came to fully equate persistent variable
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state with perception and with object-style representation. Although I had
suggested that different rates of adaptation might be key to behavior decom-
position several years earlier [Bryson, 1995], the importance of fully organiz-
ing a behavior library along these lines, and the intimate relationship between
learning and perception, only struck me while I was reimplementing my own
work on robot sensor fusion.
There is no substantial difference, from this BOD perspective, between
transient perceptual state and lifetime learning. The term ‘learning’ seems
to me to be arbitrarily applied somewhere along a continuum involving how
frequently and to what extent state changes over time.
Maintaining More Action-Selection Context
The plan in Figure 7.5 will not work under the strictly 0-stack version of
the POSH slip-stack documented in Section 4.6.2. Since this is the version
of POSH I had running on the Nomad, Figure 7.5 is actually fudged. In fact,
both the cogitate route and pick direction competences had to be wrapped in-
side of the DP-Map behavior. Pick direction, for example, was expressed as a
perceptual primitive that reported whether it had successfully found a viable
stored direction, and a dummy action which formally ‘picked’ the already-
selected direction. My intuition was that in fact a competence should be able
to ‘quickly’ fail if none of its elements could fire, and let the next element
of its parent competence fire. A year later I found a mechanism, the action
scheduler of Ymir [Tho´risson, 1999] which inspired my current implementa-
tion of POSH action selection, described in Section 4.6.3. The work leading
to this insight is described in Section 12.3.2.
7.7 Meta-State and Learning to Learn
The final form of state is state about other state. In the context of the reactive
hierarchical control architecture and modularized behavior, meta-state can be
reduced to two forms: state about control state, and state about perceptual
memory.
As I stated earlier, BOD gives no special support to this form of learning.
Such development falls outside the remit of this dissertation, which focuses
on engineering rather than autonomous approaches to development. Never-
theless, this is a fairly obvious area for research. Chapter 9 does demonstrate
the modeling of a process for learning control structures similar to a BRP. In
this section, and again in Chapter 11, I discuss possible extensions capable of
meta-learning.
Work on social and cultural learning is very closely related to the spe-
cialized learning approach championed here. In BOD, the bias that enables
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learning derives from engineering; in social learning it derives from behav-
ioral predispositions that facilitate absorbing the products of cultural evolu-
tion. BOD is a substitute for genetic evolution, but an obvious goal for au-
tonomous agents would be to be able to absorb mimetic evolution directly
from the surrounding culture as humans and other animals do [Whiten, 2000,
de Waal, 2001].
Control state can be divided into two elements: the structure that indicates
the flow of activation, and the activation itself. A great deal of work has been
done on varying the way in which activation levels spread between behaviors.
In particular, the ethological literature describes modules competing for atten-
tion by evaluating their own activation level; several ethologically inspired ar-
chitectures do precisely this [Maes, 1989, Correia and Steiger-Garc¸a˜o, 1995,
Blumberg, 1996, Cooper et al., 1995]. Blumberg [1996] has achieved prob-
ably the most coherent behavior in this genre by combining a strategy of
resource-based intelligent constraints and mutual inhibition between compet-
ing behaviors. Blumberg also provides a mechanism for reconnecting the
flow of control in order to implement conditioning. Under our typology, this
strategy would be meta-learning, though conditioning could also be imple-
mented on the perceptual level. Unfortunately, such strategies are extremely
difficult to control whether by hand or by machine learning [Tyrrell, 1993].
In general, learning has only been successful in very constrained spaces with
few behaviors.
When developing BOD, I experimented with flexible priorities within
BRPs, but eventually replaced these structures with scheduling for the drive
collections and fixed retry limits for competence elements. I found it easier to
control the simulation of continuous valued internal drive levels [e.g. Lorenz,
1973, Tu, 1999] using perceptual state. Section 10.5 will demonstrate a model
of this.
The actual structure of the action sequences and competences in POSH
control were originally designed to support another form of meta-learning. I
hoped to use evolutionary programming style processes to find new control
sequences. (See for a similar theory [Calvin, 1996].) The easy problems for
this approach are how to generate new thoughts and how to test and store
a winning solution. The hard problems are how to tell when a new plan is
needed, and how to recognize which solution wins. These are problems the
case-based learning community have been researching for some time (see for
example [Hammond, 1990, Ram and Santamaria, 1997].)
I now consider it unlikely, again due to the size of the search space, that
such a strategy would be practical for useful complex agents. I consider social
learning much more likely to be a productive area of future research. Other ar-
eas of meta-level learning that might be interesting and productive to explore
include implementing Norman and Shallice [1986]’s notion of deliberate ac-
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Figure 7.6: (Compare to Figure 2.1 on page 40.) A system capable of learn-
ing behaviors must 1) represent them on a common substrate in a 2) allow
them to be modified. Here behaviors are represented in a special long-term
memory (BLTM) and in a plastic working memory (WM) where they can be
modified. During consolidation (dashed lines) modifications may either alter
the original behaviors or create new ones.
tion. Norman and Shallice’s theory holds that deliberate control is triggered
by special circumstances. Deliberation then monitors and modifies routine
processes, possibly by slowing them or providing additional sensory infor-
mation. Another, possibly related, area is the consolidation of episodic mem-
ory into usable skills [see Karmiloff-Smith, 1992, Wilson and McNaughton,
1994, Hexmoor, 1995, and below].
7.7.1 Meta-Learning and Distributed Representations
Behavior-oriented design requires the use of complex algorithms and spe-
cialized representations. Therefore I have argued that agent behavior is best
developed in object-oriented languages. However, this representation may
limit the autonomous learning of new behaviors. Learning new skill mod-
ules is clearly desirable, and has been the focus of significant research (see
[Demiris and Hayes, 1999] for a recent example and review.) However, to
date, most efforts on these lines would qualify as specialized learning within
a single representation system, which is one skill module or behavior from
the perspective of BOD.
If we could instead represent behaviors and homogeneous, distributed
substrate such as artificial neural networks (ANN), we might more easily be
able to produce this sort of learning. Consider Figure 7.6. In this figure,
representation of the skill modules has been split into two functional mod-
130
ules: the Behavior Long-Term Memory (BLTM) and the Working Memory
(WM). The working memory allows for rapid, short-term changes not only
for perceptual memory, but also in the representation of the behaviors. The
BLTM provides a relatively stable reference source for how these modules
should appear when activated. Skill representations might be modified due
to particular circumstances, such as compensating for tiredness or high wind,
or responding to a novel situation such as using chopsticks on slippery rice
noodles for the first time.
In this model, the adjustments made in plastic, short-term memory also
affect the long-term memory. This sort of dual- or multi-rate learning is re-
ceiving a good deal of attention in ANN currently (see [French et al., 2001,
Bullinaria, 2001, McClelland et al., 1995]). Depending on long-term expe-
rience, we would like this consolidation to have two possible effects. Let’s
imagine that b2 has been modified in working memory in order to provide an
appropriate expression of a2. If the same modifications of b2 prove useful in
the near future, then they will be present for consolidation for a protracted pe-
riod, and likely to effect the permanent representation of b2. However, if the
modifications are only sometimes applicable, we would like a new behavior
b2′ to become established. This process should also trigger perceptual learn-
ing, so that the two behaviors can discriminate their appropriate context for
the purpose of action selection. Also b2 and b2′ would now be free to further
specialize away from each other.
Unfortunately, the practical constraints for this model are similar to those
described just above for evolving control structures. Also, ANN research
in supporting modularity is only in its infancy [Wermter et al., 2001]. It is
difficult to predict which strategy might become practical sooner.
7.8 Summary: Designing Learning
In summary, developing complex intelligent behavior requires not only mod-
ularized behavior, but also modularized learning. Agent programs should
constrain and specialize each learning task as much as possible. Control state
records both static knowledge of procedure and dynamic decisions on cur-
rent approach. Deictic variables simplify control state by providing a point
of reference through which procedures can be generalized across contexts.
Perceptual and motor memory allows control to be determined by factors that
appear only across time rather than in the immediate environment. Meta-state
allows the agent to learn from and change its own behavior. In BOD, however,
there is little difference between meta-state and perceptual learning. Where it
is used, it has been designed and supported in exactly the same way. We will
see an extended example of this in Chapter 9.
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Chapter 8
Behavior-Oriented Design
8.1 Introduction
Chapters 4–7 have described the elements of the BOD agent architecture in
some detail. I have also discussed the trade-offs that need to be made to build
the simplest agent possible. The simpler an agent, the more likely it is to
be successful. This means limiting as much as possible both the developer’s
search for the correct code (or, during maintenance, for bugs), and also the
agent’s search for the correct solution for any activity it must learn or plan.
The BOD methodology was introduced in Chapter 2; in this chapter it
is presented more formally. I first describe the essential procedures: the ini-
tial process of specifying and decomposing the agents goals into BOD archi-
tecture representations, and the ongoing, iterative process for building and
maintaining a complex agent. I then discuss some of the practical aspects
of BOD development, such as documentation and tool use. Finally, I briefly
discuss how this approach relates to other high-level approaches. Chapter 9
will provide a detailed example of a BOD development process.
8.2 The Basic BOD Development Process
8.2.1 The Initial Decomposition
The initial decomposition is a set of steps. Executing them correctly is not
critical, since the main development strategy includes correcting assumptions
from this stage of the process. Nevertheless, good work at this stage greatly
facilitates the rest of the process.
The steps of initial decomposition are the following:
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1. Specify at a high level what the agent is intended to do.
2. Describe likely activities in terms of sequences of actions. These se-
quences are the the basis of the initial reactive plans.
3. Identify an initial list of sensory and action primitives from the previous
list of actions.
4. Identify the state necessary to enable the described primitives and drives.
Cluster related state elements and their primitives into specifications for
behaviors. This is the basis of the behavior library.
5. Identify and prioritize goals or drives that the agent may need to at-
tend to. This describes the initial roots for the POSH action selection
hierarchy.
6. Select a first behavior to implement.
Sections 9.5.1 and 12.2.1 contain extended examples of this process.
The lists compiled during this process should be kept, since they are an
important part of the documentation of the agent. Documenting BOD agents,
which is done primarily through well-organized source code, is covered in
Section 8.4.1 below.
In selecting the first behavior, it is often a good idea to choose a simple,
low-level priority that can be continuously active, so that the agent doesn’t
‘die’ immediately. For example, on the mobile robot in Section 7.6.2, the
bottom-most priority of the main drive hierarchy was ‘wait’, a function which
keeps track of the time and snores every 30 seconds or so. This sort of be-
havior gives the developer a clear indication that the robot’s control has not
crashed, and also that none of its interesting behaviors can currently trigger.
Depending on the project, it may make sense to start with a competence
rather than worrying about a drive collection. Examples of projects I started
like this are the blocks-world experiments in Section 7.4 and the transitive
inference experiments in Chapter 9. Both of these projects:
• required building a simulation, so truly basic behaviors needed to be
tested,
• were built in conjunction with debugging a new implementation of
POSH control, and
• emphasized a cognitive capacity that is expressed in isolation, rather
than the balancing of conflicting goals over a period of time.
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8.2.2 Iterative Development
The heart of the BOD methodology is an iterative development process:
1. Select a part of the specification to implement next.
2. Extend the agent with that implementation:
• code behaviors and reactive plans, and
• test and debug that code.
3. Revise the current specification.
BOD’s iterative development cycle can be thought of as sort of a hand-
cranked version of the EM (expectation maximization) algorithm [Dempster
et al., 1977]. The first step is to elaborate the current model, then the second
is to revise the model to find the new optimum representation. Of course,
regardless of the optimizing process, the agent will continue to grow in com-
plexity. But if that growth is carefully monitored, guided and pruned, then the
resulting agent will be more elegant, easier to maintain, and easier to further
adapt.
Unlike behaviors, which are simply coded directly in a standard object-
oriented language, reactive plans are generally stored in script files. The plan
is normally read when the agent is initialized, or “comes to life,” though in
theory new plans could be added during execution. The reactive plans for an
agent grow in complexity over the course of development. Also, frequently
multiple reactive plans are developed for a single AI platform (and set of
behavior modules), each creating agents with different overall characteristics,
such as goals or personality.
Even when there are radically different plan scripts for the same platform
or domain, there will generally only be one behavior library — one set of
code. Of course, each agent will have its own instance or instances of behav-
ior objects when it is running, and may potentially save their run-time state in
its own persistent object storage. But it is worth making an effort to support
all scripts in a single library of behavior code.
Testing should be done as frequently as possible. Using languages that
do not require compiling or strong typing, such as lisp or perl, significantly
speeds the development process, though they may slow program execution
time. “Optimize later”, one of the modern mantras of software engineering,
applies to programming languages too. In my experience, the time spent de-
veloping an AI agent generally far outweighs the time spent watching the
agent run. Particularly for interactive real-time agents like robots and VR
characters, the bottle-necks are much more likely to be caused by motor con-
straints or speech-recognition than by the intelligent control architecture.
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8.3 Making It Work
8.3.1 Revising the Specifications
The most interesting part of the BOD methodology is the set of rules for revis-
ing the specifications. In general, the main design principle of BOD is when
in doubt, favor simplicity. A primitive is preferred to an action sequence, a se-
quence to a competence. Similarly, control state is preferred to learned state,
specialized learning to general purpose learning or planning. Given this bias,
heuristics are then used indicate when the simple element must be broken into
a more complex one.
A guiding principle in all software engineering is to reduce redundancy.
If a particular plan or behavior can be reused, it should be. As in OOD,
if only part of a plan or a primitive action can be used, then a change in
decomposition is called for. In the case of the action primitive, the primitive
should be decomposed into two or more primitives, and the original action
replaced by a plan element. The new plan element should have the same
name and functionality as the original action. This allows established plans
to continue operating with only minimal change.
If a sequence sometimes needs to contain a cycle, or often does not need
some of its elements to fire, then it is really a competence, not an action
pattern. If a competence is actually deterministic, if it nearly always actually
executes a fixed path through its elements, then it should be simplified into a
sequence.
The heart of the BOD strategy is rapid prototyping. If one approach is too
much trouble or is giving debugging problems, try another. It is important
to remember that programmer experience is one of the key selective pres-
sures in BOD for keeping the agent simple. BOD provides at least two paths
to simplicity and clarity: modularity and hierarchical reactive plans. Using
cyclic development and some trial and error the programmer should deter-
mine which path is best for a particular problem [Parnas and Clements, 1986,
Boehm, 1986]. This is also why modularity and maintainability are key to
BOD: programmers are to be encouraged to change the architecture of an
agent when they find a better solution. Such changes should be easy to make.
Further, they should be transparent, or at least easy to follow and understand,
when another team member encounters them.
8.3.2 Competences
One significant feature of a competence over other forms of reactive planning
is that it is relatively easy to engineer. To build a competence, the developer
imagines a worst-case scenario for solving a particular goal. The priorities
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for the steps are then set in the inverse order that the steps might have to
be executed. Next, preconditions are set, starting from the highest priority
step, to determine whether it can fire. For each step, the preconditions are
simplified by the assurance that the agent is already in the context of the
current competence, and that no higher priority step can fire.
Competences are really the basic level of operation for reactive plans, and
learning to write and debug them may take time. Here are some indications
provided by competences that the specification of an agent needs to be re-
designed:
• Complex Triggers: reactive plan elements should not require long or
complex triggers. Perception should be handled at the behavior level;
it should be a skill. Thus a large number of triggers may indicate the
requirement for a new behavior or a new method on an existing be-
havior to appropriately categorize the context for firing the competence
elements. Whether a new behavior or simply a new method is called
for is determined by whether or not more state is needed to make that
categorization: new state generally implies a new behavior.
• Too Many Elements: Competences usually need no more than 5 to 7 el-
ements, they may contain fewer. Sometimes competences get cluttered
(and triggers complicated) because there are really two different solu-
tions to the same problem. In this case, the competence should be split.
If the two paths lead all the way to the goal, then the competence is
really two siblings which should be discriminated between at the level
of the current competence’s parent. If the dual pathway is only for part
of the competence, then the competence should contain two children.
Effectively every step of the competence but the highest priority one is
a subgoal. If there is more than one way to achieve that subgoal, trying to
express both of them in the same competence can split attention resources and
lead to dithering or ‘trigger-flipping’ (where two plan elements serve only to
activate each other’s precondition). The purpose of a competence is to focus
attention on one solution at a time.
Nilsson [1994, p. 142] emphasizes more formally for his teleo-reactive
BRPs that each action should be expected to achieve a condition (prerequi-
site) of a higher plan step. He defines the regression property, which holds
for a plan where, for every element, the above is true. He also defines com-
pleteness for a BRP as being true if the conjunction of all the BRP plan steps’
releasers is a tautology. Since BOD considers chaining between competences
as a reasonable design pattern, I do not necessarily recommend the regres-
sion property. Also, since BOD emphasizes relying on the POSH control
hierarchy to specialize any particular plan’s circumstances, I do not strongly
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recommend maintaining completeness in plans. Nevertheless, these concepts
are useful to keep in mind, particularly when debugging BRPs.
The ‘complex trigger’ heuristic brings us back to the question of trading
off control complexity and behavior state discussed in Chapters 6 and 7 above,
particularly in Section 6.4.2. To reiterate, it is fairly easy to tell when deictic
representation will be useful, since it is typically a simple variable stored in
order to remove redundant control code. Determining when to build a full-
fledged categorizing behavior and when to add control code instead is more
complicated.
8.3.3 Prioritization and Drive Collections
Getting the priorities right in a POSH system can also be non-intuitive. Clear
cut priorities, like “Always run if you see a cat chasing you” are fairly simple,
but even in the case of the ALife rodent in Section 4.5.1 things aren’t neces-
sarily that clear cut. How certain do you need to be that there’s a cat? How
often should you look for cats?
Standard BRP prioritization works fine for any prioritization that is al-
ways strictly ordered. But it quickly became obvious that there needs to be
a mechanism for attending to things that aren’t very important on spare cy-
cles. This is the explanation for the scheduling system provide in the drive
collection (see Section 4.4.3).
Scheduling under my POSH implementations is inexact — the current
ones at least use course-grained, best-effort scheduling. Too many things
may be scheduled per second with no direct indication that they are failing
to execute. This is to some extent an artifact of the reactive nature of the
system — we expect some events and behaviors to arrest the attention of the
agent. An initial schedule can be computed with the help of simple bench-
marking. Facilities for benchmarking are built into the control of the C++
POSH implementation — for the CLOS version, I use a commercial profiler
instead.
Profiling helps determine the constraints on the number of elements that
can run per second, which allows estimates for the rate at which various num-
bers of drives can be executed. For example, on the Nomad robot in Sec-
tion 7.6.2, sensing is fairly expensive and limits the number of cycles for the
architecture to about 340Hz. However, if the robot stops moving and reduces
its sense sample rate, the cycle rate increases by an order of magnitude. This
suggests that the robot should engage in phased periods of activity, for exam-
ple switching between sense-intensive work like exploration and compute-
intensive work like map learning. This strategy is found in most mammals
(e.g. Wilson and McNaughton [1994]), and is one of the motivations for the
slip-stack / competence-chaining facility in POSH action-selection.
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There are other ways to correct prioritization problems. One is switching
elements between competences and drives at the control script level. Ele-
ments in drives can be scheduled the most reliably. However, an element
which is only required in a particular context may waste cycles if it is sched-
uled as a drive. The AP for handling bumps in the plan in Figure 7.2 was
initially added into the competence for motion, ‘walk’, but this overlooked
the fact some of the competing BRP steps in walk were long and the bumpers
would not be checked between their elements once they were triggered. Con-
sequently, ‘bump’ was moved to the top level drive. ‘Compound sense’ was
subsequently moved to the same drive, so that both could be limited to 7Hz,
because the hardware checks involved in sensing had relatively long durations
and were proving a bottleneck. On the other hand, the perceptual routine for
watching for landmarks was switched into ‘walk’ since it was only needed in
the context of motion, and could rely on perceptual memory if it was called
less frequently.
One problem with using scheduling is that the entire drive is only trig-
gered at the scheduled rate, which can be a problem if what is really wanted
is to be able to switch attention to that drive until a problem is solved. Be-
cause of this problem, the AP for disengaging the robot after it has bumped
into something in the plan in Figure 7.2 is actually all expressed as a trigger,
not an action (triggers are executed atomically, but like all APs terminate on
the first sense or action that fails). Some researchers use systems inspired by
hormone levels to effectively latch a particular priority ordering for a period
of time [e.g. Grand et al., 1997, Can˜amero, 1997, Breazeal and Scassellati,
1999a, Frankel and Ray, 2000]. Such a strategy can be used under BOD by
creating a behavior for each ‘hormone’ or ‘emotion’ level, then using sense
preconditions based on those behaviors (see Section 10.5 for an example).
8.4 Supporting Development and Maintenance
The entire point of BOD is to make it as easy as possible for a designer
to make an agent work correctly. This means leveraging any strategies and
tools that reliably increase productivity. Reliably here means not only that the
tools or strategies must work correctly when used properly, but that they work
well when they are used in the ways programmers are likely to use them.
The three strategies I highlight in this section really are worth the effort of
implementing, because the cost of using them is very low, even negligible,
and the payoff is very high.
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8.4.1 Document the Agent Specification in Program Code
The importance of documentation and the concept of self-documenting code
are both well established. The primary argument for incorporating documen-
tation into functioning code is that this is the only way to ensure that the
documentation will never get out of synchronization with the rest of the soft-
ware project. The primary argument against this strategy is that code is never
really that easy to read, and will never be concisely summarized. BOD at least
somewhat overcomes this problem by having two types of summary built into
the agent’s software architecture:
1. the reactive plans summarize the aims and objectives of the agent, and
2. the interface between plan primitives and the behavior libraries docu-
ments at a high level the expressed actions of the various behaviors.
Further information, such as documentation on the adaptive state used by the
agent, can be found in the code of the behavior modules.
Although BOD’s structure makes documentation straight forward, doing
it well still requires discipline and attention. I strongly advise using the fol-
lowing guidelines.
Document the Plan / Behavior Interface in One Program File
As explained earlier (remember the whats from Chapter 2?) the primitives
of the POSH reactive plans must be defined in terms of methods on the be-
havior objects. For each behavior library, there should be one code file that
creates this interface. In my implementations of POSH action selection, each
primitive must be wrapped in an object which is either an act or a sense. The
code executed when that object is triggered is usually only one or two lines
long, typically a method call on some behavior object. I cluster the primitives
by the behaviors that support them, and use program comments to make the
divisions between behaviors clear.
This is the main documentation for the specification — it is the only file
likely to have both current and intended specifications listed. This is where I
list the names of behaviors and primitives determined during decomposition,
even before they have been implemented. Intended reactive plans are usually
written as scripts (see below.)
Each Behavior should have Its Program File
Every behavior will be well commented automatically if it is really imple-
mented as an object. One can easily see the state and representations in the
class definition. Even in languages that don’t require methods to be defined
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in the class declaration, it is only good style to include all the methods of a
class in the same source file with the class definition.
Keep and Comment All Reactive Plan Scripts
This is the only suggestion that really requires discipline, but having a docu-
mented history of the development of an agent can be critical to understand-
ing some of its nuances. As always, those who can’t remember history are
doomed to repeat old mistakes. Keeping a complete set of working scripts
documenting stages of the agents development also provides a test suite, use-
ful when major changes are made to behavior libraries.
Every script should contain a comment with:
• Its name. Necessary in order to make it obvious if a plan is copied and
changed without updating the comment. In that case, the name won’t
match the file name.
• What script(s) it was derived from. Most scripts are improvements of
older working scripts, though some are shortened versions of a script
that needs to be debugged.
• The date it was created.
• The date it started working, if that’s significantly different. Since writ-
ing scripts is part of the specification process, some scripts will be am-
bitious plans for the future rather than working code.
• The date and reasons it was abandoned, if it was abandoned.
• Possibly, dates and explanations of any changes. Normally, changes
shouldn’t happen in a script once it works (or is abandoned) — they
should be made in new scripts, and the old ones kept for a record.
When tempted not to save old scripts remember: those who forget history
are doomed to repeat it. Documenting plan scripts effectively documents
the history of the agent’s development. From a single historic script and the
current interface file, it is easy to reconstruct what the behavior library must
have contained at the time the script was constructed. If revision control is
also practiced (see below) then there can be direct access to behavior files
from the appropriate dates as well.
Also, old script histories make great source material for papers document-
ing a project’s history (e.g. see Chapter 9).
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8.4.2 Use Revision Control
Again, revision control systems are well established software tools, so they
will not be covered in depth here. I will strongly recommend that some sys-
tem be used, particularly on multi-programmer projects, but even for single
programmers. In particular, I recommend CVS1. This allows you to easily
create a directory containing your latest working version of an agent (or any
version) for a demo on a moment’s notice, and without interfering with your
current development directory. It also helps handle the situation when more
than one version of the source code has been altered simultaneously. It works
on any size project — I first used it working for a multi-national company
with firewalls. It really is worth the time it takes to install the system.
8.4.3 Use Debugging Tools
Again, good tools are worth taking the time to learn to use, and sometimes to
build. I prefer starting with languages or language packages that provide
a decent level of debugging, rather than relying too much on customized
agent toolkits. At a minimum, any developer should have a profiler, to find
out (rather than guess) where bottlenecks are happening in code. Ideally,
they should also have an interruptible debugger that can show program state,
and preferably allow stepping through the program execution. Finally, class
browsers are extremely useful tools that both help the developer quickly find
code or functions in the language, and often in their own program.
I know of two very successful complex agent research projects that found
logging actions at multiple, discrete levels (e.g. high level decisions, mid-
level decisions, low-level actions) absolutely critical to debugging their code.
These are the Ymir multi-modal dialog agent project [Tho´risson, 1997] and
the CMUnited robo-cup soccer teams [Riley et al., 2001]. I have rudimentary
versions of such logging in my own system, though I personally find real-time
notification of events and stepping control more useful. Certainly, building
GUIs to help automate the most time-consuming and often needed aspects of
development and maintenance can be well worth the time.
Again, there is an entire literature on agent toolkits which I will not even
try to summarize here [though see Bryson et al., 2001a]. This section has out-
lined what I consider to be the minimum amount of support useful to develop
intelligent agents.
1The Concurrent Versions System, http://cvshome.org.
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8.5 How BOD Relates to Similar Approaches
Finally, I will give a quick, high-level summary of the relationship between
behavior-oriented design and the other design techniques that have to some
extent inspired it. First, all of these approaches are high-level methodologies,
none of them are algorithms. In most cases, it should be at least possible to
build an agent under any of these approaches. The important question is, how
easy (and consequently, how likely) it is to solve a particular problem using a
particular strategy.
8.5.1 Behavior-Based AI (BBAI)
There are two main benefits of BOD over standard BBAI: BOD’s use of hier-
archical reactive plans, and BOD’s methodology of behavior decomposition.
As I have argued frequently earlier, having explicit reactive plans built
as part of the architecture greatly simplifies control. When one particular
set of behaviors is active (say a robot is trying to pick up a teacup) there is
no need to worry about the interactions of other unrelated behaviors. The
robot will not decide to sit down, or relieve itself, or go see a movie unless
it is at a reasonable juncture with the tea cup. On the other hand, it may
drop the cup if something truly important happens, for example if it must
fend off an attack from a large dog trying to knock it over. It is much easier
to express this information in a reactive plan than to build complex mutual
inhibition systems for each new behavior every time a behavior is added,
as is necessary in conventional BBAI. In mutual inhibition or reinforcement
systems, the control problem scales exponentially; with explicit plans, the
problem scales linearly.
What BOD offers in terms of behavior decomposition over other BBAI
methods is:
• A better place to start. Instead of trying to determine what the units of
behavior are, the developer determines what information the agent is
going to need. This is one of the chief insights from OOD.
• A better way to fix things. Unlike other BBAI approaches, BOD does
not necessarily assume that decomposition is done correctly on the first
attempt. It provides for cyclic development and neat interfaces between
behaviors and control.
8.5.2 Object-Oriented Design (OOD)
Although BOD is to some extent based on OOD, it is not a fully object-
oriented approach. OOD tends to be useful for passive reactive systems, but
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is used less frequently for designing systems that are actively internally moti-
vated. The addition BOD provides over OOD is the reactive-plan component.
This allows the expression of motivation and priority as part of the organiza-
tion of behavior. It also separates the problem of organizing behavior through
time from the problem of representing information about how the behavior
is conducted. BOD applies techniques for building plans and decomposing
behaviors that are analogous but not identical to the OOD methodologies for
designing object hierarchies. There is no equivalent to OOD notions of in-
heritance in BOD2 nor to the class hierarchy. In BOD the behaviors are not
hierarchical — the reactive plans are.
8.5.3 Agent-Oriented Design (AOD)
On the other hand, if every object given its own motivations and intentions,
then that system would be called a Multi-Agent System, or MAS. Program-
ming with MAS is sometimes now called Agent-Oriented Software Engineer-
ing [Wooldridge and Ciancarini, 2001].
I believe that AOD is overkill for creating a single complex agent, though
some people are using it as a modular agent architecture. There are two prob-
lems with AOD in this context:
• Arbitration is often done by voting or some other distributed algorithm.
This is not only potentially slow, but also involves somehow being able
to determine for the entire system the relative value between individ-
ual agent’s goals [Sandholm, 1999]. For a complex agent with a fixed
number of component modules, by the time this prioritization is done,
one has essentially done the work of creating a POSH plan, which will
presumably then operate more quickly.
• Communication between agents is over-emphasized, and often relies
on a homogeneous representation. Again, I favor customizing the in-
terface as part of the design of the complex agent.
The AOD approach makes sense when a fluctuating number of agents are
running on different hardware and owned by different people are trying to
negotiate the solution to a well-defined problem or set of problems. But as
far as developing intelligence for a single complex agent goes, it seems to be
another instance of overly homogeneous representations, and overly obscure
control.
2Though see the use of drive-levels in Section 10.5.
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8.5.4 ‘Behavior-Oriented Design’
Two authors before me have used the term Behavior-Oriented Design, both in
1994. Neither author has continued using the term to any great degree. One
author, Nakata [1994], dealt with automated design using causal reasoning
about the way a device is intended to work. This work is completely unre-
lated to my own. The other author, [Steels, 1994b], does work in the complex
agent field, and was discussing the development of behavior-based robots.
The Steels paper is primarily devoted to documenting his extremely impres-
sive robot experimental enclosure, where robots competed or cooperated in
generating then acquiring electric power. His only mention of the actual pro-
cess of “behavior-oriented design” though is as part of a definition:
A behavior-oriented design starts by identifying desirable behav-
iors and then seeking the subset for which behavior systems need
to be developed.
[Steels, 1994b, p. 447]
This approach speaks to the decomposition of the parallel modules in his
robot architecture. He speaks elsewhere of a “behavior-oriented as opposed
to a goal-oriented design” [pp. 445, 451]. This phrase does not encompass
his entire architecture or philosophy, which at that point included avoiding
the use of action selection.
I view the work of this dissertation as a significant elaboration on this
earlier work by Steels.
8.6 Conclusions
This chapter has gone into detail in describing the BOD methodological pro-
cess, that is, how to put a BOD agent together. I have described what the
specification for a BOD agent needs to contain. I have also described the im-
portance of developing both the agent and its specification in order to contin-
ually optimize the agent for simplicity. This is necessary in order to keep the
agent easy to extend, adapt and maintain; and also to keep control of the com-
plexity of the problems the agent will be expected to learn or solve for itself.
I have also described several important ancillary issues to supporting a BOD
development effort, such as how to guarantee that the specification is kept up-
to-date, and how to make best use of programmer time and resources. Finally,
I have briefly related BOD to other related high-level software methodologies.
The next chapter is also devoted to explaining BOD methodology, but this
time by example, not by instruction.
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Chapter 9
Design Process Example:
Modeling Transitive
Inference in Primates
9.1 Introduction
In previous chapters I have shown complete working BOD systems but only
toy examples to illustrate the design process. In this chapter I document a
complete design process in order to illustrate the process of developing and
scaling a BOD system while simultaneously controlling its complexity.
The system developed here is built to examine a particular competence in
real animals — the ability to perform transitive inference (described below).
As such, it has a relatively simple drive structure, since it models only two
compatible goals (learning the task, and training the agent to learn the task).
Also, because the experimental agents are situated only in an artificial-life
simulation, there is no complex perceptual or motor control. Consequently,
the behavior code is relatively brief, concentrating primarily on coordinating
behavior, the learning task itself and reporting results. The full code appears
in Appendix A (available online).
The experiments in this chapter are also intrinsically interesting because
they extend the current models of transitive-inference learning available in
the psychology and biology literatures. Also, the capacity being learned is in
itself very BRP-like. The difficulty both monkeys and humans have learning
this task supports the emphasis in this dissertation on the design rather than
learning of action selection mechanisms.
145
9.2 Biological Background:
Learning Ordered Behavior
Transitive inference is the process of reasoning whereby one deduces that if,
for some quality, A > B and B > C then A > C. In some domains, such as
real numbers, this property will hold for any A, B or C. For other domains,
such as sporting competitions and primate dominance hierarchies, the prop-
erty does not necessarily hold. For example, international tennis rankings,
while in general being a good predictor of the outcome of tennis matches,
may systematically fail to predict the outcome of two particular players1
Piaget described transitive inference as an example of concrete opera-
tional thought [Piaget, 1954]. That is, children become capable of doing
transitive inference when they become capable of mentally performing the
physical manipulations that would determine the correct answer. In the case
of transitive inference, this manipulation would be ordering the objects into
a sequence using the rules A > B and B >C, and then observing the relative
location of A and C.
Since the 1970’s, however, demonstrations of transitivity with preopera-
tional children and various animals — apes, monkeys, rats and even pigeons
[see for review Wynne, 1998] — has lead some to the conclusion that transi-
tive inference is a basic animal competence, not a skill of operations or logic.
In fact Siemann and Delius [1993] [reported in Wynne, 1998] have shown that
in adults trained in the context of an exploration-type computer game, there
was no performance difference between the individuals who formed explicit
models of the comparisons and those who did not (N = 8 vs. 7 respectively).
9.2.1 Characteristic Transitive Inference Effects
The following effects hold across experimental subjects, whether they are
children, monkeys, rats, pigeons, or adult video-game players. Once a subject
has learned the ordering for a set of pairs (e.g. AB, BC, CD...), they tend to
show significantly above-chance results for transitive inference. They also
show the following effects [see Wynne, 1998, for review]:
• The End Anchor Effect: subjects do better (more correct and faster reac-
tion times) when a test pair contains one of the ends. Usually explained
by the fact they have learned only one behavior with regard to the end
points (e.g. nothing is > A).
1British sports vernacular has a word for such non-transitive relationships: the lower ranking
team is called a “giantkiller”.
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• The Serial Position Effect: even taking into account the end anchor
effect, subjects do more poorly the closer to the middle of the sequence
they are.
• Symbolic Distance Effect: again, even compensating for the end anchor
effect, the further apart on the series two items are, the faster and more
accurately the subject makes the evaluation. This effect is seen as con-
tradicting any step-wise chaining model of transitive inference, since
there should be more steps and therefore a longer RT between distant
items.
• The First Item Congruity Effect: in verbal tests, pairs are better evalu-
ated if the question is posed in the same direction as the evidence (e.g.
If the evidence takes the form “A is bigger than B”, “is C smaller than
A” is harder to answer than “is C bigger than A”.) This is considered
possibly analogous to the fact that pairs closer to the rewarded end of
the series are done better than those symmetrically opposite (e.g. in 5
items with A rewarded, AC is easier than CE).
P1 Each pair in order (ED, DC, CB, BA) repeated until 9 of 10
most recent trials are correct. Reject if requires over 200 trials total
P2a 4 of each pair in order. Criteria: 32 consecutive trials correct.
Reject if requires over 200 trials total
P2b 2 of each pair in order. Criteria: 16 consecutive trials correct.
Reject if requires over 200 trials total
P2c 1 of each pair in order. Criteria: 30 consecutive trials correct.
No rejection criteria.
P3 1 of each pair randomly ordered. Criteria: 24 consecutive trials correct.
Reject if requires over 200 trials total
T1 Binary tests: 6 sets of 10 pairs in random order.
Reward unless failed training pair.
T2a As in P3 for 32 trials. Unless 90% correct, redo P3.
T2 6 sets of 10 trigrams in random order, reward for all.
T3 Extended version of T2.
Figure 9.1: Phases of training and testing transitive inference [Chalmers and
McGonigle, 1984]. When a subject reaches criteria, it proceeds to the next
phase.
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9.2.2 Training a Subject for Transitive-Inference Experi-
ments
Training a subject to perform transitive inference is not trivial. Subjects are
trained on a number of ordered pairs, typically in batches. Because of the
end anchor effect, the chain must have a length of at least five items (A . . .E)
in order to clearly demonstrate transitivity on just one untrained pair (BD).
Obviously, seven or more items would give further information, but training
for transitivity is notoriously difficult. Even children who can master five
items often cannot master seven2. Individual items are generally labeled in
some arbitrary way, designed to be non-ordinal, such as by color or pattern.
Additional control is normally provided by assigning different color or pattern
orderings for different subjects. For example, one subject may learn blue <
green < brown while another brown < blue < green.
The subjects are first taught the use of the testing apparatus; they are
presented with and rewarded for selecting one option. For the experiments
reviewed in this paper, subjects learned to look under colored tins for a re-
ward. Next, they are trained on the first pair DE, where only one element,
D is rewarded3 When the subject has learned this to some criteria, they are
trained on CD. After all pairs are trained in this manner, there is often a phase
of repeated ordered training with fewer exposures (e.g. 4 in a row of each
pair) followed by a period of random presentations of training pairs.
Once a subject has been trained to criteria, they are exposed to the testing
data. In testing, either choice is rewarded, though sometimes differentially
rewarded training pairs are interspersed with testing pairs to ensure they are
not forgotten.
9.2.3 Standard Models
The currently dominant way to model transitive inference is in terms of the
probability that an element will get chosen. Probability is determined by a
weight associated with each element. During training, the weight is updated
using standard reinforcement learning rules. Normalization of weights across
rules has been demonstrated necessary in order to get results invariant on the
order of training (whether AB is presented first or DE). Taking into account
some pair-specific context information has proven useful for accuracy, and
necessary to explain the fact that animals can also learn a looping end pair
(e.g. E > A for 5 items).
2Interestingly, this is also true for even conventional sorting of conspicuously ordered items
such as posts of different lengths [see e.g. McGonigle and Chalmers, 1996].
3The psychological literature is not consistent about whether A or E is the ‘higher’ (rewarded)
end. This paper uses A as high.
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Wynne [1998] provides the following as a summary model:
p(X |XY ) = 1
1+ e−α(2r−1)
(9.1)
r =
V (X)+V (Z)+ γV (〈X |XY 〉)
V (X)+V (Y )+2V (Z)+ γV (〈X |XY 〉)+ γV (〈X |XY 〉) (9.2)
where Z is the normalizing term, 〈a|ab〉 indicates context sensitivity, and α
and γ are free parameters. Such models assume that reaction time somehow
co-varies with probability of correct response.
9.3 Modeling Errors in Transitive Inference
It is often the case in cognitive modeling that the errors made by subjects
are the most telling way to disambiguate between different possible models.
This section describes a set of experiments that indicate that there is more to
transitive inference than a single-weight system such as the above indicates.
It also describes two models describing these errors.
9.3.1 The Binary Sampling Model
In one of the earliest of the non-cognitive transitivity papers, McGonigle and
Chalmers [1977] not only demonstrated animal learning of transitive infer-
ence, but also proposed a model to account for the errors the animals made.
Monkeys, like children, tend to score only around 90% on the pair BD. Mc-
Gonigle and Chalmers proposed the binary-sampling theory. This theory as-
sumes that:
• Subjects consider not only the items visible, but also items that might
be expected to be visible. That is, they take into account elements asso-
ciated with the current stimuli, especially intervening stimuli associated
with both.
• Subjects consider only two of the possible elements, choosing the pair
at random. If they were trained on that pair, they perform as trained;
otherwise they perform at chance, unless one of the items is an end
item, A or E, in which case they perform by selecting or avoiding the
item, respectively.
• If the animal ‘selects’ an item that is not actually present, it cannot act
on that selection. Instead, this selection reinforces its consideration of
that item, which tends to push the animal towards the higher valued of
the items displayed.
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Thus for the pair BD, this model assumes an equal chance the monkey will
focus on BC, CD, or BD. Either established training pair results in the monkey
selecting B, while the pair BD results in an even (therefore 17%) chance of
either element being chosen. This predicts that the subjects would select B
about 83% of the time, which is near to the average actual performance of
85%.
The binary-sampling theory is something of a naive probabilistic model:
it incorporates the concept of expectation, but is not very systematic. It also
fails to explain the symbolic distance effect. However, it motivated McGo-
nigle and Chalmers to generate a fascinating data set showing the results of
testing monkeys (and later children [Chalmers and McGonigle, 1984]) on tri-
grams of three items. The binary-sampling theory predicts that for the trigram
BCD there is a 17% chance D will be chosen (half of the times BD is attended
to), a 33% chance C will be chosen (all of the times CD is attended to) and
a 50% chance of B (all of BC plus half of BD). In fact, the monkeys showed
3%, 36%, and 61%, respectively.
Figure 9.2: Blue, one of McGonigle’s squirrel monkeys, inside a test appara-
tus. He is confident with two items but slower on three. (Photos c© Brendan
McGonigle, 1987)
9.3.2 The Production-Rule Stack Model
The trigram data has since been used by Harris and McGonigle [1994] to
create a tighter-fitting model, which is based on the concept of stack of pro-
duction rules. This model matches the performance of the monkeys very well
whether they are modeled as a group and as individuals.
The production-rule stack model requires the following assumptions:
1. The subject learns a set of rules of the nature “if A is present, select A”
or “if D is present, avoid D”.
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2. The subject learns a prioritization of these rules.
This process results in a rule stack, where the first rule is applied if its trigger
finds the context appropriate. If not, the second, and so on.
The production rule stack is very much like a BRP, except that it is only
executed once. For an example, consider a subject that has learned a stack
like the following:
1. (A present) ⇒ select A
2. (E present) ⇒ avoid E
3. (D present) ⇒ avoid D
4. (B present) ⇒ select B
Here the top item (1) is assumed to have the highest priority. If the subject is
presented with a pair CD it begins working down its rule stack. Rules 1 and
2 do not apply, since neither A nor E is present. However, rule 3 indicates the
subject should avoid D, so consequently it selects C. Priority is critical. For
example, for the pair DE, rules 2 and 3 give different results. However, since
rule 2 has higher priority, D will be selected.
Adding the assumption that in the trigram test cases, an ‘avoid’ rule re-
sults in random selection between the two remaining items, Harris and Mc-
Gonigle [1994] model the conglomerate monkey data so well that there is no
significant difference between the model and the data. For example, over all
possible trigrams, the stack hypothesis predicts a distribution of 0, 25% and
75% for the lowest, middle and highest items. Binary sampling predicts 3%,
35% and 63%, and logic of course 0%, 0% and 100%. The monkeys showed
1%, 22% and 78%. Further, individual performance of most monkeys were
matched to a particular stack.
Without trigram data, there would be no way to discriminate which rule
set the monkeys use. However, with trigram data, the stacks are distinguish-
able because of their errors. For example, a stack like
1′. (A present) ⇒ select A
2′. (B present) ⇒ select B
3′. (C present) ⇒ select C
4′. (D present) ⇒ select D
would always select B from the trigram BCD by using rule 2′, while the pre-
vious stack would select B 50% of the time and C 50% because it would base
its decision on rule 3.
There are 8 discernible correct rule stacks of three rules each which will
solve the initial training task. There are actually 16 correct stacks of four
rules, but trigram experiments cannot discriminate whether the fourth rule
selects or avoids.
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9.4 The Proposed Model
The model of transitivity built in this chapter is influenced by all three mod-
els discussed above. It is also influenced by the neurologically based models
of action selection [Redgrave et al., 1999] and reinforcement learning [see
Gillies and Arbuthnott, 2000, for a review] in the basal ganglia (see Chap-
ter 11). The basal ganglia appears to control movement primarily through
selective context-based inhibition of activity moving from perceptual and mo-
tivational streams towards motor cortices.
9.4.1 Components of the Novel Model
My model proposes the following:
1. In the earliest phase of training, the subjects learn to grasp any viewed
tin in order to get their reward.
2. In the large blocks of ordered pair training, subjects discover that they
may only select one item, and that only one is rewarded. Consequently,
they must inhibit both applicable grasping behaviors until they have
selected one item.
3. As the size of the training blocks is reduced, subjects must also learn
prioritization between neighboring inhibition rules. The interactions of
these neighbors is generally sufficient to produce a total ordering, al-
though the compartmentalization also allows for learning the additional
EA pair.
4. The process of selecting between two rules of similar activation in-
volves probabilistic attentive sampling of the alternative rules. Atten-
tion allows for searching for increased evidence and generally increases
the activation of the rule. Where two competing rules are similarly
weighted, this process is likely to be both longer and more arbitrary.
In this chapter, I focus on modeling the third of these proposals. The first
two are relatively uncontentious, and the fourth is essentially an elaboration
of the common assumption of the sequence-learning models [e.g. Wynne,
1998].
9.4.2 Learning in the Model
The full model I will eventually construct requires several vectors to be learned
representing the priorities between contexts and the priorities for the rules as
applied to each context.
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Each vector v is composed of normalized weights representing the priority
level. The weights are updated after every trial, where a trial is a presentation
of a pair or trigram, a selection by the agent, and a reward. For the update
rule, I replace the sigmoid in eq. 9.1 with a step function. Assume that the
pair XY has been presented4, that X has been selected by the agent, and Ξ
and δ are free parameters.
If X is correct and (vX −vY < Ξ), add δ to vX .
Else, if X is incorrect, subtract δ from vX (9.3)
Renormalize v.
For a five item task, there can be up to six vectors: one to represent the
different stimuli, and one for each stimuli representing associated rules. In
fact, in some of the experimental runs up to two stimuli are never selected for
attention. In these runs less vectors are used (see examples below).
For each trial, a subject agent selects first a stimuli to attend to, then a
rule to apply, based on the current prioritizations. (Initial weights are even, in
the matched case the outcome is arbitrary.) The subject agent also stores its
selections in short term working memory. After the subject agent has chosen,
the training agent rewards or fails to reward the subject. The subject agent
updates its vectors based on the reward and its recalled decision.
9.5 Behavior-Oriented Design of a Model Agent
In this section, I document the construction of a performing agent-based ver-
sion of the above model. This section is intended primarily as a detailed
example of BOD. However, some of the intermediate versions of the model
are represented in the results shown in Section 9.6.
Although this is a real modeling problem, the agent produced is relatively
simple, particularly with respect to its drive system. The model is of a single
task in a controlled environment, and is not real-time. To see more interesting
examples of drive collections, see the agents in Sections 4.5.1, 7.6 or 10.5.
The primary goal of this section is to illustrate in detail the BOD process, not
the capabilities of BOD agent architectures.
Because Harris and McGonigle [1994] reverse the priority of the standard
labeling letters A-E, I have chosen to use color labels for the five items to
be ordered. This reduces the possibility for confusion based on assumptions
about ordering. For all the following examples, the correct transitive ordering
is this: red > white > blue > green > yellow.
4In the case of a trigram, the subject selects one of the two rejected items at random for the
role of Y in equation 9.3.
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9.5.1 Initial Decomposition
Here are the steps of BOD initial decomposition (see Section 8.2.1) applied
to the task of modeling a monkey learning transitive inference. The agent
built here actually represents two agents in the real world: the monkey and
the test machine. This is not really as strange as it might seem, since in the
real world the test apparatus must be designed in such a way that it accounts
for the behavior of the monkey. BOD can also be applied to multi-agent
systems (see Chapter 10), but in this case the behavior organization is better
considered from the perspective of the system as a whole.
1. High level description: At the highest level of description, we want a
system that on the one (apparatus) hand administers tests, and on the
other (monkey) hand, makes choices and learns from them. In more
detail, we want the agent to learn an ordering of selection rules for
choosing one item when presented with pairs of stimuli, and if it learns
to a particular criteria, then we want to test it with novel pairs and also
triads of stimuli and see what it does.
2. Prototype plans: An individual trial should look something like this:
set test, choose a box, be rewarded (if right) or notified (if wrong),
learn from this experience, have test-board cleared. At a higher level,
the testing machine must follow a training procedure: learn each set of
adjacent pairs to criteria, then demonstrate competence on each pair, in
ordered sets following training, and then mixed randomly. If criteria is
passed, then perform on all possible pairs (rewarding any behavior on
the non-training pairs, correct behavior only on training pairs) and then
on all possible triads (rewarding any behavior.)
3. Prototype plan primitives: The actions the system needs to be able to
perform are setting the test, administering a reward, clearing the test,
grasping a box and learning from an episode of test and reward. The
monkey will need to be able to notice when a test has been set, distin-
guish between the boxes, and notice its learned preferences. The ma-
chine will need to be able to tell when to administer a test or a reward,
and also what test or reward to administer.
4. Prototype Behaviors One obvious decomposition in this case is be-
tween the state needed by the monkey, and that needed by the apparatus.
Further, some state on the monkey varies rapidly by context (e.g. where
the monkey is looking or what it is holding) while other state adapts
slowly over time (e.g. the priorities the monkey assigns its possi-
ble actions.) Since very different rates of state change are a key de-
composition indicator, we will expect to have at least three behaviors:
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monkey (for the eyes and hands), sequence (for the priority learning),
and apparatus (for the testing machine).
5. Determine drives: In this case, we are really only modeling a single
high-level competence, although we will code it as a drive so that the
system will run continuously while we are developing and debugging
it.
6. Select a first behavior to implement: We will start by modeling the
behavior in Harris system: a hard-coded reactive plan for transitive in-
ference. This gives us a chance to debug our primitives, and to demon-
strate the difference between encoding this knowledge and learning it.
Once an initial decomposition exists, what remains is to iteratively build
the agent. The following sections document my development of this agent.
Each drawn model represents a plan script I debugged then saved as part
of my test suite. A test suite of relatively simple plan scripts is useful for
when major changes to the behavior library are made. Such changes could
be caused by new insights about underlying representations, or the discovery
of bugs. But most often, they are part of the development process — either
the next added capability, or a new simplification of agent structure. All such
changes are expected and supported in the BOD process.
9.5.2 Modeling an Expert
We begin by replicating a simplified version of Harris’ system, which models
skilled monkeys. We initially ignore the slightly more complicated avoid
rules; we model the only correct solution using all select rules.
binary-test
The very first cut is just a competence (Figure 9.3). There are two behaviors
that support it, representing the state in the monkey, and the state in the testing
machine (set-test must be invoked by hand before running the competence.)
(The monkey part of the agent is named Elvis after a particular Capuchin.)
The primitive set-test must be called by hand before the competence can be
tested.
The competence here works effectively like a switch statement in C or a
cond in lisp (or a production stack in Harris’ production-rule system.) The
monkey grasps the highest priority color it sees. The see-color primitives all
map to a single method with a particular perceptual argument. The perceptual
primitive also sets the visual attention, which is then used by grasp-seen to
determine which object is grasped. Grasp-seen has the side-effect of remov-
ing the grasped object from the test-tray of the apparatus.
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monkey
visual-attention
hand grasp-seen
see-color, //
grasp
''_ _ _ _Â
Â
Â
Â
_ _ _ _
Action
Selection
apparatus
test-board
set-testoo
see
hh
(a) Behaviors
elvis ⇒
〈 (see-red) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-white) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-blue) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-green) ⇒ grasp-seen
〉
(9.4)
(b) Plan
Figure 9.3: The plan binary-test. This models only a simple, trained compe-
tence for making transitive choice. Subsequent diagrams omit the ‘grasp’ and
‘see’ arcs for clarity.
driven-b-test
The next step is to incorporate the elvis competence into an agent. The agent
in Figure 9.4 sets a test if there’s currently no test, removes the test if the
monkey is currently grasping something, and lets the monkey make its choice
otherwise.
This plan gives an example of each POSH element type, though the ac-
tion pattern is mostly gratuitous5. Notice that the drive collection, life, has
no goal, so it never ends. The bottom-most drive should never trigger, it is
included for debugging purposes. Screeching and hooting are nominally as-
cribed to the monkey behavior, though they require no state — they produce
formatted output that alerts the experimenter.
156
monkey
visual-attention
hand noises, grasp-seen
see-color, grasping, //
_ _ _ _Â
Â
Â
Â
_ _ _ _
Action
Selection
apparatus
test-board
no-test, new-test,
finish-test
oo
(a) Behaviors
life ⇒
〈〈 (no-test) ⇒ new-test
(grasping) ⇒ finish-test
(no-test ⊥) ⇒ elvis-choice
⇒ hoot
〉〉
(9.5)
elvis-choice ⇒
〈 (see-red) ⇒ noisy-grasp
(see-white) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-blue) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-green) ⇒ grasp-seen
〉
noisy-grasp ⇒ 〈screech→ grasp-seen〉
(b) Plan
Figure 9.4: The plan driven-b-test. This models an experienced monkey.
9.5.3 Learning an Ordering
prior-learn
The next step is to enhance the model by forcing the monkey to learn the
ordering of the colors. This requires two significant changes:
• augmenting the test-behavior to reward the monkey appropriately, and
• adding a new behavior, sequence, to the system.
As external observers we would of course ascribe sequence to the mon-
key. However, notice that this is a separate object / behavior from the pre-
vious monkey behavior. This is in keeping with the BOD principle that be-
havior decomposition is dictated by representation and the rate of adapta-
tion. Monkey’s state is deictic and changes utterly on every testing episode.
Sequence represents life-long learning. Its primary adaptive state is a vector,
and its learning rule is akin to standard neural-network weight update rules.
5I used screeching for very high-level debugging — when this agent operates with all tool-
wise debugging turned off, the only indication it is running successfully is the occasional screech
at a red box.
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Selection
apparatus
test-board
reward
find-color, reward-found, new-test,
no-test, finish-test, save-result
oo
monkey
visual-attention
hand
grasp-seen,
noisesgrasping,
OO
sequence
seq
sig-dif
weight-shift
adaptive-choice,
consider-rewardRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
iiRRRRRRRRRRRRRRRR
look-atoo
(a) Behaviors
life ⇒
〈〈 (no-test) ⇒ new-test(rewarded) ⇒ end-of-test
(grasping) ⇒ reward-monkey
(no-test ⊥) ⇒ educated-grasp
⇒ hoot
〉〉
(9.6)
reward-monkey ⇒
〈 (find-red) ⇒ reward-found
(find-white) ⇒ reward-found
(find-blue) ⇒ reward-found
(find-green) ⇒ reward-found
〉
educated-grasp ⇒ 〈adaptive-choice→ grasp-seen〉
end-of-test ⇒ 〈consider-reward→ save-result→ finish-test〉
(b) Plan
Figure 9.5: The plan prior-learn. Learning the priorities for different colors.
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The other two associated pieces of state are parameters for this learning rule,
which are fixed for each individual monkey.
The apparatus uses an adapted version of the already-debugged transitive
competence to determine whether the monkey has chosen correctly. Apparatus
now requires extra perceptual skills in order to notice which color box was
selected. The apparatus also has a new piece of state, ‘reward’, which is either
nil, a peanut, or no peanut. (For the real monkeys, “no peanut” is an audible
buzzer as well as a lack of reward following the choice.)
Figure 9.5 illustrates an example of trading off complexity in the behav-
ior for complexity in the plan (see Section 6.5). ‘Educated-grasp’ is now a
simple action pattern, which relies on sequence to determine which item to
look at. Here the motivation for the tradeoff is not only simplification, but
also the primary design goal for the agent: that it should learn appropriate
prioritization. It is important to realize that although ‘reward-monkey’ looks
like ‘elvis-choice’, it is in fact an entirely new competence in terms of ability
for the system, if not in actual code.
By the principle of reducing redundancy (Section 8.3.1) competence ‘elvis-
choice’ begged simplification. Of course, so does ‘reward-monkey’. On the
other hand, the arbitrary ordering of colors needs to be specified somewhere.
It as easy specify this in the plan which is readily edited (if we ever wanted a
different sequence), and, in this case, already debugged.
The sequence-learner contains three bits of state: a list of known objects
with weights, a ‘significant difference’ and a ‘weight shift’. The learning
algorithm works like this:
• If the monkey chooses correctly, but its certainty was less than significant-
difference, then it adds weight-shift to the weight of the winner, then
renormalizes all the weights.
• If it is wrong, it shifts the weight in favor of the alternative, regardless
of its certainty.
The sum of all the weights in a sequence is kept at 1.0; this is a standard
strategy of modeling resource-constrained learning. If the monkey sees a
new item it has never seen before, it adds this to the sequence list, giving it
a weight equal to 1/N where N is the number of items currently in the list,
reflecting a lack of expectation about where in the sort order the item will
occur. This weight is derived from the other elements in proportion to their
current weight (that is, each existing weight is multiplied by (N−1)/N).
The test machine is now in charge of both setting and rewarding the be-
havior. The new primitive ‘find’ searches the world for a colored box, then if
it is found, a reward (or lack of reward) is given based on whether the machine
is attending to the monkey’s hand or the test-board. The end-of-test action-
pattern calls actions in sequence from two different behaviors — sequence
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learns from the reward, then apparatus records the result and clears the test
board.
Results for the learning systems in this section are shown and discussed in
Section 9.6 below. See Figure 9.9(a) for this particular plan. In this section, I
will continue concentrating on demonstrating scaling under BOD.
fair-prior-learn
The figures I have been using to illustrate BOD systems do not show every
aspect of a model’s complexity. In particular, they do not show code for the
behavior methods, but only their names. When scaling a model such as this
one, some changes will only be in terms of method code. For example, the
script fair-prior-learn only switches from training the agent on all possible
pairs to only training it on adjacent pairs, in keeping with the standard animal
procedure described in Section 9.2.2. The only impact on the plans in Fig-
ure 9.5 is to change ‘new-test’ to ‘new-training-set’. Nevertheless, this was
potentially a significant change to the training regime, so I ran another cluster
of tests. With the monkey at this level of complexity, the performance was
effectively identical to being trained on every possible pair.
9.5.4 Learning an Ordering of Rules
The full experimental results in the McGonigle and Chalmers [1977] transi-
tivity tests indicate that both monkeys and 5-year-old children [Chalmers and
McGonigle, 1984] learn not sequences of colors, but sequences of behavior
rules. This fact is exposed when the primate or child is exposed to a choice
of three colored boxes. As explained above, Harris and McGonigle [1994]
showed a tight fit to a model where the subjects sometimes learn a rule like
avoid yellow rather than select red. This fit assumes that if the highest ranking
applicable rule is avoid yellow, the selection between the two other choices
(in a triad) is at chance.
roger-test
The first step towards modeling learning rule rather than color ordering is
modeling having such rules. Thus I returned to an earlier script, driven-b-
test, and update it to represent a monkey that uses avoid rules. The monkey
modeled happens to be a squirrel monkey named Roger.
The main monkey difference between roger-test and driven-b-test (Plan 9.6)
is that the competence elvis-choice is replaced by the one in Figure 9.6, and
the behavior monkey now supports the primitive ‘grasp-other’, as described
above. However, in order to fully test the behavior, we also need to expose
160
_ _ _ _Â
Â
Â
Â
_ _ _ _
Action
Selection
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test-board
no-test, save-mcg-result,
new-bt-test, finish-test
oo
monkey
visual-attention
hand
see-color, grasping,
noises, grasp-blockwwwww
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tester
tests
pending-testQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQQ
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pop-test
OO
(a) Behaviors
life ⇒
〈〈 (no-test) (pending-test ⊥) hoot ⇒ goal
(no-test) ⇒ new-bt-test
(grasping) ⇒ record-finish-test
⇒ roger-choice
〉〉
(9.7)
roger-choice ⇒
〈 (see-red) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-yellow) ⇒ grasp-other
(see-white) ⇒ grasp-seen
(see-blue) ⇒ grasp-seen
〉
record-finish-test ⇒ 〈save-mcg-result→ finish-test〉
(b) Plan
Figure 9.6: The plan roger-test. This models a monkey with an avoid rule,
and also an apparatus with a test regime.
the monkey to triads. Thus I added a new behavior to apparatus, tester, which
governs a regiment of training followed by testing. The first implementation
is fairly simple — tester has a list of possible tests, and when that list is empty
‘pending-test’ is false. Notice life now has a goal, and terminates when the
test is complete.
rule-learn
The final system will combine roger-test (Plan 9.8) with fair-prior-learn (ef-
fectively Plan 9.7). However, both to make debugging simpler and to more
fully explore the model as a representation of a real monkey, we only add one
behavior to a system at a time. Consequently, rule-learn does not incorporate
tester from roger-test, but is instead is dedicated solely to learning orderings
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of rules.
In the model in Figure 9.7, I assume (based on the results of Harris and
McGonigle [1994]) that the learning of the select and avoid rule is indepen-
dent for each possible context. That is, the monkey learns both which visual
stimuli (colored box) is most important, and, for that stimuli, which rule is
appropriate. This is consistent with the fact that some monkeys learn behav-
ior that looks like “Select the 1st , Avoid the 5th, Select the 2nd”, where the
earliest mentioned rule has the highest priority6.
There are two major embellishments in rule-learn. The first is a new
behavior, rule-learner, which has four pieces of named state. Two are refer-
ences to sequences, and two are deictic state for referencing the winning units
in those sequences. In fact, ‘rule-seqs’ is really a list of sequences, one for
each element in ‘attendants’. The elements in ‘attendants’ correspond to the
visual contexts, and are acquired the same way as the colors were acquired in
prior-learn. I assume that the gross behaviors select and avoid have been ac-
quired previously and are generally associated with colors. Thus, every time
a new element is added to ‘attendants’, a new rule sequence is added as well,
with the two rules preset to equal priorities (see also Section 9.4). Notice that
there are now multiple instances of sequence behaviors. Each has its own dis-
tinct variable state, and is referenced differently, but has the same primitives.
(See further the Section 7.6.2 commentary on directions.)
The second change is that ‘educated-grasp’ is now again a competence
rather than an action pattern. This is not strictly necessary — ‘pick-this’
and ‘pick-other’ might have been simply ‘pick’ with reference to a deictic
variable. However, given the large difference in the two procedures, I felt that
segregating them improved the agent’s clarity.
Other differences are somewhat less visible. For example, ‘rules-from-
reward’ now affects two sequences, not one. This is implied by the fact it
is now a method on rule-learner. In rule-learn, when making a choice, the
monkey uses the rule-learner attendants’ sequence to determine which color
box it attends to, then the rule-seq associated with that color to determine
which rule it applies. Learn-from-reward applies the learning rule to both
sequences.
9.5.5 Real Training Regimes
As is shown in Section 9.6 below, rule-learn, unlike prior-learn, does not
always converge when exposed only to randomly ordered adjacent pairs in
the sequence. To complete our model, we must subject the monkey from
6As I explained earlier, the monkeys must actually learn four rules to disambiguate a five-item
sequence, but the fourth rule cannot be discriminated using triad testing.
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(a) Behaviors
life ⇒
〈〈 (no-test) ⇒ new-test
(rewarded) ⇒ end-of-test
(grasping) ⇒ reward-monkey
⇒ educated-grasp
〉〉
(9.8)
reward-monkey ⇒
〈 (find-red) ⇒ reward-found
(find-white) ⇒ reward-found
(find-blue) ⇒ reward-found
(find-green) ⇒ reward-found
〉
educated-grasp ⇒
〈 (target-chosen) ⇒ grasp-seen
(focus-rule ’avoid) ⇒ pick-other
(focus-rule ’select) ⇒ pick-this
⇒ priority-focus
〉
end-of-test ⇒ 〈rules-from-reward→ save-rule-result→ finish-test〉
(b) Plan
Figure 9.7: The plan rule-learn. This learns the priorities of rules for different
colors, as well as learning an ordering between these rules.
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rule-learn to a full training regime. I used the regime specified by Chalmers
and McGonigle [1984] because of the detail in the description.
educate-monkey
Adding the mechanism for a training regime into a BOD agent is not strictly
necessary. As was explained in Section 2.2.5 (see also Section 12.2), conven-
tional software systems can be incorporated directly into an intelligent BOD
agent. The training system, more algorithmic than ‘intelligent’, seems a prime
candidate. Consequently, the new competence ‘pick-test’ grossly oversimpli-
fies the complexity of the regime — there are actually nine phases of training
and testing. The distinction between an (adjacent) pair and an n-gram (bi-
gram or trigram) I document with separate primitives simply because it also
documents the movement from training to testing.
McGonigle and Chalmers [1977] also found it necessary to continue at
least partially training the animals during testing. If a monkey is confronted
by one of the adjacent pairs it has been trained on, and it performs incorrectly,
then it is not rewarded. On all other test stimuli (all triads, and any non-
adjacent pairs), the monkey is rewarded regardless of its choice. This explains
why I needed to alter the reward competence for educate-monkey.
The results shown below were actually based on a script with one further
refinement — it computes whether the monkey was right as well as whether
it should be rewarded in order to simplify the analysis. Since there is little
additional theoretical or pedagogical value in this improvement, the script
(educate-me+monk) is included only in Appendix A.
9.6 Results
The previous section described the entire process of developing a BOD-agent
model for learning transitive inference. Although the main motivation for go-
ing into detail on seven versions of the model was to illustrate the BOD pro-
cess, several of the models provided interesting results. In this section I will
not discuss the results of binary-test, driven-b-test or roger-test, because
these non-learning models only replicated the work of Harris and McGonigle
[1994]. While checking the replication was an essential part of development,
it is not particularly interesting, since the operation of production-rule sys-
tems is well understood.
Similarly, prior-learn and fair-prior-learn were essentially replications
of the studies documented by Wynne [1998], only with less precise mathe-
matical models. However, these learning systems provide a basis for compar-
ison for the final two models, so I begin by reviewing these systems.
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life ⇒
〈〈 (test-done) clean-up hoot ⇒ goal(no-test) ⇒pick-test
(rewarded) ⇒ end-of-test
(grasping) ⇒ selective-reward
⇒ educated-grasp
〉〉
(9.9)
pick-test ⇒
〈 (no-test ⊥) ⇒ goal
(criteria ’3) ⇒ set-ngram
⇒ set-pair
〉
selective-reward ⇒
〈 (board-only ’red) (hand ’white) ⇒ buzzer(board-only ’white) (hand ’blue) ⇒ buzzer
(board-only ’blue) (hand ’green) ⇒ buzzer
(board-only ’green) (hand ’yellow) ⇒ buzzer
⇒ give-peanut
〉
educated-grasp ⇒
〈 (target-chosen) ⇒ grasp-seen
(focus-rule ’avoid) ⇒ pick-other
(focus-rule ’select) ⇒ pick-this
⇒ priority-focus
〉
end-of-test ⇒ 〈rules-from-reward→ save-rule-result→ finish-test〉
Figure 9.8: The plan educate-monkey. This augments rule-learn by making
the training apparatus more sophisticated.
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(a) fast-prior-learn finds a stable solution rapidly if one exists. Here ‘sig-dif’ was .08, and
‘weight-shift’ .02. The dotted line represents red (1st ), the plain line is white (2nd ), stars are
blue (3rd ), pluses are green (4th), and triangles yellow (5th).
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(b) If there is no stable solution, then chance orderings of tests can drive one set of weights
above another. Here prior-learn is running with ‘sig-dif’ at .12, (‘weight-shift’ is still .02).
Figure 9.9: Results from prior-learn.
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9.6.1 Learning Colors, Not Rules
Figure 9.9(a) shows a typical result for fair-prior-learn. Unlike real animals
or children, these models perform well regardless of training regime. In either
form of prior-learn, given that the weights sum to one, if the significant-
difference set to .08 or less then a stable solution is found. In fact, although
I gave fair-prior-learn its name because it was only exposed to training and
not testing pairs, it actually trained more reliably and stabilized its weights
much quicker than prior-learn (see Figure 9.10). This is no doubt due to the
high incidence of significant (boundary) information provided in the training
sets.
prior-learn fair-prior-learn
last err. weights stbl. last err. weights stbl.
1 180 220 92 140
2 200 > 278 96 130
3 35 280 90 150
4 190 320 93 140
5 35 > 326 88 150
Figure 9.10: prior-learn vs. fair-prior-learn. Weights are only reported
every 10 trials. Two trials ended (arbitrarily) before weights stabilized.
On the other hand, if the ‘sig-dif’ is greater than .1, then a stable solution
for five items cannot be reached. Unless learning tails off, a ‘hot hands’-
like phenomena causes the weight of an item that has recently occurred in a
number of training pairs to grow higher than the next-ranking element (see
Figure 9.9(b)). In systems without stable solutions, this happens regularly.
These results give us a hypothetical explanation for individual difference
in transitive task performance. Individual differences in stable discrimina-
tions between priorities can affect the number of items that can be reliably
ordered. On the other hand, for fair-prior-learn, competing / unstable weights
often represent the two top-priority colors. This violates the End Anchor Ef-
fect, so is not biologically plausible Of course, given that the bottom-most
priority item successfully buries itself in a stable weight, one could imagine
a dual-weighting system (such as proposed by Henson [1998]) that would
anchor both ends.
9.6.2 Rule-Learning Results
With the added complication of rule learning, the monkey model can no
longer learn the correct solution. In fact, rule-learn consistently learns ei-
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Figure 9.11: rule-learn fails to find a stable solution. The figure does not
show the rule associated with each stimuli: they are select for green/pluses
(4th), avoid for blue/stars (3rd), and avoid for white/no mark (2nd). This agent
confuses only one training pair, blue/green.
ther the solution shown in Figure 9.11 or a symmetric one with the 2nd and
3rd rules fighting for top priority. Although the priority between stimuli is not
stable, the priority for rules does quickly stabilize. These solutions, although
they look truly pathological, only make a mistake in one training pair — that
of the two top priority stimuli. The ordering of these two rules is irrelevant,
the error is made whichever rule fires.
Notice that this result does display the End Anchor Effect. The simulated
monkeys quickly choose rules which avoid making errors on the two end
points, but they choose rules which do not lead to complete solutions. It also
displays the Serial Position Effect – it confuses only central pairs. Further,
a real monkey named Blue (Figure 9.2) showing a consistent error between
the 3rd and 4th item is discussed by Harris and McGonigle [1994, p. 332].
Perhaps Figure 9.11 is a model of Blue’s mind.
The training regiment implemented in educate-monkey (see Figure 9.1)
was actually a more rigorous procedure than was applied to the monkeys,
because children have more difficulty learning this task than adult monkeys
do. It also is more rigorous than necessary for my simulated monkeys. Nearly
all of them converge quickly, and the ones that fail to learn fail early, usually
during Phase 2a.
Figure 9.12(a) shows an interesting run of educate-monkey, where, prior
to testing, two rules are not fully ordered. However, since the rules concern
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(a) With the training regime of educate-monkey in place, most runs are able to find a correct
solution. Vertical lines and labels mark the end of the labeled phase. This agent shows further
learning occurring during test phases T1 and T2. It learns to select red/dots (1st ), avoid yel-
low/triangles (5th), and avoid green/pluses (4th). This monkey was particularly stupid: sig-dif
.12, weight-shift .06.
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(b) Another educate-monkey agent. This agent learned to select red/dots (1st ), select
white/plain (2nd ), and either avoid yellow/triangles (5th) or select blue/stars (3rd ). This mon-
key also had sig-dif .12, but weight-shift was .02.
Figure 9.12: Results from educate-monkey.
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the two opposite ends of the inference chain, either ordering is correct.
Figure 9.12(a) also shows how rule use can provide for stable solutions
within resource constraints that would be too tight for stability in prior-learn.
Because some rules would never normally compete with each other, they can
share priority space, producing solutions such as those shown during phases
P2c and most of P3, or the end of the third portion of training. Figure 9.12(b),
where the sig-dif is also .12, also shows two rules that do not interfere with
each other share a priority level until testing. However, after trigram testing,
pressures similar to those in Figure 9.9(b) coupled with the lack of negative
reinforcement result in a stable weight configuration being found that is no
longer as correct. Of course, in trigram testing, all selections are rewarded,
so from the agent’s perspective, the solution is satisfactory.
9.7 Conclusions and Discussion
The primary emphasis of this chapter is illustrating the BOD development
process with an extended example. The flow of design is shown from a sys-
tem of one competence and two simple behaviors, to a POSH action-selection
tree with a drive collection, three competences and an action pattern, arbitrat-
ing for six behaviors, several of which are adaptive. I have also presented the
first learning model of the rule-learning hypothesis proposed by Harris and
McGonigle [1994], and demonstrated a number of interesting agents which
show at least qualitative resemblance to various individual monkeys, and thus
supply hypotheses about the learning process and beliefs underlying the mon-
keys’ behavior.
The results section contains only the beginning of an analysis for this
system, and further, the agent itself could continue to be scaled. To fully
implement the model proposed in Section 9.4, I would need to alter ‘priority-
focus’ to be more probabilistic when the model is uncertain. To make the
model more biologically plausible, the basic priority representation probably
requires two weight vectors instead of one, as suggested in Section 9.6.1.
Making either of these improvements is fairly trivial: testing the agents and
the analysis of the results is the most time consuming part of the process. (In
fact, a batch tester added on top of tester and apparatus should probably be
the next stage of my development!)
My model of the transitive-inference task is particularly interesting with
respect to this dissertation. It extends the discussion of tradeoffs between
plans and behaviors begun in Section 6.5, by showing how an adaptive be-
havior (rule-learner) can learn what is essentially a BRP. At the same time,
the difficulty for both children and monkeys in learning this task underscores
my emphasis on the importance of bias in learning, and of design in AI.
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Chapter 10
Another Example:
Modeling Social Interactions
in Primate Colonies
10.1 Introduction
In Chapter 9, I gave an extended review of a BOD project, though of a rel-
atively simple agent system. Although the primate competence being mod-
eled was significant and interesting, the simulation itself was not in real-time.
Also, although I was modeling two real-world agents (a monkey and a ma-
chine) I built only one BOD agent.
This chapter is the reverse: it is a very brief introduction to some prelimi-
nary work being done on a very interesting complex agent domain. Although
the model is still under development, I include its current state here, because
it demonstrates several important features not shown elsewhere in this disser-
tation:
• The use of BOD in a multi-agent context.
• A real-time drive system implemented under the newer POSH imple-
mentation (see Section 4.6.3). I have already demonstrated the earlier
real-time POSH control on a robot (in Chapter 7). However, since this
chapter uses the same implementation as in Chapter 9, the code is more
readily comparable (see the Appendixes.)
• The conventional level-based modeling of emotional motivations. Ex-
isting models by other researchers along these lines were already re-
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viewed in Section 8.3.3. This chapter demonstrates how to incorporate
this important idiom of the agent literature into BOD.
10.2 Biological Background: de Waal’s Theory
of Primate Societies
The work in this chapter is being done in collaboration with Jessica Flack of
Emory University. Here is her summary of the phenomena we are modeling:
One of the most interesting questions in the study of animal
societies is how individuals negotiate their social relationships.
This question of how conflict among lower level units (individ-
ual group members) is regulated in the formation of higher level
units (societies) has been described as the fundamental problem
in ethology, [Leigh, 1999]. Although research on non-human pri-
mate societies indicates that there are a variety of mechanisms —
such as aggression, social tolerance, and avoidance — by which
conflict is managed or resolved [de Waal, 2000], it is not well un-
derstood how and why the expression of these mechanisms varies
across and even within social systems. For example, there is
tremendous variation across the macaque genus in terms of how
conflict is managed despite similar patterns of social organiza-
tion. Aggression in some species is common and severe while in
others, it is extremely frequent but rarely escalates to levels that
produce injuries [de Waal and Luttrell, 1989]. Corresponding to
this variation in the degree to which aggression is employed to
settle conflicts of interest is variation in the degree of social tol-
erance by dominant individuals of subordinate ones, particularly
in the context of resource acquisition, and variation in the degree
to which relationships damaged by aggression are repaired via
reconciliation [de Waal and Luttrell, 1989]. Although it appears
that this co-variation in conflict management mechanisms varies
in predictable ways across species, it does not appear that the
co-variation is species-specific. Rather, the variation seems to be
emergent from patterns of social interaction among individuals,
and self-reinforced through social learning.
[Bryson and Flack]
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10.3 Extending BOD for a Multi-Agent Simula-
tion
The first significant technical challenge to this work has been creating a multi-
agent implementation of a BOD system. Of course, this would be easy
enough to do with multiple fully independent agents, but for the reasons
described in Section 8.4.3, I wanted to run all of the BOD agents under a
commercial debugging environment on a single machine.
Fortunately, the current version of the POSH architecture was already
implemented in a version of common lisp that supports multiple processes
[Xan, 1999]. The approach I took was to dedicate one process to each agent,
and rely on the platform to perform the time sharing between agents. Each
agent has its own instances of both its behaviors and its current control stack
(the action scheduler). Currently they share the same POSH reactive plan,
but we intend to explore heterogenous communities in the future. However,
since the action-schedule holds current instances of the POSH control objects
in order to keep track of control state, there is currently no reason to replicate
the template POSH plan structure for each agent.
10.4 Using BOD to Model Drives and Emotions
10.4.1 Modeling Conventional Emotion and Drive Theory
The topic of emotions is losing its taboo both in artificial intelligence and in
the animal sciences. Nevertheless, emotions seem necessarily an emotional
subject, often raising unusually passionate responses, both in support and in
criticism for systems and theories. The primary goal of the present model is to
explore models of state and behavior underlying the complex social activity
in non-human primates. As a byproduct of this work, we must also integrate
emotional responses into complex agent control.
By all indications, the various phenomena we know as emotions charac-
terize a set of behaviors that evolved at significantly different points in our
ancestral history [LeDoux, 1996]. Emotions are effectively an intervening
variable used to explain categories of species-typical behaviors that are re-
lated not only by the behaviors and the environmental contexts in which they
tend to be displayed, but by expressive body postures in the behaving animal.
These emotion “variables” have a real, biological correlate: relatively slow
and diffuse chemical transmissions within the brain (and the rest of the or-
ganism) which create a significant internal context for the brain’s operation,
affecting both perception and action selection.
Our agents are designed to model animal behaviors that humans read-
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ily describe as emotional — the interactions between individuals in a pri-
mate colony. Our current model shows the animals oscillating between two
“drives”, the desire to groom, and the desire for privacy. Grooming is an
interesting behavior, associated with bonding between animals and a calm-
ing effect on the recipient. Although most primates seem to derive pleasure
from grooming, they normally engage in this behavior relatively infrequently.
Frequency of grooming tends to increase in times of certain social stresses.
The ‘desire for privacy’ in this model stands in for a number of other ways
primates spend their time, such as foraging and napping. We model only
seeking isolation from other agents for simplicity’s sake. For monkeys living
in a community, one monkey’s desire to groom can interfere with another’s
desire for privacy. There are a number of possible solutions to such conflict
[de Waal, 2000], but for our pilot study we are only modeling two: tolerance
and aggression. Aggression is of course associated with two other emotions,
anger and fear.
10.4.2 Representing Emotions under BOD
The emotional responses of the agents in our simulation are represented ex-
actly as any other behavior — through a combination of reactive plans rep-
resenting particular orderings of actions (action patterns) and behaviors that
determine how and in which way these actions are expressed. That emo-
tional responses should be continuous with normal action selection makes
sense in light of current understandings of emotions. Damasio [1999], for ex-
ample, suggests that essentially any species-typical behavior is an emotional
response, because emotions are central to motivation.
To begin with, I have made a general-purpose behavior, drive-level, for
representing the current level of activation for a drive. This becomes one of
the pieces of state in behaviors that follow the sort of pattern of activation of
emotional responses. Methods in these behaviors help determine the motiva-
tion level (see Figure 10.1). For example, the desire for isolation increases
slowly in the presence of other animals, and decreases slowly when the an-
imal is alone. Fear on the other hand increases radically in the context of a
direct threat, and more slowly in the context of a fight between other nearby
agents. It decreases slowly in isolation, or more quickly when being groomed
out of the context of danger.
Emotional body postures are very much abstracted in our ALife simula-
tion: they are simply colors for the agents. Their expression is also controlled
by the emotion behaviors.
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Figure 10.1: The behaviors supporting move-n-groom. The top two rows of
primate ‘state’ are really characteristic of any object in the simulation.
10.5 A Model Showing Grooming Oscillating with
Privacy
The current system controlling our primates is as follows. First, there are
currently four behaviors. The first two, grooming and explore, are fairly sim-
ple behaviors as described above, controlling latent variables that might be
identified with emotions or drives. The third is the drive-level behavior al-
ready described. The fourth, primate, has the relatively large responsibility of
handling the primates’ ‘bodies’ — it controls navigation of the agents around
their enclosure.
If the simulations of the primates were particularly complex, primate
would probably be decomposed into more behaviors. However, the most im-
portant output of our system is a simple list of events in the colony such as is
produced by primatologists, since this is the information that is being com-
pared to existing models and data. For the purpose of debugging, we also
have a GUI representation of the agents, but they are represented by simple
buttons, with color indicating their expression, and ASCII characters indicat-
ing their identity and some gestures. The observing function that produces the
log of activity actually has more information than can be gleaned by observ-
ing the GUI, but not more than could be gathered by field workers observing
real primates. Although there is of course less noise from ambiguities aris-
ing in the field in determining the intended object of a gesture in a crowded
location, in general the level of reporting is plausible because it records only
expressed behaviors.
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Figure 10.2: Reactive plan supporting the coordination of the ALife agents.
See text for explanation.
Figure 10.2 shows the current reactive plan for coordinating potential
conflicting actions between these behaviors. Each primate moves between
three possible states — trying to groom, trying to be alone, and just sitting
around. The current drive collection determines that the desire for grooming
outweighs the desire for isolation, if it is operating. But it is equally possible
to guard the competences with sense predicates based on the relative differ-
ences between drives. What move-n-groom shows is that prioritization drive
levels can be combined for determining high-level action selection.
10.6 Preliminary Results and Future Work
We are still working on building the behaviors of our primates, and have thus
not yet begun quantitative analysis of our results. However the transcript
in Figure 10.4 shows a brief episode in the experience of a colony. When
the animals want to be alone, they move towards a location (in 2-D space),
when they are attempting to groom they move towards each other. Mutual
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CH Charlie (all names should be unique in first 2 letters)
CH- Charlie gesturing right
=CH Charlie touching left
^CH Charlie gesturing above
vCHv Charlie touching below
Grey - neutral: normal motion or sitting
Pink - displaying
Red - angry (fighting)
Orange - frightened (screeching)
Lavender - aroused
Purple - mounting
Blue - playing
Green - grooming
Figure 10.3: Labels and colors indicating the state and identity of a particular
agent in the simulated colony. The only colors in current use are grey and
green.
grooming as seen between Murray and Jean is at this stage coincidental —
the agents do not yet deliberately cooperate. For example, Roger, who is
not particularly in the mood to groom, but not particularly concerned with
being isolated, ignores Alice. George, on the other hand, wants to move
to an isolated spot, and is being chased rather pathetically by Monica who
repeatedly tries to sit down by him as he moves. The agents shown here do
not yet have any simulation of a ‘theory of mind’ — they cannot notice when
their company is not wanted, or even that they are failing to meet a goal. Of
course, both of these are well within the capacity of BOD representations,
but current development efforts have been concentrating on the more general
MAS aspects of this simulation, such as creating better debugging tools.
The next steps for this model will be to make the agents aware of the
actions of others, and to model tolerance and aggression / fear. At this point,
we will review the effects of varying parameters for such a system on the
extent to which individual agents are able to meet their individual goals (e.g.
amount of time spent alone or grooming.) Once we have this baseline of
performance established, we will begin modeling intervention behaviors and
social ordering.
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George APPROACH (0 54) 485591
Ringo APPROACH (0 67) 487575
Murray WAIT (374 9) 487881
Monica WAIT (45 236) 491908
Jean APPROACH Murray 497864
Jean ALIGN Murray 500125
Jean GROOM Murray 500254
Alice APPROACH Roger 500275
Alice GROOM Roger 503282
Murray APPROACH Jean 505554
Jean APPROACH Murray 505772
Murray GROOM Jean 506143
Jean GROOM Murray 506237
Monica APPROACH George 509439
Monica ALIGN George 510684
Monica APPROACH George 510972
Monica ALIGN George 513842
Monica APPROACH George 513958
Figure 10.4: Part of a sample observation log for the simulated primate
colony. “Approach” indicates walking, “wait” sitting or foraging, “align”
engaging (sitting closely) for interactions, and “groom” is obvious. See com-
ments in text.
10.7 Conclusions and Discussion
This chapter has given a brief glimpse not only into multi-agent BOD, but also
into modeling conventional drive theory in a BOD system and the relationship
between emotions and action selection. Further, the code for this chapter (see
Appendix A) shows the functioning of real-time drives in the most recent
implementation of POSH, and shows another example of a behavior library
and a POSH script history.
The primate project is the first example of a MAS being built of BOD
components. Thus, besides being a platform for exploring models of pri-
mate social organization, I expect this research to also be useful for exam-
ining the differences between modular intelligence of a single agent and the
multi-agent intelligence of a community. Primates are interesting examples of
successful communities, because they use fairly unstructured, low-bandwidth
communication between agents.
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Chapter 11
Extending BOD toward
Modeling Neural Systems
11.1 Introduction
One useful and interesting application of complex agent technology is cre-
ating functioning models of naturally intelligent systems. In this chapter, I
examine the extent to which this is possible under the BOD methodology. I
also discuss what extensions to the current standard for BOD agents would
be useful for modeling biological intelligence.
In Chapter 3 I argued that there is convergent evidence in the agent ar-
chitecture literature supporting the utility and necessity of the structural at-
tributes of BOD agents. If, as is often claimed [Brooks, 1991a, Hendriks-
Jansen, 1996, Bryson, 2000b, e.g] biological agents face similar problems
and constraints as complex artificial agents, and if the thesis of Chapter 3 is
true, then animals might also be expected to have somewhere control struc-
tures. This chapter also examines evidence that this is in fact the case.
Besides examining the relationship between BOD and biological intelli-
gence directly, this chapter also examines relationship between BOD and arti-
ficial neural networks (ANN). Although ANNs are vast simplifications of real
neural systems, they have been a useful technology for helping us think about
and model highly distributed systems of representation, control and learning.
This work has proven useful both in science, by providing models, paradigms
and hypotheses to neuroscientists; and to engineering, by providing adaptive
control and classifier systems. Integrating ANN with agent software architec-
tures may also further both science and engineering. BOD brings to ANN an
understanding of modularity, specialized learning, and timing and synchro-
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nization issues. ANN brings to BOD a homogeneous adaptive representation
which might in theory extend the sorts of adaptability possible under BOD.
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Figure 11.1: Advances in artificial neural networks (ANN) have been both in-
spired by and used for better understanding neuroscience (BNN). This chapter
shows that similar relationships can exist between BOD and both fields.
ANNs can not so far be used for control systems that attempt to replicate
the behavioral complexity of complete animals. One reason, as we discussed
in Chapter 6, is that the complexity of such systems effectively requires de-
composition into modules and hierarchy. This requirement is not theoretical,
but practical. In theory, monolithic systems may be Turing complete; but
whether attacked by design or by learning, in practice complex control re-
quires decomposition into solvable subproblems. As we’ve seen, modularity
is a key feature not only of BOD agents, but of many other architectures for
complete complex agents.
This chapter begins with a discussion of modularity as found in mam-
malian brains. I the use this as the background for describing mapping be-
tween the features of BOD and other agent architectures and known or theo-
rized functioning in mammal brains. Next, I return to the discussion begun in
Chapter 6 of the limitations of BOD adaptivity, and discuss what extensions
to BOD would be needed in order to model all of the adaptivity exhibited by
natural intelligence. I conclude with a more practical sublist of biologically-
inspired features of agent architectures that I consider useful and ripe for
widespread implementation.
11.2 Modularity in Nature
There are at least three types of modularity in mammalian brains. First, there
is architectural modularity. Neuroanatomy shows that the brain is composed
of different organs with different architectural structures. The types and con-
nectivity of the nerve cells and the synapses between them characterize dif-
ferent brain modules with different computational capabilities. Examples of
architectural modules include the neocortex, the cerebellum, the thalamus,
the hippocampus, periaqueductal gray matter and so forth: the various organs
of the fore, mid and hindbrains.
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Second, there is functional modularity. This modularity is characterized
by differences in utility which do not seem to be based on underlying dif-
ferences in structure or computational process. Rather, the modules seem to
have specialized due to some combination of necessary connectivity and in-
dividual history. Gross examples include the visual vs. the auditory cortices.
Sur et al. [1999] have shown at least some level of structural interchangeabil-
ity between these cortices by using surgery on neonate ferrets. There is also
other convincing and less invasive evidence. For example, many function-
ally defined cortical regions such as V1 are in slightly different locations in
different people [Nestares and Heeger, 2000]. Many people recover capac-
ities from temporarily debilitating strokes that permanently disable sections
of their brains, while others experience cortical remaps after significant alter-
ations of there body, such as the loss of a limb [Ramachandran and Blakeslee,
1998]. This evidence indicates that one of the brain’s innate capabilities is to
adaptively form functionally modular organizations of neural processing.
Thirdly, there is temporal modularity. This is when different computa-
tional configurations cannot exist contemporaneously. There are at least two
sorts of evidence for temporal modularity. First, many regions of the brain ap-
pear to have local “winner take all” connection wiring where a dominant “im-
pulse” will inhibit competing impulses [Hebb, 1949, Grossberg, 1999]. This
neurological feature has been used to explain the fact that humans can only
perceive one interpretation of visually ambiguous stimuli at a time [Po¨ppel,
1994]. Second, many cells in the brain are members of more than one as-
sembly, and can perform substantially different roles in only subtly different
contexts [e.g. in the hippocampus Kobayashi et al., 1997, Wiener, 1996].
Brain cell recording experiments showing that individual cells are associated
with different stimuli and/or behavior, and indeed are members of different
ensembles, depending on the animal’s current context [e.g. Skaggs and Mc-
Naughton, 1998]. This sort of temporal modularity is not yet well understood,
but it could have implications for individual differences in intellectual task
performance such as insight and metaphoric reasoning.
Figure 11.2: An ambiguous image. This figure can be seen either as a vase or
as two faces, but not both at the same time. From [Gleitman, 1995, p. 213]
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The presence of these forms of modularity in mammalian brains motivates
a modular architecture in two ways. First, if we are interested in modeling
the brain as a matter of scientific interest, we will need to be able to replicate
its modularity. Second, the presence of modularity in the best examples of
intelligent control available is that further evidence that modularity is a useful
means of organizing behavior. Evolution is not a perfect designer — the mere
presence of a solution in nature does not prove it is optimal. However, given
the extent and complexity to which the brain has evolved, it is at least worth
treating the utility of its features as hypotheses.
11.3 Mapping BOD Features to Mammal Brain
Structure
Chapter 3 shows that complete agent architectures have converged on three
sorts of architectural modules in order to support complex, reactive behavior.
Skill modules and hierarchically structured reactive plans are used to focus
attention on behaviors likely to be useful in a particular circumstance and
provide temporal ordering for behavior. Environment-monitoring or alarm
systems switch the focus of action-selection attention in response to highly
salient environmental events. In BOD, behaviors correspond to skill modules,
and the POSH control structures handle both plans and attention switching.
If this sort of organization is necessary or at least very useful for intelli-
gent control, then it is also likely to be reflected in the organization of animal
intelligence. This section relates these principles to what is known of mam-
mal brain architecture.
11.3.1 Skill Modules
In the previous section we discussed modularity in mammalian brains. Using
that terminology, we consider BOD behaviors to correspond roughly to func-
tional modularity, particularly in the neocortex, and perhaps to some extent to
temporal modularity. The strength of this correspondence various, however,
both is a factor of BOD application and of brain region.
Consider a behavior for grasping a visual target. In a BOD agent, it would
be likely to incorporate information that and mammals comes from the reti-
nas, visual and associative cortices, motor pre-planning and motor coordina-
tion. It would also need to exploit somatic and proprioceptive feedback from
the grasping limb, though some of this complexity might be masked by inter-
facing to other specialist modules. This end-to-end processing, encompassing
both perception and action, contrasts with most understandings of brain mod-
ularity. Much of functional cortical modularity in mammals tends to be more
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general purpose or modality specific, for example the usual understanding of
the visual, auditory, somatic cortices.
On the other hand, very recent research [e.g. Graziano and Gandhi, 2000,
Graziano et al., 2001] shows that the premotor and motor cortices actually
do represent not only motion, but also multi-modal input specific to various
complete motor primitives, such as feeding, scratching and ducking blows or
projectiles. These complex behaviors, triggered with single-cell simulation,
indicates that animals is complex as monkeys not only use BOD-like mod-
ules, but represent them hierarchically. Further, the temporal modularity in
the parietal cortex and the hippocampal formation, which is also multi-modal,
is obviously not strictly parallel. Such temporally asynchronous and context-
specific biological modularity motivates those BOD behaviors which have
no associated parallel processes, but which are only active when supporting
affected primitives.
Of course, most artificial agent models are not strictly biological, but this
does not preclude a researcher interested specifically in biological modeling
from using BOD to do so. As I have reiterated many times in this dissertation,
BOD-like behavior decomposition is motivated primarily by expedience for
the software engineer. Modularity in BOD serves primarily to support an
orderly decomposition of intelligence into manageable, constructible units.
However, for the researcher interested in modeling the brain directly, BOD
can easily be used with known or theorized cortical modularity as a blueprint
for skill decomposition.
11.3.2 Action Selection
The basal ganglia has been proposed as the organ responsible for at least some
aspects of action selection [Mink, 1996, Gurney et al., 1998, Redgrave et al.,
1999, Prescott et al., to appear]. In a distributed parallel model of intelligence,
one of the main functions of action selection is to arbitrate between different
competing behaviors. This process must take into account both the activation
level of the various ‘input’ cortical channels and previous experience in the
current or related action-selection contexts.
The basal ganglia is a group of functionally related structures in the fore-
brain, diencephalon and midbrain. Its main ‘output’ centers — parts of the
substantia nigra, ventral tegmental area, and pallidum — send inhibitory sig-
nals to neural centers throughout the brain which either directly or indirectly
control voluntary movement, as well as other cognitive and sensory systems
[Middleton and Strick, 2000]. Its ‘input’ comes through the striatum from
relevant subsystems in both the brainstem and the forebrain. Prescott et al.
[to appear] have proposed a model of this system whereby it performs action
selection similar to that proven useful in complex agent architectures.
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Arbitrating between subsystems is only part of the problem of action se-
lection. Action patterns must also be sequenced with appropriate durations to
each step. The duration of many actions is too quick and intricate to be mon-
itored via feedback, or left to the vagaries of spreading activation from com-
peting but unrelated systems [Lashley, 1951, Houghton and Hartley, 1995].
Further, animals that have had their forebrains surgically removed have been
shown capable of conducting complex species-typical behaviors — they are
simply unable to apply these behaviors in appropriate contexts [Gleitman,
1995]. In particular, the periaqueductal grey matter has been implicated in
complex species-typical behaviors such as mating rituals and predatory, de-
fensive and maternal maneuvers [Lonstein and Stern, 1997]. However, there
appears to be little literature as to exactly how such skills are coordinated.
There is also little evidence that learned skills would be stored in such areas.
We do know that several cortical areas are involved in recognizing the ap-
propriate context for stored motor skills [e.g. Tanji and Shima, 1994, Asaad
et al., 2000]. Such cortical involvement could be part of the interface between
skill modules and action selection.
11.3.3 Environment Monitoring
Our proposal for the mammalian equivalent to the environment monitoring
and alarm systems is more straight-forward. It is well established that the
limbic system, particularly the amygdala and associated nuclei, is responsi-
ble for triggering emotional responses to salient (particularly dangerous, but
also reproductively significant) environmental stimuli. Emotional responses
are ways of creating large-scale context shifts in the entire brain, including
particularly shifts in attention and likely behavior [Damasio, 1999, Carlson,
2000]. This can be in response either to basic perceptual stimuli, such as
loud noises or rapidly looming objects in the visual field, or to complex corti-
cal perceptions, such as recognizing particular people or situations [Carlson,
2000, Bechara et al., 1995b]. Again, there can be no claim that this system
is fully understood, but it does, appropriately, send information to both the
striatum and the periaqueductal grey. Thus the amygdaloid system meets our
criteria for an alarm system being interconnected with action selection, as
well as biasing cortical / skill-module activation.
11.3.4 Discussion
We can only begin to produce a mapping of BOD agent attributes to neural
subsystems, primarily because the workings of neural subsystems are only
beginning to be understood, but also because of differences in decomposi-
tion strategies. The primary function of a BOD architecture is to facilitate
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a programmer in developing an agent. Consequently, complexity is kept to
a minimum, and encapsulation is maximized. Evolution, on the other hand,
will eagerly overload an architectural module that has particular computa-
tional strengths with a large number of different functions. Nevertheless, we
have identified several theories from neuroscience that are analogous to the
features of BOD agents.
I would like to describe one more interesting biological analog to the men-
tal architecture constructed under BOD. The structure is in fact a neat inverse,
which is not surprising because it is not a theory of control, but of percep-
tion — specifically Rensink’s theory of visual attention and comprehension
[Rensink, 2000]. Rensink proposes that the visual scene is essentially covered
with proto-objects which are monitored in parallel by the vision system. Only
one item is fully attended to at any given time. That item is constructed of
approximately four “fingers” of attention which bind proto-objects into the at-
tended, fully represented object. Only attended objects can appear in episodic
memory, or be associated with time. Proto-objects may however communi-
cate location and gist, particularly on the level of priming. This is a striking
inversion of the BOD model, where a single point of control attention (often
focused on 3–7 BRP plan steps) governs the expression of behavior generated
by a number of semi-autonomous behavior modules.
11.4 Adaptivity in Modular Systems
As we discussed can Chapter 6, BOD is designed to support specialized learn-
ing. We can design learning systems for the knowledge the agent is destined
to know, and indeed, this is the dominant form of learning exhibited by ma-
ture agents in nature. The tradeoff for BOD being a good way to designing
agents is that it is not particularly suited to other forms of learning — what
in Chapter 6 I called meta-learning, learning plans or behaviors. I will now
begin to discuss possible strategies within BOD and extensions to BOD for
addressing these concerns.
Given that action selection requires structure, a natural extension of the
standard BOD architecture would allow an agent to learn new reactive plans.
There are at least three means by which this could be done. The most com-
monly attempted in AI is by constructive planning. This is the process whereby
plans are created by searching for sets of primitives which, when applied in a
particular order to the current situation, would result in a particular goal situa-
tion [e.g. Fikes et al., 1972, Weld, 1999]. Another kind of search that has been
proposed but not seriously demonstrated is using a genetic algorithm (GA) or
GA-like approach to combine or mutate existing plans [e.g. Calvin, 1996].
Another means of learning plans is to acquire them socially, from other, more
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knowledgeable agents.
Constructive planning is the most intuitively obvious source of a plan,
at least in our culture. However, this intuition probably tells us more about
what our consciousness spends time doing than about how we actually ac-
quire most of our behavior patterns. The capacity for constructive planning is
an essential feature of Soar and of most three-layer-architectures; however it
is one that is still underutilized in practice. We suspect this will always be the
case, as it will be for GA type models of “thinking”, because of the combi-
natoric difficulties of planning and search [Chapman, 1987]. Winston [1975]
states that learning can only take place when one nearly knows the answer
already: this is certainly true of learning plans. Search-like algorithms for
planning in real-time agents can only work in highly constrained situations,
among a set of likely solutions.
Social or mimetic learning addresses this problem of constraining pos-
sible solutions. Observing the actions of another intelligent agent provides
the necessary bias. This may be as simple as a mother animal leading her
children to a location where they are likely to find food, or as complex as the
imitation of complex, hierarchical behavioral patterns (in our terminology,
plans) [Whiten, 2000, Byrne and Russon, 1998]. This may not seem a partic-
ularly promising way to increase intelligence, since the agent can only learn
what is present in its society, but in fact, it is. First, since an agent uses its
own intelligence to find the solution within some particular confines, it may
enhance the solution it is being presented with. This is famously the case
when young language learners regularize constructed languages [Bickerton,
1987, Kirby, 1999]. Secondly, a communicating culture may well contain
more intelligence than any individual member of it, leading to the notion of
cultural evolution and mimetics [Dennett, 1995]. Thus although the use of
social learning in AI is only beginning to be explored [e.g. Schaal, 1999], we
believe it will be an important capacity of future artificial agents.
Finally, we have the problem of learning new functional and/or skill mod-
ules. Although there are many PhD theses on this topic [a good recent ex-
ample is Demiris, 1999], in the taxonomy presented in this paper, most such
efforts would fall under the parameter learning for a single skill module or
behavior. Learning full new representations and algorithms for actions is be-
yond the current state of the art for machine learning. Such a system would
almost certainly have to be built on top of a fine-grain distributed representa-
tion — essentially it should be an ANN. However, again, the state of the art
in ANN does not allow for the learning and representation of such complex
and diverse modules.
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11.5 Requirements for a Behavior Learning Sys-
tem
If the current state of the art were not an obstacle, what would a system capa-
ble of all three forms of adaptivity described in the previous section look like?
I believe it would require at minimum the elements shown in Figure 11.3(a).
This section explains that model.
BLTM
PSTM
ESTM
SP
TA
AS
ELTM
WM
(a) Complete Model
BLTM
PSTM
ESTM
SP
TA
AS
ELTM
WM
(b) Skill Modules
BLTM
PSTM
ESTM
SP
TA
AS
ELTM
WM
(c) Expressed Behavior
BLTM
PSTM
ESTM
SP
TA
AS
ELTM
WM
(d) Learning Action Selection
Figure 11.3: An architecture for allowing adaptation within skill modules, of
new plans, and of new skill modules. Icons for sensing and action are on the
lower left and right respectively. Dashed lines show the flow of information
during an active, attending system. Dotted lines are pathways for consoli-
dation and learning. The heavy solid line is the path of expressed behavior;
the double line represents the constant perceptual pathway for environmental
alerts. The fine lines indicate references: the system pointed to references
representations in the system pointed from.
Consider first the behavior or skill module system, Figure 11.3(b). The
representation of BOD behaviors has been split into two functional modules:
the Behavior Long Term Memory (BLTM) and the Perceptual Short Term
Memory (PSTM). The persistent representation of the behaviors’ representa-
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tions and algorithms belong in the former, the current perceptual memory in
the latter. There is further a Working Memory (WM) where the representation
of the behaviors from the BLTM can be modified to current conditions, for
example compensating for tiredness or high wind. In a neurological model,
some of these representations might overlap each other in the same organs,
for example in different networks within the neocortex or the cerebellum.
The behaviors of course contain both perception and action, though notice
the bidirectional arrows indicating expectation setting for perception [see e.g.
Jepson et al., 1996, Hinton and Ghahramani, 1997].
The full path for expressed action is shown in Figure 11.3(c). This takes
into account both standard action selection and environment monitoring. Here,
with the learning arcs removed, we can see recommendations flowing from
the behavior system to action selection (AS). Action selection also takes into
account timing provided by a time accumulator (TA, see below) and recent
action selections (decisions) stored in episodic short term memory (ESTM).
Expressed action takes into account current perceptual information in PSTM
as well as the current modulated version of the behaviors in WM.
I have also provided a separate path for basic perceptual reflexes such as
alarm at loud noises or sudden visual looming. The module for recognizing
these effects is labeled SP for Special Perception. In nature this system con-
sists of subcortical perception systems like the superior and inferior colliculi,
but also has connections to the cortical system, so that reflexive fear responses
can be developed for complex stimuli. However, is probably important to iso-
late the fundamental system from possible modification by the skill module
learning system.
To make action selection adaptive (Figure 11.3(d)) we provide first a
time accumulator (TA) as proposed by Po¨ppel [1994] and Henson [1996]
and episodic short term memory (ESTM) as postulated by a large number
of researchers (see [McClelland et al., 1995] for experiments and review.)
Episodic long term memory (ELTM) is included for good measure — as con-
solidated experience, it might also represent other forms of semantic memory,
or it might actually be homologous with BLTM.
Finally, in keeping with [Teyler and Discenna, 1986, McClelland et al.,
1995], this model assumes that many of the modules make reference to the
state of other modules rather than maintaining complete descriptions them-
selves. This is considered an important attribute of any system which needs
to hold a large number of things which are learned very quickly, because
it allows for a relatively small amount of state. Such reference is consid-
ered important in computer science as a means to reduce the probability of
conflicting data sets, and is also a likely feature of evolved systems, where
existing organization is often exploited by a variety of means.
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11.6 Future Directions:
From Neuroscience to Agent Architectures
Fortunately, implementing such a complex system is not necessary for most
agent applications. In general, the adaptive needs of the agent can be an-
ticipated in advance by the designer, or discovered and implemented during
the process of developing the agent. We do, however, suspect that some of
the systems being discovered and explored in neuroscience may soon become
standard functional modules in agent architectures, in the same way that ac-
tion selection and alarm systems are now.
One of the capacities often ascribed to the hindbrain, that of smoothing
behavior, should probably be given its own functional module. This allows
modules that create motor plans to operate at a relatively coarse granularity.
It also allows for the combination of influences from multiple modules and
the current situation of the agent without complicating those skill modules.
The only current architecture I know of that explicitly has such a unit is Ymir
[Tho´risson, 1999], where the Action Scheduler selects the most efficacious
way to express messages given the agent’s current occupations (see further
Sections 5.5.1 and 12.3.2). This sort of capacity is also present in a number of
new AI graphics packages which allow for the generation of smooth images
from a script of discrete events [Brand et al., 1997, Baumberg and Hogg,
1996]. The fact that such work is not yet the norm in robotics (though see
[Schaal and Atkeson, 1994, Atkeson et al., 1997]) may be partially due to the
fact that a physical agent can take advantage of physics and mechanics to do
much of its smoothing [Bryson and McGonigle, 1998]. As robots attempt
more complex feats such as balancing on two legs, providing for smoothed or
balanced motions may well deserve dedicated modules or models similar to
those cited above.
I also expect that sparsely represented records of episodic events (as in
Section 7.6.3) will become a standard mechanism. Episodic records are use-
ful for complimenting and simplifying reactive plans by recording state about
previous attempts and actions, thus reducing the chance that an agent may
show inappropriate perseveration or redundancy when trying to solve a prob-
lem. Further, as mentioned previously, episodic memory can be a good source
for consolidating semantic information, such as noticing regularities in the en-
vironment or the agent’s own performance [e.g. Smart, 1992]. These records
can in turn be used by specialized learning systems for particular problems,
even if a full-blown skill learning system has not been implemented.
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11.7 Additional Humanoid Subsystems
Many researchers are currently working on emotion modules for complex
agents. Emotions can be used to provide complex reinforcement signals for
learning behavior [e.g. Gadanho, 1999], and to represent motivation level
[e.g. Tu, 1999]. These functional considerations can be addressed from within
BOD (see for example Chapter 10). Explicitly modeling human-like emo-
tions may also be useful from an HCI standpoint [e.g. Breazeal, 2000], or to
provide the agent with model necessary to empathically comprehend human
social interactions [c.f. de Waal, 1996]. I am however skeptical of the need
for or practicality of an independent emotion module for two reasons. First,
there is a great deal of evidence that the basic emotions evolved indepen-
dently at different times in our history. This suggests that a single emotion
module might not be appropriate. Second, emotions are intimately involved
in action selection. In vertebrates, emotions serve as specialized mechanisms
for focusing attention, including by deactivating large sections of the cortex
[Damasio, 1999]. In fact, Damasio [1999] implies that any species-typical
behavior pattern is effectively an emotional response. This suggests that it is
impossible to separate emotions from motivation in action selection. Conse-
quently, I believe emotions are best modeled within the existing BOD frame-
work.
An even more contentious area of research is that of consciousness an
explicit knowledge. None of the models presented in this dissertation make
claims regarding which of their aspects might be conscious, or what of their
information might be explicitly known. This is not due to lack of interest
or capability. Rather, it was simply not necessary feature of these particular
models. Notice also that there is a lack of data: it is often unclear how much
consciousness affects even human action selection [Bechara et al., 1995a,
Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992]. Nevertheless, I can imagine modeling some
of the current, well-specified theories of consciousness [e.g. Norman and
Shallice, 1986, Dennett and Kinsbourne, 1992] using the methodology pre-
sented in this dissertation.
11.8 Conclusions
BOD hypothesizes the following:
1. most of intelligence is broadly modular,
2. arbitrating between modules requires a specialized mechanism for ac-
tion selection,
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3. complex behavior requires hierarchical and sequential structure for ar-
bitration, and
4. switching attention from complex behavior to new salient features or
events also requires a specialized mechanism, operating in parallel.
In this chapter I have shown that these hypotheses are reasonable for nat-
ural as well is artificial intelligence. I have shown some of the relationships
between BOD architectures, ANN research and brain science, and suggested
possible future work in all three areas. I hope that one day there will be as rich
exchange between researchers in complex agent architectures and those in be-
havioral neuroscience as the currently is between ANN and neuroscience.
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Chapter 12
Extending BOD toward
Industrial Applications
12.1 Introduction
Could BOD be used in an industrial setting? I believe so for two reasons.
First, BOD is designed to address the concerns of industrial development
processes. BOD agents are designed to be modular and easy to maintain,
easily decomposed for multi-programmer projects, and easy to integrate. The
behavior structure can incorporate existing packages and solutions; the POSH
control structures are designed to be as intuitive as possible for conventional,
sequential programmers.
The second reason is that I have twice worked with it in industrial or
semi-industrial research settings. Unfortunately, neither of these projects
have reached completion, so I have classified them under ‘future work’. The
first was a blue-sky virtual-reality (VR) research effort for an entertainment
company, which unfortunately was terminated when the company closed its
digital research division. The second was a dialog tutoring agent still un-
der development at the Human Computer Research Centre in Scotland. In
this case I had to leave the project after only a few months, due to personal
obligations.
These two projects may appear similar in that both deal with personified
software agents. In fact, only the VR project involved building personalities
similar to the artificial life projects demonstrated in this dissertation. The di-
alog agent is much more like conventional large-scale AI project. It requires
integrating many disparate technologies into a functioning, coordinated sys-
tem. The VR project also required coordination, but this time primarily be-
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tween disparate teams of designers.
Many other industrial applications have similar needs. For example med-
ical monitoring systems [e.g. Doyle et al., 1999], or intelligent environments
[e.g. Coen, 1997]. Any problem where a system is required to prioritize con-
flicting goals or integrate multiple sources of information can potentially be
viewed as a BOD agent.
The rest of this chapter describes the progress that was made on the two
projects mentioned above. As such, they not only describe some exciting
possibilities for future BOD agents, but also serve as two final examples of
BOD methodology.
12.2 BOD and Tutoring Dialog systems
Dialog systems currently require an enormous amount of engineering, and
typically result in relatively brittle systems. This section reports work ex-
ploring the use of reactive planning in general and BOD in particular for
simplifying dialogue system design.
12.2.1 A BOD Decompositon of a Dialog Project
I will begin by considering as an example the problem of dialog management
in a system such as TRAINS-93 [Allen et al., 1995]. This system was a
major effort in addressing the complete problem of dialog, including having
a system capable of planning and acting as well as discussing its plans and
acquiring its goals verbally. The TRAINS system served as an assistant to
a manager attempting to make deliveries of commodities, such as bananas
and orange juice, to a number of different cities. In addition, various cities
had various important resources, such as trains, cars, processing plants and
raw commodities. These cities were connected by rail, so transport requires
scheduling in both time and space.
To build a dialog system similar to TRAINS-93, we must first list a rough
set of capabilities we expect the agent will have. In this case, we can use the
existing system as a guide, and assume that the agent will eventually need the
same set of speech acts as capabilities. While we are organizing the gross
behavior of the agent, these speech acts will be simple primitives that merely
indicate their place in execution by typing their name. This practice of imple-
menting bare, representative functionality as a part of early design is called
stubbing in OOD. Based roughly on TRAINS speech acts, the initial list of
primitives is the following:
accept or reject a proposal by the dialog partner,
suggest a proposal (e.g. a particular engine or location for
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(if my-turn)
(if request-obligation) (if check-request false) reject
(if request-obligation) (if check-request true) accept
(if inform-obligation) supply-info
(if comprehension-failure) check last-utterance
(if bound-non-requirement)
(if requirement-checked) check-task
check-requirement
(if requirement-not-bound)
pick-unbound-req , suggest-req
(if (no task)) request-task
wait
Table 12.1: In this table, indentation indicates depth in the plan hierarchy.
Notice that the action primitives generally assume deictic reference, where
the perception primitive has set attention to a particular task or requirement.
a particular task),
request information (e.g. a particular of the current plan),
supply-info in response to a request, and
check for agreement on a particular, often necessary
due to misunderstandings.
Working from these primitives, we can construct a high-level plan for
dialog management in just a few lines (see Table 12.1). Here, sensory checks
for context are indicated by parenthesis. The primitive actions listed above
are in bold face.
The highest level concern for this plan is simply whether the agent should
take a turn, or whether it should wait quietly. Once it has decided to take
a turn, the highest priority behavior is to fulfill any discourse obligations,
including the obligation to try to understand the previous statement if it was
not successfully parsed. If there are no existing obligations, the next highest
priority is to resolve any inconsistencies in the agent’s current understanding,
indicated here by having a requirement not entailed by the task bound to some
value. This indicates a need either for clarification of the requirement, or of
the current task.
If there are no such inconsistencies, but there is an outstanding task to
perform, then the next highest priority is to complete the task, which in the
case of TRAINS usually involves assigning a particular resource to a partic-
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ular slot in the problem space. Finally, if there is no task, then this agent,
having no other social or personal goals, will seek to establish a new one.
This simple plan indicates a number of elements of state the agent is re-
quired to keep track of. These elements in turn indicate behaviors the agent
needs to have established. To begin with, the agent needs to know whether it
currently believes it has the turn for speaking. Although that may be a simple
of bit of information, it is dependent on a number of perceptual issues, such
as whether the dialogue partner is actively speaking, and whether the agent
itself has recently completed an utterance, in which case it might expect the
other agent to take some time in processing its information. The agent may
also be capable of being instructed to wait quietly. Further, that waiting might
also be time bounded.
12.2.2 Building a Behavior Library and Drive Structure
To a first approximation, the primitives used in the plan above can be arranged
into behaviors as shown in Figure 12.1.
The constructive planning required by TRAINS-93 can also be replaced
by a fairly short reactive plan (omitted for space) though still supplemented by
an A∗ search algorithm for finding the nearest resources. This suggests that a
reasonable initial drive structure for the TRAINS-like dialog agent might be:x
〈 Priority Releaser ⇒ Action4 (if noise) ⇒ listen
3 (if need-answer) ⇒ think
2 (if my-turn) ⇒ take-turn
1 ) ⇒ wait
〉
(12.1)
This small plan serves as the parallel operating root of the action selec-
tion for the entire dialog agent. The plan that would eventually be derived
from Table 1 would fit under the label take-turn above. The reactive plan for
scheduling, including the call to the search algorithm, would fit under think.
A drive structure like this allows another speaker to interrupt, since listen
has the highest priority. The entire system still relies on the basic behaviors
shown in Figure 1. The act of attempting to take a turn would set the flag for
‘need-answer’ if a problem requiring domain-specific planning has been en-
countered. Solving such a problem should unset the flag, so that turn-taking
might again operate. Notice that the drive structure has no goal, so will never
terminate due to success. Also, the lowest priority element has no precondi-
tion, so the drive might never terminate with failure, unless wait has a timer
and a limit after which wait itself fails.
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Turn
my-turn
wait
²²
Hear
last-utterance
oo
²²Speak
check-request
check-task
check-requirement
reject, accept
supply-info
Listen
request-obligation
inform-obligation
comprehension-failure
oo
Task
bound-non-requirement
requirement-checked
requirement-not-bound
pick-unbound-req
suggest-req, task
OO
Figure 12.1: A first cut at a behavior decomposition for a TRAINS-93 type
dialog agent. Unlike the other behavior diagrams in this dissertation, here the
contents of the behavior are just the names of the primitives that that behavior
will provide. This represents Step 4 of the BOD initial decomposition process
(see Section 8.2.1.) Arrows still vaguely indicate the general information flow
between behaviors.
12.2.3 Scaling the System
The above system obviously hides a great deal of complexity: the problems
of parsing the dialog input and constructing sensible output are completely
untouched. On the other hand, a BOD system is sufficiently modular that
these procedures may be primitives or ‘black boxes,’ since many AI systems
for language parsing and generation have already been constructed.
The above analysis was actually preliminary work for organizing an even
more complex dialog project. The intention would be to use BOD to organize
dialog management for an even more complex system than the one shown
above. The problem domain is tutoring basic electricity and electronics, and
we hope to integrate systems that are capable of a wide range of behaviors for
assisting students. Examples of desired behavior include analyzing incorrect
answers in order to diagnose the learning failure, and providing multi-turn,
Socratic method tutoring to lead the students to correcting their basic mis-
conceptions. To be useful with real students, this system will need to be suf-
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ficiently reactive to allow the student to either solve the problem prematurely,
and also be able to branch into a greater depth of explanation in response to
a query or further errors from the student. The design specifications of this
tutoring system are described further in [Core et al., 2000].
12.2.4 Specialized Learning in a Dialog Agent
BOD is designed to enable learning within a behavior; the rate at which state
varies is one of the chief cues for what state should be clustered into a par-
ticular behavior. Machine learning techniques can be used for constructing
a behavior, or at least part of its state. Another promising research direction
would be to incorporate statistically acquired semantic lexicons [e.g Lowe,
1997] into a dialogue agent. This could quickly broaden the scope of the
agent’s ability to recognize conversational contexts. An agent with this lex-
icon could recognize entire classes of semantically similar sentences for any
one programmed interaction.
Similarly, I would like to incorporate the statistically acquired mecha-
nisms of natural language generation of Knight [Knight and Hatzivassilogon,
1995, Oberlander and Brew, 2000] into a dialog agent. This would allow
varying the generative output of a dialog system to be appropriate for various
audiences simply by training the mechanism on an appropriate corpus.
Ultimately, it would be interesting to attempt to learn dialog patterns di-
rectly from corpora as well. In this case, we could create a ‘learning Eliza’
with only basic turn-taking mechanisms built into the system. The system
might be vacuous [Searle, 1980], but this might not be apparent in gossip-
level conversations.
12.3 BOD and the Integration of AI characters
into
VR Entertainment
The evolutionary utility of play is considered to lie in enabling an individual
to acquire and rehearse complex behaviours, as well as to learn appropriate
situations in which to express them [Bekoff and Byers, 1998, Byrne and Rus-
son, 1998]. This section addresses the problem of incorporating pre-packaged
artificial intelligence into a creative play environment for a child.
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12.3.1 Character Architecture and Constructive Narrative
Much research into agents for entertainment concentrates on the problem of
combining the concept of a script with the notion of autonomous, reactive
characters [Hayes-Roth and van Gent, 1997, Lester and Stone, 1997, Andre´
et al., 1998]. A better approach to constructive narrative eliminates this prob-
lem by changing the top level creative design from a script to a cast of charac-
ters. This simplifies the task of the player by removing the need for character
addition, substitution, alteration, or removal. It has the penalty of removing a
substantial element of narrative structure: a sequential order of events. How-
ever, this problem has already been addressed by the creators of role-playing
and adventure games. Their solution is that plot, if desired, can be advanced
by knowledgeable characters, found objects, and revealed locations. Struc-
ture is produced through the use of geographic space as well as character
personalities. Personality traits such as loyalty, contentment or agoraphobia
can be used to maintain order despite a large cast of autonomous character, by
tying particular characters to particular locations. Developing such characters
requires an agent architecture powerful enough to support this complexity. It
also requires sufficient modularity to allow reasonably quick construction of
behaviour patterns.
Most virtual reality agent architectures are fundamentally behaviour-based,
and at least partially reactive [see Sengers, 1998, for a recent review and cri-
tique]. This is because the reactive, behaviour-based AI revolution of the
late 1980s [Kortenkamp et al., 1998] was primarily the triumph of a design
approach. Behaviour-based AI is simpler to design than a monolithic intel-
ligence system because it allows the decomposition of intelligent behaviour
into easy-to-program modules, with more localised control structures. Speci-
fying that the intelligence should also be reactive removes the complex prob-
lems of learning and constructive planning from the agent. In spite of limiting
the potential complexity of the agent’s capabilities, the behaviour-based ap-
proach has been more successful in achieving interesting, believable charac-
ters than any fully human-specified or fully machine-learned approach simply
because it empowers the human designer.
There are two sets of problems associated with using the established AI
‘complex agent’ architectures. One is getting the correct level of control for
scripted personalities or behaviours. As I argued in Chapter 3, most hybrid
architectures do not seem truly reactive enough to support the abrupt and
frequent changes in context possible in a play scenario. Their ‘reactive’ ele-
ments are constrained to switching in new, complete plans during exceptional
circumstances — for example if a fire alarm has sounded. When working
with children, a more consistent sort of responsiveness is required in order to
respond to unexpected assistance or interruption by the child. These events
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are more likely require movement within the same script than restarting or
changing scripts. On the other hand, more purely reactive architectures make
scripting coherent behaviour very difficult. In other words, constructive play
is another domain that requires agent architectures with BRPs (see Chapter 4).
The other set of problems is associated with the technical difficulties of
controlling a real-time multi-modal VR system. Very few AI architectures
support the millisecond precision and modality coordination necessary for
believable, engaging real-time interactions. These concerns are critical for
all VR, but are particularly apparent when dealing with dialogue and gesture
[Tho´risson, 1998].
12.3.2 Spark of Life
Working with Kris Tho´risson, I developed a solution for these problems,
Spark of Life (SoL). SoL is essentially Ymir [Tho´risson, 1996, 1999] ex-
tended with POSH action selection (see Section 5.5.1 for the details of the
extension).
Ymir is a highly modular, hybrid architecture which combines features
from classical and behaviour-based AI, and provides a system that can simu-
late in great detail the psychosocial dialogue skills of humans. Real-time,
face-to-face dialogue encompasses a broad range of perceptual, cognitive
and action requirements. Ymir addresses these phenomena, including nat-
ural language and multi-modal input and output (facial expression, gesture,
speech, body language), load-balanced handling of time (from short reactive
behaviours like fixation control to the execution of several seconds of multi-
modal actions), and employs a modular approach that enables the creation of
complex, human-like behaviour.
SoL consequently encompasses the following capabilities: multi-modal
perception and action, real-time speech input and output, memory, and plan-
ning. SoL’s modularity combined with robust, simple control makes it ideal
for constructive play by allowing for easy additions and modifications.
12.3.3 Adapting BOD to SoL and Constructive Narratives
The SoL architecture provides the framework for the middle layer of our pro-
posed three-layer design approach. AI facilitates the creation of a socially
engaging world; however such a world also requires careful overall creative
design, and a rich visual and behavioral structure. Because SoL is both be-
haviour based and has POSH action selection, it is an excellent platform for
practicing BOD.
However, BOD has to be adapted somewhat for SoL. This is because
Ymir, like many architectures including PRS and Soar, represents explicit
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knowledge in a single, general purpose knowledge base. Since SoL’s VR
timing skills hinge on particular Ymir’s motor representation, the Motor Lex-
icon, SoL follows Ymir’s representational framework, including knowledge
representation. Modularity in knowledge can still be at least documented, in
both Ymir and SoL, by dividing the knowledge base into a variety of Knowl-
edge Areas. Also the Motor Lexicon has a hierarchical structure which is not
only a form of self-documenting modularity, but can also be quite useful for
incremental development. As the Motor Lexicon is elaborated, new actions
can sometimes be automatically absorbed by the SoL/Ymir Action Sched-
uler, even if they are not specifically referenced in plans. However, the link
between perception and action that is so explicit in standard BOD is no longer
as clear under SoL.
12.3.4 The Responsibilities of AI Developers
Development of a constructive play VR world requires development on three
levels:
1. a high, artistic design level for creating story and characters,
2. a middle, behaviour-based design level for creating personality in char-
acter agents, and
3. a low, VR design level for basic capabilities and appearances.
AI developers should not necessarily be expected to be sufficiently skilled
artists that they can create the plots and characters needed for a fully engag-
ing interactive play experience. AI attracts (and perhaps requires) developers
with a hubristic belief in their own ability to replicate the thinking skills of
others. However, good artists devote years of attention, and often their for-
mal education, to perceiving and constructing the things that make a situation
interesting, æsthetic and fun. The design process above places the AI devel-
oper as an intermediary between the artistic and the engineering aspects of the
project. The AI developer is in the best situation to understand both require-
ments and restrictions of the overall project, and therefore has considerable
responsibility for communication as well as developing solutions.
The AI expert is responsible for taking a set of motivations, goals, knowl-
edge, personality quirks and skills, and creating an agent that will behave co-
herently according to these. In a rich virtual environment designed for free,
creative play an autonomous character should be able to prioritise its goals
and display its intentions. It should exhibit both persistence and resolution
while at the same time being aware and opportunistic. In short, it should have
a recognisable personality. Developing the initial set of character attributes,
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however, is not necessarily solely the task of the agent expert. It is necessarily
the task of one or more creative artists. The artist’s responsibility is to pro-
vide well formed and interesting characters, skills and situations, to design
potential plots and plot twists. This is level 1 of the design process model. In
this, as in most industrial design, it will be best if the artists work in a team
with the agent developers, who can help the artists understand the limits of
the agent’s behavioral and expressive capabilities.
The agent developers are themselves constrained by the particular plat-
form on which the artificial agent is to be implemented. In robotics these
constraints come from the robot’s hardware; in virtual worlds they come from
the graphics environment in which the agent will be embodied. Creating this
platform is level 3 of our design process. It is the responsibility of the AI
developer to provide requirements for, and understand the constraints of, the
underlying platform. Again, the character personality developer may or may
not be the correct person to develop the agent’s behavioral platform, depend-
ing on whether the platform in this context also provides the basic behaviours,
or behaviour primitives, for the agents.
Drawing a line between levels 2 and 3 can be difficult. For example,
it may make sense to put collision detection or motor smoothing into the
‘world’ (i.e. the graphics environment itself), either for more efficient perfor-
mance of the system or for cleaner implementation and easier debugging. In
nature, vertebrates have dedicated systems for providing such smoothing in
their hindbrain [Carlson, 2000], as well as being able to rely on physics for
smoothness and consistency. In a simulated world the division between an
agent’s own perception and the world itself may not be well defined. Imple-
mentations in level 3 can become a point of contention because on either side
of the fence between graphics and AI, very different skill sets have been de-
veloped, and people working on each side may prefer very different solutions
to the problems at hand.
Grossly, the levels of our design process model correspond to the differ-
ent sides of SoL. The interface between levels 1 and 2 leads to specifications
of personalities and drives, and the interface between levels 2 and 3 lead to
the implementation of the behaviours. But as is emphasised under BOD, the
design process has to happen iteratively. Many forms of technical constraint
might only be recognised after development has begun. Further, as the sys-
tem develops, it can provide considerable creative inspiration to the designers.
Even more importantly, early users, particularly those coming from outside
the project, will discover both shortcomings and unforeseen creative potential
in the system. All of these sources of information should lead to periods of
redesign and renegotiation between the various levels of the project. Further,
personality may be demonstrated in subtle motions best provided in the be-
havioral level, or complex behaviour may require or suggest changes to the
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plans and drives. Thus all three levels of the design process must be available
for cyclic development and reanalysis. The AI programmers working pri-
marily at level 2 cannot be abandoned to try to satisfy potentially impossible
constraints coming from isolated processes on either side of the project.
12.4 Case Study: Creating Characters for an Ad-
venture Narrative
The design process described above was developed as part of a research ef-
fort at LEGO to create an interactive virtual reality entertainment package
that allows children to engage in creative and constructive play within an es-
tablished action/adventure framework. The project illustrates the design prin-
ciples above, and gives indication of the efforts and difficulties involved. I
will refer to the AI portion of this large-scale, multi-faceted research effort as
the “castle character project”. This effort included a detailed, relatively large
virtual world with a castle situated on rolling hills, surrounded by a mountain
range. A full moon hangs in the sky; the sun just under the horizon. Users
can enter the world either through a desktop, or as fully embodied virtual
(humanoid) LEGO characters with full body tracking and immersive glasses
with displays.
12.4.1 High Level Design
In the case of the castle character project, much of the character content was
predetermined, as it was a virtual version of an active product. The general
appearance of the characters, an outline of their personalities, as well as their
world, had been developed as a part of the marketing, but no stories had been
created. The domain was a magic castle, inhabited by an evil knight and var-
ious magical entities. Much of the larger VR research effort was dedicated to
ensuring that simply exploring the space would be intrinsically rewarding, but
it was the introduction of moving characters that made the virtual experience
become alive and magical. For example, there is a SoL character named Puff.
Puff is a talking, flying green LEGO dragon. Puff can discuss the castle, or
be encouraged to demonstrate his flying ability.
The first step toward creating an interesting narrative for a set of charac-
ters is to understand the constraints of the task and the system. One set of
constraints comes from the character’s environment, e.g. the size and fea-
tures of open spaces: The castle world, though complex and interesting, is
not very large relative to the size of the characters, so this constrains the char-
acters motions inside the castle. This can be compensated by setting the most
gross motion (such as large-character flying and sword fights) to the space
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Figure 12.2: Still from the castle project, a real-time interactive virtual reality
environment. Image c©1998 The LEGO Group
surrounding the castle. Another set of constraints are those dependent on the
expected users of the system. Because expected users were young, na¨ive to
virtual worlds and, perhaps most importantly, only exposed to the system for
a few minutes total, we considered it essential to make the characters interest-
ing whether or not the user deliberately attempted to interact with them. The
solution was to make the characters interact with each other as well. They
were also designed to react to the visitor in their domain in a way that en-
couraged exploration, but not to be too forceful or too intrusive on the user’s
experience. To maintain interest, the characters should act and interact in
such a way that they generate continuous change. There should be no steady
state that the system of characters can reach if the user is being passive.
The constraints of the virtual environment and the pre-existing product
meant that most of this change had to take the form of arrivals and departures,
as well as a few gross gestures. This effect was achieved by designing charac-
ters with various incompatible goals. For example, a witch could frequently
fly around the castle in a quest for intruders. When she found the intruder
she would do little other than land nearby, slightly approach the stranger and
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cackle. However, her presence might attract other characters, some of whom
might in turn repulse her (she was designed to fear flying bats). Having char-
acters that are attracted by some situations, yet repulsed by either crowds or
other characters, can help maintain the amount of free space needed for char-
acter motion. In addition, it limits the number of simultaneous interactions,
and therefore the amount of confusion. This allows the designers to quickly
focus the interest for the short-term visitor.
Notice that stateless ‘reactive’ social behaviours such as flocking [e.g
Reynolds, 1987, Mataric´, 1992] will not be sufficient — the characters here
are doing more than being repulsed, attracted and avoiding obstacles. They
are displaying personalities. A visitor can learn individual character’s traits,
and then manipulate these deliberately. Exploring the personality space of the
characters in the world becomes part of the puzzle, and part of the fun.
12.4.2 Encoding Personality
After creating a rough description of the desired world, the next task is to
develop a first-cut description of the reactive plans which will encode each
character’s personality. Starting from the descriptions of the characters set
by the marketing department of the product, and keeping in mind the con-
straints determined in evaluating the task, each character was described in
terms of three to five goals or drives. Further, the behaviour associated with
achievement of these goals was visually described. This work was done by
a team of in-house artists and external creative consultants, with the AI team
participating both creatively and as technically informed resources.
Once the personality of the characters has been sketched, the next steps
were as follows:
• Prioritising goals or gross behaviours and determining their necessary
preconditions. For example, the witch described above has a goal of
patrolling the castle from the air. This has a fairly high priority, but
the motivation should be reduced by the performance of the act, so that
in general she circles the castle only three times. She has a priority of
landing in a room in which she has seen an intruder, once she no longer
desires to fly. She also avoids bats.
• Determining necessary behaviour primitives and behaviour states. For
example, the witch has to remember if she saw an intruder on her pa-
trol. A bat might approach an intruder closer and closer over successive
swoops. A state within the bat’s swooping behaviour enables it to keep
track of its current level of ‘boldness,’ which in turn determines its
trajectory. Some characters can be made into friends by playing with
them. These would have to remember how friendly they feel towards a
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particular person. Seeing the user, avoiding the walls of the castle, fly-
ing and landing are behaviour primitives required by all of these agents.
• Developing and testing the behaviour libraries and the scripts.
The architectural and methodological support we developed for this level
has already been discussed.
12.4.3 Developing Perception and Action Primitives
In developing behaviour libraries, the task of the personality designer con-
nects to the task of environment’s architects. For the castle character project,
some of the potential difficulties of this relationship were overlooked, and
caused some of the greatest difficulties of the AI effort.
There are several possible approaches for building the basic movement
primitives. One straightforward approach would be for the character devel-
opers to program the behaviours from scratch using models prepared by the
graphic artists. There is a general problem for this approach: As mentioned
earlier, AI programmers are not necessarily artists or students of natural mo-
tion. Animals have evolved complex motion behaviours, constrained by phys-
ical forces and structures not normally modelled on an artifact, particularly
one designed to run in real time, so difficult to take into account. Animals
are also constrained by habits of behaviour, whether general to a species or
specific to an individual. Even if æsthetic motion primitives are achieved by
an AI programmer, the process of programming them is likely to have been
very time-consuming. Nevertheless, this was the main source of behaviors
for the one SoL character — Puff, the flying and talking dragon.
Another potential source of behaviour primitives explored on the castle
character project were the efforts of a team of animators already working
on the project. The idea was to segment animations into sets of behaviours
suitable as exemplars of various behaviour primitives. A continuous variety
of behaviour could be derived from combining and connecting fixed sets of
canned behaviours. Unfortunately, animations also proved slow and difficult
to develop. More importantly, the format the animations were produced in
was determined to be incompatible with the primary real-time virtual reality
environment.
We also explored an intermediate solution: a purpose built animation tool
for ‘quick and dirty’ animation segments stored in an appropriate format for
the main VR engine. This technique was used for creating some of the most
life-like motion on the castle, a guard that responded to an approaching cam-
era / observer by turning and facing it. The intelligence behind this character
was purely reactive, and did not use SoL, but it did show the promise of this
technique. Motion capture of humans participating as puppeteers was the
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final source of ‘intelligence’ explored in the project. This could also have
potentially served as a source of primitives for AI, but this alternative was not
explored due to lack of time.
12.5 Conclusions
In the introduction to this dissertation (Chapter 1), I quoted part of the fol-
lowing:
The distinctive concerns of software engineering are today [1995]
exactly those set forth in Chapter 1 [of the original 1975 version
of The Mythical Man Month]:
• How to design and build a set of programs into a system
• How to design and build a program or a system into a ro-
bust, tested, documented, supported product
• How to maintain intellectual control over complexity in large
doses.
. . . This complex craft will demand our continual development
of the discipline, our learning to compose in larger units, our
best use of new tools, our best adaptation of proven engineering
management methods, liberal application of common sense, and
a God-given humility to recognize our fallibility and limitations.
[Brooks, 1995, pp. 288–289]
BOD has been developed with these issues very much in mind. Most of
this chapter has been a description of how to integrate BOD into two real-
world, industrial projects. Both of these might be thought of as ‘character
based’, though the tutor being built at Edinburgh has no conventional per-
sonality. However, any application that involves juggling priorities, chosing
between possible actions, and / or regulating and interpreting multiple envi-
ronments or contexts in parallel might profit from BOD design.
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Chapter 13
Conclusions
In this dissertation I have presented Behavior-Oriented Design (BOD), a method-
ology for creating complex adaptive agents capable of addressing multiple,
conflicting goals. BOD consists of an architecture and a design process. The
architecture is modular; specialized representations are associated directly
with code for acting and sensing. The specialized representations facilitate
learning, the modularity facilitates design. Potential conflicts between the
modules are resolved using reactive plans. The details of this reactive plan-
ning system are among the contributions of this dissertation, as is the litera-
ture research supporting the approach, and the experimental research demon-
strating it.
The literature research is primarily presented in Chapters 3 (for artificial
intelligence) and 11 (for natural intelligence). The experiments are primarily
presented in Chapters 7 (simulated blocks world and real mobile robots), 9
(primate learning of transitive inference) and 10 (social behavior in primates).
There are also references to working BOD systems not fully presented here
in Chapters 4 and 12.
For more complete listings of contributions and chapters, please see Chap-
ter 1. This last chapter concentrates on restating the most important lessons
of this dissertation.
13.1 Design is Key to the Success of ‘New AI’
One of the most important aspects of the reactive revolution of the late 1980’s
is often overlooked. The break-throughs in robotics associated with reactive
and behavior-based systems are usually attributed to the loss of deliberate
planning and/or explicit representations. The real contribution of the reactive
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paradigm was explained nearly a decade earlier: you can’t learn something
you don’t practically already know [Winston, 1975], nor, by extension, plan
something you can’t nearly already do. The reason is simple combinatorics
[Chapman, 1987, Wolpert, 1996b, McGonigle and Chalmers, 1998]. As evo-
lutionary linguists and case-based reasoning researchers often try to tell us,
what makes humans seem so much more intelligent that the other apes is
not just our creative ability to plan, but our excellent methods of storing and
transmitting solutions we manage to find [e.g. Hammond, 1990, Knight et al.,
2000].
Reactive and behavior-based AI thus facilitate the advance of AI in two
ways. First, by severely deprecating both planning and state (and conse-
quently learning), the reactive approach increased by default the emphasis
on one of the largest problems of AI and software in general: design. Sec-
ond, the behavior-based approach made fashionable a proven software design
methodology: modularity.
Yet the importance of human design for reactive systems still seems to
be under-recognized. This is despite the extensive mention of design in the
descriptions of the best known early architectures [e.g. Brooks, 1991b, Maes,
1990b]. Further, users tend to design agents by hand even for architectures
like PRS [Georgeff and Lansky, 1987], which are intended to exploit produc-
tive planners, or like Soar [Newell, 1990], which are intended to learn.
Besides emphasizing the use of modularity, the behavior-based movement
also made an important engineering contribution by emphasizing specialized
learning [e.g Brooks, 1991b, pp. 158–9]. Specializing learning increases its
probability of success, thus increasing its utility in a reliable agent. Simi-
larly, modularity simplifies program design, at least locally, thus increasing
the probability of correctness.
13.2 Learning is Important, but Not Sufficient
As the BOD emphasis on adaptive state and perception indicates, learning (or
at least adaptation at many different time scales) is absolutely critical for an
intelligent agent. However, a learning system alone is not enough to achieve
AI. Even children, who are highly-honed learning machines, take years to
acquire useful behaviors to any degree of proficiency. Consequently, even if
building a child were within the ability of science and technology, any artifi-
cial system with a limited market window is best instilled from the beginning
with as much knowledge as its designers can impart. Learning is necessary
for giving an agent information its designer can’t know in advance, such as
the layout of its owner’s home. It is also useful when it can save the designer
development time. But the process of making learning work is a design pro-
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cess. Thus, even in learning systems, design is critical.
13.3 BOD Makes New AI Better
Behavior-oriented design maximizes the benefits of behavior-based AI by
reemphasizing both the design process and modularity. BOD addresses the
difficulties inherent in arbitrating between or coordinating behaviors using
another specialized representation: POSH reactive plans. The critical aspects
of POSH action selection are these:
• it supports basic reactive plans (BRPs), which allow for flexible though
focussed action selection
• it limits stack growth and allows cycles in its hierarchy,
• it supports pseudo-parallelism and the changing of attention to higher
priorities, and
• it restarts a plan hierarchy from its root if it terminates.
In BOD, POSH action selection provides all these features without eliminat-
ing either the autonomy or heterogeneity of the underlying behaviors. POSH
plans communicate to the behaviors by an interface supported by the behav-
iors.
BOD leverages many of the design contributions of one of the most sig-
nificant improvements in software engineering of the last 20 years: object-
oriented design (OOD). For example, BOD addresses the BBAI issue of be-
havior decomposition (and the analogous issue of agent decomposition facing
the MAS community) using the rule-of-thumb for object decomposition de-
veloped in the OOD community. Behavior decomposition can be determined
by the adaptive requirements of the various primitive actions. BOD also heav-
ily emphasizes iterative design.
The fact that BOD exploits OOD not only implies that libraries of behav-
iors can be easily and cleanly developed in any object-oriented language, but
also that, in the future, BOD can continue absorbing the advances of the OOD
community.
13.4 BOD Doesn’t Require Changing Architec-
tures
I have demonstrated that BOD can be used to greater or lesser extent with
existing agent architectures. This means that BOD can improve existing
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projects, or new projects, that for whatever reason are implemented in other
agent architectures or simply in object-oriented languages. So long as there
is a neat way to express the critical idioms of action sequences and basic
reactive plans, and so long as learning and behavior can be at least partly
modularized, BOD can help keep agents simple and successful.
To get maximum benefit from the BOD development process, three con-
ditions need to be met by the underlying architecture.
First, there needs to be reactive action selection capable of supporting
three kinds of situations:
1. things that need to be checked all the time,
2. things that only need to be considered in particular contexts, and
3. things that reliably follow one from another.
POSH action selection supports these situations with drive collections, com-
petences and action patterns, respectively.
Second, there should be ways to modularize the project’s code and data,
preferably with specialized representations for particular learning tasks. Fur-
ther, there should be a way of tagging or grouping associated primitive actions
and the data that supports them.
Finally, there should be enough structure to the development process that
the designer or design team can come together regularly and reevaluate the
current structure of the agent. This provides the opportunity for reexpressing
the agent in a clearer way. Regular housekeeping is the only way to keep a
project clean and coherent.
13.5 The Future
As I said in Chapter 1, my main motivation for conducting this research
has been to create a platform on which I can build psychologically plausi-
ble agents and models. The motivation for me is building and exploring the
agents and models themselves; BOD is just a necessary step in that process.
I have no doubt that in the future both I and other people in the agent com-
munity will discover methodological insights that can significantly improve
the current BOD process. I have already suggested (in Chapter 11) some ad-
ditional mechanisms that may compliment its architecture. I hope that, as a
community, we will be able to share these insights and improve our field.
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Appendix A
The Code Appendixes
The original dissertation included three code appendixes which took over
100 pages. These have been deleted from the technical report to save pa-
per. However, both the appendixes and the actual code are available on line.
Look for my web page either from
http://www.ai.mit.edu/contact/people/alumni.shtml
or by searching for “Joanna Bryson” and “Intelligence By Design”.
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